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JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
The State appeals from the order finding Debra Brown factually innocent of the 
crime of aggravated murder under Part 4 of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. Ms. 
Brown cross-appeals from the order granting summary judgment in favor of the State on 
her claims under Part 1 of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(i) and (]) (2009). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The State's Appeal 
The factual innocence statute requires the trial court to vacate a conviction if the 
court, after considering "all the evidence, determines by clear and convincing evidence 
that the petitioner" is factually innocent. Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-404(4). The statute 
does not require that newly discovered evidence be the sole evidentiary basis for a 
finding of factual innocence, nor does it require, as the State argues, that newly 
discovered evidence be the "pivotal, transformative" evidence on which the court's 
innocence determination is based. Instead, section 78B-9-404(4) unambiguously 
instructs the trial court to vacate the conviction if, after considering "all the evidence," 
the trial court concludes that the petitioner is factually innocent. 
1. Does the factual innocence statute permit the trial court to base its 
innocence determination either upon newly discovered evidence alone or upon a 
14697714 
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combination of evidence, so as long as the newly discovered evidence provides at least 
part of that basis? 
Standard of review: The trial court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for 
correctness. H.U.F. v. W.P.W., 203 P.3d 943, 949 (Utah 2009). 
2. Did the trial court commit clear error in finding Debra Brown innocent? 
Standard of review: The trial court's factual finding of Ms. Brown's innocence 
cannot be set aside unless it was "clearly erroneous." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 
(Utah 1987). The trial court's innocence finding is clearly erroneous only if it is against 
the clear weight of the evidence, or if this Court reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake was made. Id. 
Ms. Brown's Cross-Appeal 
1. Did the trial court err in granting the State's motion for partial summary 
judgment on each of Ms. Brown's claims under Part 1 of the Post-Conviction Relief Act 
(the "PCRA")? 
Preservation: Ms. Brown preserved this issue at PCR.001256-1309, by opposing
 { 
the State's motion for summary judgment and at PCR.001852, by moving the Court to 
reconsider its order. 
i 
Standard of review: This Court reviews a "grant of summary judgment for 
correctness," affording no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 258 P.3d 539 (Utah 2011). i 
14697714 
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2. Did the trial court err in holding that the PCRA's statute of limitations 
complied with the Utah Constitution's open courts provision in Article I, section 11? 
Preservation: Ms. Brown raised this issue in its memorandum in opposition to the 
State's motion for summary judgment and at oral argument on the State's motion for 
summary judgment. PCR.001303-001308 and PCR.002252:64-70. 
Standard of review: The district court's ruling regarding a statute's 
constitutionality is reviewed for correctness. State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30 (Utah 
2011). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The Utah Factual Innocence Statute, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-401 to 405 (2010), 
attached as Addendum A to State's Brief. 
The Utah Post Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78B-9-101 to 110 
(current version), attached as Addendum C to State's Brief. 
Addendum A - Proposed Version of House Bill 307, 2012 General Session 
Addendum B - House Bill 307, 2012 General Session. 
Addendum C - Utah Constitution, article I, section 11. 
Addendum D - Trial Court's May 2, 2011 Memorandum Decision Re: Post-
Conviction of Factual Innocence 
Addendum E - Trial Court's December 21, 2010 Memorandum Decision Re: 
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
14697714 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
At issue in this case is Debra Brown's innocence for a murder of which she was 
convicted in 1995, and for which she spent more than 16 years in prison. On May 2, 
2011, the trial court issued a memorandum decision in which it determined by clear and 
convincing evidence that Ms. Brown was innocent and ordered her release from prison. 
PCR.002095-002141. 
This appeal concerns two separate orders: (1) the trial court's order granting Ms. 
Brown's claim of factual innocence (the "Innocence Claim") and (2) the trial court's 
order granting the State's motion for summary judgment on Ms. Brown's claims under 
Part 1 of the PCRA (the "PCRA Claims"). With respect to the Innocence Claim, the 
i 
State's appeal asks whether the trial court erred in concluding that it should consider all 
the evidence, both newly discovered and previously available, in determining Ms. 
Brown's innocence. Alternatively, the State's appeal asks whether it was clearly
 { 
erroneous for the trial court to conclude, based on all the evidence, that she was factually 
innocent. 
• { 
With respect to the PCRA Claims, Ms. Brown's cross-appeal asks whether the 
trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that all of the PCRA Claims were time-
barred. In addition, the cross-appeal asks the Court to hold the PCRA's statute of ^ 
14697714 
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limitations unconstitutional under the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution 
because it does not allow an exception for the interests of justice. 
2. Course of Proceedings 
Ms. Brown was convicted of aggravated murder on October 18, 1995 and 
sentenced to life in prison. She appealed her conviction, and on October 24, 1997, this 
Court affirmed her conviction. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997). On March 4, 
2009, Ms. Brown filed a petition for post-conviction relief under Part 1 and Part 4 of the 
PCRA. PCR.OOOOOl.1 The State filed two separate motions asking the Court to dismiss 
Ms. Brown's claims. PCR.000278, 000298. The trial court denied the State's motions 
and held that a "bona fide issue [exists] as to whether Petitioner is factually innocent." 
PCR.000460-470. 
After discovery, the State moved for summary judgment on the PCRA Claims, 
arguing they were filed untimely. PCR.001191.2 Ms. Brown opposed the motion, 
arguing that her claims were timely, and alternatively, that the statute of limitations was 
unconstitutional because it did not contain an interests of justice exception. PCR.001256. 
On December 21, 2010, the trial court granted the State's summary judgment motion. 
PCR.001807. Ms. Brown then moved the court to reconsider its order granting summary 
judgment on Ms. Brown's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. PCR.001852. The 
1
 Ms. Brown adopts the State's method of citing to the post conviction record as the PCR and the 
trial record as the TR. 
The factual innocence statute has no statute of limitations, and the State did not move for 
summary judgment on the Innocence Claim. 
14697714 
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trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. PCR.002056. Ms. Brown timely 
appealed the Court's summary judgment order. 
On January 18-24, 2011 and March 7, 2011, the trial court held an evidentiary 
hearing on the Innocence Claim. On May 2, 2011, the trial court issued its memorandum 
decision holding that Ms. Brown was factually innocent and vacating her conviction. 
PCR.002095. 
3. Statement of Facts 
The Murder of Lael Brown 
Debra Brown met Lael Brown, who was no relation to her, in Logan in the mid-
1980s. PCR.002257:69. In 1993, Ms. Brown was in her mid-thirties and a single mother 
of three children. Id. at 68. She had worked for Lael Brown on and off for 10 years, 
during which time they became close friends and socialized regularly. Id. at 68-70. 
On Friday afternoon, November 5, 1993, Lael Brown and Ms. Brown went 
together to Freeman's Cafe in Logan for pie and coffee, as they often did. Id. at 78. Lael 
Brown was not feeling well and decided to forego his usual piece of pie and had just a 
cup of coffee. Id. After coffee, Ms. Brown went home, cleaned up, and picked up her 
boyfriend Brent Skabelund for a date. TR.617. After an evening out with Mr. 
Skabelund, Ms. Brown spent the night at his house. TR.619-620. She woke between 
6:00 and 7:00 a.m. and returned home. PCR.002257:81; TR.621-622. She planned to 
make soup for Lael Brown and her daughter, Alana, who also was sick, and she wanted 
14697714 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to do so before her son's basketball game later that morning. PCR.002257:81-82. After 
arriving home from Mr. Skabeland's house, she bathed, dressed, and went to the grocery 
store to buy ingredients. PCR.002257 at 81. 
Ms. Brown's son, Ryan, woke up and saw his mother making soup. TR.905. 
Around 10:30 a.m., Mr. Skabelund arrived at Ms. Brown's house and accompanied her to 
her son's basketball game at a high school in Cache County. TR.627-630. After the 
game, Ms. Brown returned home, and soon after, Mr. Skabelund left for his house. 
TR.633. After Skabelund left, Ms. Brown finished making soup and delivered a pot of 
the soup to Lael Brown's house. PCR.002257:84. She placed the pot of soup on his 
doorstep along with a handwritten note. Id. at 85. 
Mr. Skabelund called Ms. Brown around 4:30 p.m. and invited her to go shopping. 
TR.634. He picked up Ms. Brown, and they went to the grocery store for about an hour. 
TR.634-635. They returned to Ms. Brown's home and had dinner. TR.635. Skabelund 
and Ms. Brown then went to Skabelund's home. TR.636. While watching a movie on 
television, Ms. Brown fell asleep. TR.637. She woke up around midnight and drove 
home. TR.637. Her sons, Ryan and Josh, were home and still awake when she arrived 
shortly after midnight. TR.913-914; PCR.002257:88. She did not leave home again until 
the next morning, Sunday, when she drove to Angie's Cafe to have coffee with Lael 
Brown, as was her normal routine. PCR.002257:88. 
14697714 
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As Ms. Brown pulled into the parking lot at Angie's, she noticed that Lael 
Brown's vehicle was not there, so she drove to his house to check on him. Id. at 89. Ms. 
Brown noticed that the soup was still on his porch. Id. When she knocked and got no 
answer, she used a key Lael Brown had previously given her to enter the house. Id. 
After calling for him and not hearing a response, she went into the bedroom and saw him 
lying in his bed, dead and covered in blood. Id. at 90. She screamed, ran out of the 
house, called 911, and sat on the front porch waiting for help. Id- at 90-91. 
On September 9, 1994, ten months after the murder, police arrested Ms. Brown 
and charged her with Lael Brown's murder. Ms. Brown maintained her innocence from 
the day the police first focused its investigation on her through her trial, conviction, and 
more than 16 years of incarceration. 
The Criminal Trial 
At her trial in 1995, the prosecution presented no physical evidence linking Ms. 
Brown to the murder. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. The medical examiner and police 
agreed that the murderer would have been covered in Lael Brown's blood. TR.1501; 
PCR.002255:173. Indeed, a bloody handprint was found on the front door. TR.1499-
1500. Nevertheless, they found no murder weapon or stolen property, and no blood or 
other physical evidence linking Ms. Brown to the murder, although the police searched 
Ms. Brown's person, purse, truck, and home on the day Lael Brown's body was found. 
TR.1356-1357, 1509; State v. Brown, 948 P.2d at 339. 
14697714 
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The State instead based its case entirely on circumstantial evidence. State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d at 343. The State argued that Ms. Brown was motivated to murder Lael 
Brown because Lael Brown discovered that Ms. Brown had forged his checks, and he 
was likely to call the authorities. TR. 1565-1567. In support of this motive theory, the 
State presented evidence that Ms. Brown forged about $3,000 in checks on Mr. Brown's 
bank account. TR.791-99, 852-63, 882. The State called Lael Brown's former wife and 
son to testify that the only bank statement missing from Lael Brown's financial records 
was the bank statement that contained the cancelled, forged checks. TR.748. The State 
also presented testimony from bank and postal employees that the incriminating bank 
statement would likely have arrived on Friday, November 5, with the implication that 
Lael Brown confronted Ms. Brown with the evidence, and that this confrontation led to 
the murder. TR.764-775. 
The State also presented evidence concerning Ms. Brown's access to Lael 
Brown's house. Police testified that Lael's front door was always locked and that the 
back door was secure. TR. 87, 686, 1336. A police officer testified that Lael Brown's 
windows were painted shut and looked like they had not been opened in years. TR.1336. 
The State presented testimony that there were only two keys to Lael Brown's home -
Lael Brown had one, and Ms. Brown had the other. TR.734. Accordingly, the State 
argued, because there were no signs of forced entry, the murderer must have entered with 
14697714 
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a key, and because Ms. Brown had the only other key, she must have been the murderer. 
TR. 1567-1568. 
The lynchpin of the State's case, however, was its circumstantial evidence on the 
time of Lael Brown's death. The State argued that Lael Brown was killed around 7:00 
a.m. on Saturday, November 6, 1993, which was the only time during the weekend for 
which Ms. Brown did not have a corroborated alibi. The State called Ms. Paulette 
Nyman, a neighbor, who testified that she heard gun shots at about 7:00 a.m. on Saturday. 
TR.581-582 (72-73) . The State also called the State Medical Examiner, who agreed that 
the murder could have occurred any time between when Lael was last seen alive (Friday 
evening) and Sunday morning. TR.1480. The State argued that the murder must have 
occurred Saturday morning because no one saw Lael Brown "going around, doing 
things" at any point on Saturday. TR.1569. Another of Lael Brown's neighbors testified 
that she was outside working from 10:00 to 4:30, that she could hear the phone ring in 
Lael Brown's house, but that she never heard gun shots at any point in that time period. 
TR.596-597, 613 (87,88,104). The State argued that since Ms. Brown could not establish 
her alibi at the time that Lael Brown was supposedly murdered, and since she had the 
motive and opportunity to commit the murder, she must be guilty. TR. 1568-1569. 
The jury convicted Ms. Brown based on the foregoing circumstantial evidence. 
Ms. Brown appealed, arguing that the circumstantial case against her was insufficient. 
3
 Certain pages of volume three of the criminal trial transcript were paginated incorrectly. Accordingly, 
the number in the parentheses refer to the transcript pagination found in the upper right corner of the 
volume three transcript. 
14697714 
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This Court affirmed the judgment based on the jury's verdict. It held that circumstantial 
evidence supported the following factual conclusions: 
• Lael Brown's residence was intact, without signs of forced entry. The 
murderer must have gained access by using a key or after Lael Brown 
himself opened the door. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d at 344. Debra Brown 
was the only person besides Lael Brown who had a key. Id. at345 
• The items stolen were Lael Brown's wallet, his gun, and the October 1993 
bank statement containing the cancelled, forged checks. Debra Brown, 
"because of the forgeries, had a personal interest in obtaining those 
canceled checks." Id. 
• Based on testimony from the medical examiner and Paulette Nyman, Lael 
Brown was shot at 7:00 a.m. Id. 
• Ms. Brown accounted for her whereabouts for the entire weekend except 
the hours between 6:40 a.m. and 10 a.m. on Saturday, November 6, the 
time of the murder. Id. 
The Factual Innocence Hearing 
Ms. Brown filed her petition for post-conviction relief on March 4, 2009, after a 
lengthy investigation. Following more than a year of formal discovery and motion 
practice, Debra Brown presented her case to the trial court in early 2011. At the 2011 
evidentiary hearing, Ms. Brown proved two general propositions. First, she proved that 
the circumstantial case against her was completely false. In other words, she disproved 
each of the circumstantial facts outlined above on the basis of which this Court upheld 
the conviction. Second, Ms. Brown proved that she could not have murdered Lael Brown 
and was innocent. Following is a summary of the evidence she presented on both of 
these propositions. 
14697714 
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Time of Death 
As noted above, the prosecution presented evidence at the 1995 trial that Lael 
Brown was killed between 6:40 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. on Saturday, November 6, 1993. 
This is the only window of time during the weekend for which Debra Brown could not 
prove her whereabouts. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d at 344 (the defense "established the 
whereabouts of Debra Brown for the remaining period when the murder could have 
occurred"). The evidence Ms. Brown presented at the 2011 evidentiary hearing, 
however, proved that Lael Brown could not have been murdered on Saturday morning, 
but must have been murdered much later, at a time when Ms. Brown had a proven alibi. 
In the 1995 trial, the only direct evidence the State presented that Lael Brown was 
killed on Saturday morning was the testimony of Paulette Nyman, the neighbor who said 
she heard shots at that time. In the 2011 evidentiary hearing, however, Ms. Nyman 
recanted her previous testimony and said that she heard shots on the day on which she 
saw the police activity at Lael Brown's house, in other words, Sunday, November 7: 
Q: If [the police officers] were active investigating the crime on Sunday, 
November 7, 1993, that would have been the same day you heard the shots 
in your bathtub; is that right? 
A: Yes. 
PCR.002256:196. The testimony of Paulette Nyman was unquestionably newly 
discovered evidence. Also at the 2011 evidentiary hearing, the State Medical Examiner 
testified that the physical evidence of Lael Brown's body led him to conclude that Lael 
Brown was killed after 9:00 p.m. on Saturday night. PCR.002256:55. Dr. Grey testified: 
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Q: But was there anything that, any physical evidence that you saw that 
persuaded you that your estimate of 36 hours prior to the time of your 
* autopsy4 was incorrect? 
A: No. 
PCR.002256:57. Indeed, Dr. Grey completely discredited the State's theory that Lael 
Brown was murdered Saturday morning. The State's theory of time of death, he testified, 
was "beyond what [he would] think would be a legitimate frame of time with respect to 
the time of death." TR.450; see also PCR.002256:74. At the 2011 evidentiary hearing, 
the Rocky Mountain Innocence Center's Jensie Anderson testified how, in 2008-2009, 
the Center's volunteers first contacted Ms. Nyman and discovered that Dr. Grey had 
originally told the Logan Police that the time of death was likely no earlier than Saturday 
night. PCR.002255:67, 69-70 (contact with Paulette Nyman); PCR.002255:75-76, 104-
05 (discovery of police records concerning Dr. Grey's 1993 statements to police). 
Perhaps most importantly, evidence presented at the 2011 evidentiary hearing 
showed that several people saw Lael Brown alive on Saturday afternoon, with the result 
that he could not have been murdered on Saturday morning. Police records disclosed 
that, during the 1993 investigation of the crime, three different citizens informed the 
police that they saw Lael Brown alive on Saturday afternoon or evening. 
PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 1, tab 34, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, tabs 80 and 82. In one of these 
police notes, Logan Police Detective Greg Ridler reported that his neighbor, Mr. Del 
Hall, told him that: 
4
 The autopsy occurred at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, November 8. PCR.002256:55. 
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he saw Lael Friday night at Angie's and also Saturday, 11-6-93 at approx. 1430 
hours in Angie's. Del is sure of the time because he was stopping in Angie's 
before going to work at Albertson's at 1500 hours. 
PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 2, tab 82. Neither this note, nor any of the other police records 
that showed Lael Brown to have been seen alive on Saturday afternoon and evening, was 
even mentioned at the 1995 trial. 
At the 2011 evidentiary hearing, Ms. Brown called two additional witnesses to 
testify that they saw Lael Brown alive on Saturday afternoon or evening. One was Terry 
Carlsen and the other was Del Hall, the source of the tip reflected in the above-referenced 
police note. Their testimony may be summarized as follows: 
Terry Carlsen was a lifelong friend of Lael Brown and often saw him at Angie's 
Cafe in Logan. PCR.002261:19-20. He testified that he was sitting at the back counter 
of Angie's when Lael Brown walked in on Saturday evening and sat at the end of the 
counter. PCR.002261:21-22. Mr. Carlsen testified that he was certain that it was 
Saturday evening, rather than some other evening, when he last saw Mr. Brown. He was 
certain because after being informed of Lael Brown's murder on Sunday, he was shocked 
to realize that Lael must have been murdered shortly after seeing him on Saturday 
evening. PCR.002261:24. The trial court concluded that the details in Terry Carlsen's 
testimony "strongly suggest that Carlsen had accurately remembered seeing Lael 
Saturday evening." PCR.002126. Based on his evaluation of this witness, the trial court 
found that Terry Carlsen's account was "certainly believable". PCR.002129. The trial 
court found it significant that Terry Carlsen's testimony was consistent with Dr. Grey's 
14697714 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
time of death estimate. PCR.002126-002127. The trial court concluded that it was 
"highly probable Carlsen accurately remembered seeing Lael in Angie's restaurant on 
Saturday, November 6th." PCR.002127.5 
Del Hall was another of Lael Brown's friends and "coffee drinking buddies." Id. 
He testified that he saw Lael Brown at Angie's Cafe on Saturday afternoon. 
PCR.002261:4. Mr. Hall remembered the time because he visited Angie's just before he 
had to report to work on Saturday afternoon. Id. at 5. He testified that Lael Brown was 
having coffee with another man. He said he was "quite certain" of his testimony. Id. at 
16. The trial court was convinced that it was "highly likely Hall was not mistaken when 
he told Detective Ridler in 1993 that he saw Lael at Angie's Restaurant on Saturday, 
November 6th." PCR.002130. As support for its conclusion, the trial court found it 
material that Del Hall first reported seeing Lael Brown at Angie's within four days of the 
murder, when his memory of the events was fresh. PCR.002130. The trial court also 
found it significant that Del Hall's statement was consistent with Dr. Grey's time of death 
estimate. PCR.002133. The trial court recognized that Del Hall gained nothing by 
testifying and that he had no relationship with Ms. Brown. PCR.002133-002134. The 
trial court concluded: 
[N]o evidence was presented to suggest that Hall had any motive whatsoever to 
manufacture the information he provided to Detective Ridler in 1993 or that the 
The trial court recognized that although there were reasons to doubt the Terry Carlsen's 
credibility, there were also "reasons suggesting that he is telling the truth," and therefore his 
testimony was entitled to some weight. PCR.002135-002136. 
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testimony he provided during the evidentiary hearing was a fabrication. In the 
Court's view, Hall testified truthfully about what he saw. 
PCR.002134-002135. 
Most importantly, the trial court recognized that unlike "the circumstantial 
evidence presented by the State at trial that Lael was dead sometime Saturday morning, 
Del Hall's testimony and statement to the police are direct evidence that Lael was alive 
Saturday afternoon." PCR.002136. In other words, the evidence not only disproved the 
State's circumstantial case; it also proved that Debra Brown could not have murdered 
Lael Brown. 
Opportunity 
At the 1995 trial, the State argued that the murderer must have entered Lael 
Brown's house with a key because investigators found the house secure, with no evidence 
of forced entry. Because only Lael Brown and Ms. Brown had keys, the State argued, 
Ms. Brown was the only person with opportunity to murder Lael Brown. Ms. Brown's 
presentation of evidence in 2011 demonstrated the falsity of the State's circumstantial 
case on this point as well. 
At the 2011 evidentiary hearing, Ms. Brown proved that Lael Brown's house was 
not secure. Contrary to the 1995 testimony of Officer Collins, police records showed that 
the windows at the house were not painted shut. Police notes showed that at least one of 
the windows was opened by the police officers themselves during the investigation of the 
crime scene on November 7, 1993. PCRJPetitioner's Exhibit 2, tab 7 (stating that the 
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police opened a window while investigating the murder). At the 2011 evidentiary 
hearing, Officer Collins was asked whether he would have testified that the windows had 
been painted shut had he known that at least one of the windows had been opened during 
the investigation. Officer Collins candidly answered: "probably not." PCR.002255:149. 
Evidence presented at the 2011 evidentiary hearing also showed that the lock on 
the back door was broken, and that the door was held shut with duct tape or perhaps a 
knife shoved into the jam. PCR.002255:142. The following photograph, obtained from 
police files in 2008, shows the condition of the back door at the time of the police 
investigation: 
PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 1, tab 8. 
Not surprisingly, in 2011 Detective Ridler testified at the hearing that the back 
door was "less secure, less security than I would recommend." PCR.002256:8. At the 
2011 evidentiary hearing, police officers also testified that the windows at the rear of the 
house were broken. PCR.002255:143. They conceded that the window on the front 
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screen door was broken. PCR.002255:145. At the 2011 hearing, police officers 
conceded that they failed to investigate when or why the windows on the house were 
broken. PCR.002255:183-184. Moreover, newly discovered evidence presented in 2011 
showed that Lael Brown's grandson, a known cocaine user, had repeatedly broken into 
Lael Brown's house to steal money. PCR.002255:180-181. And contrary to testimony 
presented in the 1995 trial, at least one other person possessed a key to Lael Brown's 
house, namely, Lael Brown's son Mike Brown. PCR.002257:73. Contrary to the 
testimony elicited by the State at trial, Lael Brown's house was often left unlocked. 
TR.539. 
Finally, inherent in the 1995 circumstantial case against Ms. Brown was the 
assumption that because Ms. Brown was the only person with access, there was no one 
else who could have committed this crime. This, in turn, was based on the assumption 
that the Logan City Police Department thoroughly investigated and evaluated all the 
physical evidence and that all potential suspects were methodically investigated. The 
State assured the jury that no one else could have committed the murder because its 
careful investigation eliminated all other suspects. But, as shown below, the Logan 
Police Department's other suspects were never investigated. And, as shown in detail 
during the 2011 evidentiary hearing, the police department's shoddy investigation led to 
the destruction of exculpatory evidence. Most emblematic of the quality of the police 
department's investigation was Detective Wolcott's testimony at the 2011 evidentiary 
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hearing. He testified that on Monday, November 8, 1993, he found the bloody handprint 
of the murderer on the door jam of Lael Brown's house, but he failed to photograph it, 
measure it, or document any feature of this handprint, because, as he said, it had been a 
long day. PCR002255:223.6 
Motive 
At the 1995 trial, the State presented evidence that only one bank statement was 
missing from Lael Brown's otherwise complete financial records. The prosecution 
argued that, because the stolen bank record contained a series of cancelled, forged 
checks, the murderer must have carefully selected only the incriminating bank statement 
so as to hide her forgeries. The evidence presented at the 2011 evidentiary hearing, 
however, showed that this theory was fiction. 
Newly discovered evidence presented in 2011 showed that the testimony of the 
State's witness on this topic was false. Robert Brown, Lael Brown's son, testified in the 
1995 trial that he compiled Lael Brown's financial records, that the only bank statement 
6
 In fact, much exculpatory physical evidence was not preserved, thus undermining the 
credibility of any evidence presented by the State. For example, although Lael Brown had been 
shot in the head in his bed and blankets were pulled up over his arm, the police initially treated 
the crime scene as a suicide. PCR.002256:10-11; PCR.002255:122. The unfortunate result of 
this clearly erroneous conclusion was that the crime scene was not properly processed. Instead, 
police officers moved blankets, stepped on the bed, and moved the body without preserving 
critical trace evidence. PCR.002255:124-127,130. As another example, the neighbor testified 
that she heard phone calls on Saturday. When the police arrived an alarm clock was playing loud 
enough to interfere with conversation, yet no attempt was made to determine when the alarm 
went off or whether it could be heard outside the house. PCR:002255:124-125. And as 
explained below, the critical financial information that was material to the State's case was not 
collected or processed, but turned over to members of Lael's family, including some of whom 
were considered suspects. 
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missing was the October statement, and that "his records were otherwise complete." 
TR.748,743. At the 2011 evidentiary hearing, however, Greg Ridler, the Logan Police 
Department detective who had responsibility for the investigation of financial records at 
the crime scene, testified that many bank records were missing. Detective Ridler testified 
that "[t]here were several bank statements that we could not locate . . . There were bank 
statements missing, specific checks missing, entire bank statements with checks and just 
some checks missing." PCR.002256:39-40. During his investigation, Detective Ridler 
prepared Petitioner's Exhibit 2, tab 59, a table showing that multiple checks and bank 
statements were missing from Lael Brown's home. Detective Ridler's table of missing 
bank statements was first produced to Ms. Brown's legal team in 2008. PCR.002255:83-
84. When the prosecution argued that Lael Brown's murderer selectively stole only the 
statement and checks that incriminated Ms. Brown, its own investigating police officer 
knew this to be untrue. 
The evidence presented at the 2011 evidentiary hearing also proved that Robert 
Brown's brother and nephew, Mike and Todd Brown, were active suspects at the time 
that all of Lael Brown's financial records were turned over to them a few days after the 
murder. PCR.002255:177-178. Detective Ridler testified that Mike Brown had both 
motive and opportunity to commit the murder. PCR.002256:22. Notwithstanding this, 
the Logan Police turned Lael Brown's house and all of its contents over to them on 
November 9, 1993, after which they had sole possession of all the financial information 
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and other physical evidence. PCR.002255:177-178.7 In 1995, the prosecution ignored 
Detective Ridler's evidence on the subject and instead relied on the Brown family to 
provide the critical circumstantial evidence of what financial information was taken from 
Lael Brown's house. 
Newly discovered evidence also showed that the October 1993 bank statement, the 
key piece of motive evidence, was not received at Lael Brown's house until after his 
murder. In 2008, the police provided Ms. Brown's legal team with the envelopes of bank 
statements mailed to Lael Brown. PCR.002255:66-67. The postmarks on these 
statements showed that they were aH mailed after the fourth of the month, and usually 
between the seventh and tenth of the month. PCR.002255 at 67. The monthly 
-statements were never mailed out in time to arrive at Lael Brown's house before the 
morning of November 6, 1993, when he was purportedly murdered. 
Finally, the evidence at the evidentiary hearing proved that other persons who had 
the motive to kill Lael Brown were completely ignored by the police. A series of tip 
sheets and police notes obtained from Logan Police Department files in 2008 identified a 
person named Bobby Sheen as a suspect. See, e.g., PCR.002255:80; Petitioner's Exhibit 
1, tabs 42 and 43. A tenant in one of Lael Brown's rental units, Sheen was evicted by 
Mr. Brown shortly before the murder. Sheen committed suicide in 2007. Sylvan Bassett, 
who was a friend of Bobbie Sheen, testified at the 2011 evidentiary hearing that shortly 
7
 Detective Ridler acknowledged that they released the house too quickly and should have held 
onto it longer. PCR.002256:49. 
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after the murder he saw Sheen in possession of a .22 Colt Woodsman, the same make and 
model of the gun used to kill Lael Brown. PCR.002257:43. When Bassett asked if could 
buy the gun, Sheen said that he had thrown it in the Benson Marina to lose it for good. 
PCR.002257:43. Mr. Bassett also testified that after the murder, he saw Sheen, an 
unemployed drug addict, in possession of a large amount of cash, consistent with his 
having stolen money along with the gun from Lael Brown's home. PCR.002256:41. Mr. 
Bassett knew that Lael Brown had evicted Sheen, that Sheen had called Lael Brown a 
"dirty SOB," and that Sheen had stated that if he "had half the amount that he stashed, 
that Lael stashed away," he would be rich. PCR.002257:41. Lael Brown had disposed of 
drugs and pornography belonging to Sheen when he evicted him.8 PCR.002257:96-97. 
Mr. Bassett testified that when, in 1993, he reported this information to police, he was 
ignored. PCR.002257:57. 
This evidence of a likely alternative perpetrator with motive to commit the crime 
was never investigated by the police and was never disclosed to Debra Brown's trial 
counsel. PCR.002255:184-187 (police received tips that Bobbie Sheen was a suspect but 
never interviewed him); PCR.002256:77-81 (trial counsel never saw police documents 
showing Bobbie Sheen was a suspect and never knew that Sylvan Bassett had 
information linking Bobbie Sheen to Lael Brown's murder). The evidence disproved the 
Although Ms. Brown knew about Sheen's eviction at the time she was convicted of murder, its 
significance was unclear prior to Sylvan Bassett's statement and the development of other 
evidence placing Sheen at the scene of the crime. 
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State's circumstantial case that Ms. Brown was the only person with a motive to commit 
this crime. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The State's Appeal 
Evidentiary requirements of the factual innocence statute—The district court 
correctly considered both newly discovered evidence and previously discovered evidence 
in determining Ms. Brown's innocence. The plain language of the statute unambiguously 
instructs the trial court to consider "all the evidence," including both new and old 
evidence. The State's argument, which would require the trial court to find that newly 
discovered evidence is the sole or primary evidence of innocence, finds no support in the 
statute. The 2012 amendment to the factual innocence statute, which was sponsored by 
the Utah Attorney General, demonstrates that the State's statutory interpretation 
argument is wrong. Further, the district court's interpretation of the statute is consistent 
with its purpose, which is to provide a remedy for innocent people based on all of the 
evidence. The district court's interpretation is also consistent with the structure of the 
statute, which establishes an initial screening mechanism to eliminate claims that are 
nothing more than an attempt to relitigate old evidence. Once a petitioner passes the 
initial screening, the statute appropriately requires the trial court to consider all evidence 
in making its ultimate determination of the petitioner's innocence. Finally on this point, 
even if the trial court's interpretation of the statute was incorrect, it is immaterial: the 
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transformative" evidence of Ms. Brown's innocence was "newly discovered," as the 
latter term is defined in the factual innocence statute. 
Sufficiency of the evidence—The trial court's finding that Ms. Brown is factually 
innocent was not clearly erroneous. There is not now, nor has there even been, any 
physical evidence linking Ms. Brown to the murder. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d at 339-
343. At the 2011 evidentiary hearing, Ms. Brown proved that the State's circumstantial 
case was groundless. She also proved by clear and convincing evidence that Lael Brown 
was alive at least until the evening of Saturday, November 6, 1993, with the result that he 
must have been murdered at a time for which Debra Brown had an alibi. This Court 
should reject the State's invitation to substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge 
who heard the evidence. The State has presented no evidence or argument that would 
justify reversal of the trial court's determination that Ms. Brown is innocent. 
Ms. Brown's Cross-Appeal 
Summary judgment on PCRA claims—The trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment against Ms. Brown on her claims under Part 1 of the PCRA. For two reasons, 
the trial court erred in holding that Ms. Brown's ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
was time-barred. First, that claim accrued when she learned or should have learned of 
her trial counsel's ineffectiveness, which was within one year of the time she filed her 
petition. Her claim did not accrue, as the trial court erroneously concluded, when trial 
counsel first learned of his own ineffectiveness. Second, the trial court erred in holding 
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that there were no disputed issues of fact concerning when Ms. Brown learned or should 
have learned of facts supporting her ineffective assistance claim. 
The trial court's determination as a matter of law that Ms. Brown's other PCRA 
claims were time barred should also be reversed because there were material issues of 
fact concerning when she learned or should have learned of the facts underlying those 
claims. 
Constitutionality of the PCRA statute of limitations—The statute of limitations 
in Part 1 of the PCRA violates article I, section 11, of the Utah Constitution because it 
unreasonably limits a petitioner's constitutional right to post-conviction relief. This 
Court has previously held that in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny, the statute of 
limitations must provide an exception for the interests of justice. Since the present statute 
lacks such an exception, it unreasonably restricts petitioner's ability to obtain post-
conviction relief. 
ARGUMENTS IN RESPONSE TO THE STATE'S APPEAL 
1. The District Court Correctly Concluded That It Could Consider Both Newly 
Discovered Evidence and Previously Discovered Evidence in Determining Ms. 
Brown's Innocence. 
(L The statute Js plain language supports the trial court ys conclusion. 
It is "axiomatic that the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of 
the statute itself." Anderson v. Bell 2010 UT 47, f 9, 234 P.3d 1147. Accordingly, to 
determine the intent of the Legislature this Court looks to the statute's "plain language 
and presume[s] that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term 
14697714 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
according to its ordinary and accepted meaning." State ex rel. J.M.S., 2011 UT 75, Tf 13, 
687 Utah Adv. Rep. 60. Here, the trial court correctly concluded that, under the plain 
language of section 78B-9-404 of the factual innocence statute, the trial court: must 
consider whether all the evidence, including the newly discovered evidence, demonstrates 
the factual innocence of the petitioner. 
The factual innocence statute requires the trial court to vacate the conviction if the 
court, after considering "all the evidence, determines by clear and convincing evidence 
that the petitioner . . . is factually innocent." See Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-404(4). 
Section 78B-9-404(4) does not require that the newly discovered evidence be the sole 
evidentiary basis for a finding of factual innocence, or even the "pivotal, transformative" 
evidence, as the State argues. Instead, section 78B-9-404(4) simply and clearly instructs 
the trial court to vacate the conviction if, after considering "all the evidence," the trial 
court concludes that the petitioner is factually innocent. 
The State asks the Court to impose an additional evidentiary requirement that finds 
no support in the statute. The State argues that, in addition to considering "all the 
evidence," the trial court must find that newly discovered evidence is the sole or primary 
evidence establishing innocence. Nothing in the statute compels or even supports this 
additional requirement, and it is inconsistent with the plain language. When examining 
the statutory language, the Court "assume[s] the legislature used each term advisedly. 
Tooele County, 2002 UT 8 at TJ10. Moreover, the "judiciary is obligated to interpret 
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statutes as they are crafted, not to redesign them." Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 
P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997). Here, if the Legislature had intended to require that the trial 
court decide, first, whether "all the evidence" proves the petitioner's innocence, and 
second, to decide whether the primary evidence of innocence is newly discovered, the 
Legislature would have written the second requirement into the statute. The Court should 
not rewrite the statute to add a requirement that the Legislature omitted and that is 
inconsistent with the statute's unqualified instruction that the court simply consider "all 
the evidence." 
The Utah Court of Appeals rejected an attempt by the State to write a newly 
discovered evidence requirement into a section of the statute that did not include this 
requirement. In Miller v. State, 2010 UT App 25 (Utah Ct. App. 2010), the petitioner 
was convicted of the crime of aggravated robbery. Id. at 1 2. Although the petitioner was 
released from custody nearly four and one half years after his initial arrest, and the 
charges against him dismissed, he filed a petition under the factual innocence statute 
seeking a determination of factual innocence and the statutory payments owed him. The 
State moved to dismiss on the ground that the petitioner did not allege that newly 
discovered evidence supported his claim of factual innocence, but rather relied on 
evidence that had previously been presented in previous post-conviction proceedings. 
Under the version of the statute then in effect, section 78B-9-402(2)(a) required a 
petitioner convicted of felony to allege in his or her petition that there was "newly 
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discovered evidence that exists that establishes that the petitioner is factually innocent." 
However, section 78B-9-402(2)(b) applied to petitioners, like Mr. Miller, whose 
convictions had been vacated. Unlike section (2)(a), section (2)(b) did not require the 
petitioner to allege that newly discovered evidence established his innocence. Although 
the plain language of section (2)(b) did not include the newly discovered evidence 
requirement in section 2(a), the State argued that this additional requirement was inherent 
in section 2(b). The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that if the 
Legislature intended the "newly discovered" requirement to apply to section (2)(b) it 
"would have been easy for the Legislature to have included such language, and thus we 
presume the Legislature intentionally omitted those requirements from subsection (2)(b)." 
Id at 13. 
Here, as in Miller, the State seeks to impose a newly discovered evidence 
requirement that is not found in the statute. Like the section of the statute at issue in 
Miller, section 78B-9-404(4) does not state that the Court must determine that the "newly 
discovered" evidence is the sole or even the primary evidence of the petitioner's 
innocence. 
The State concedes that "Section 78B-9-404 allows all relevant evidence to be 
presented at a hearing so that the court may fully and accurately evaluate the impact of 
petitioner's newly discovered evidence on the evidentiary picture presented at trial." 
Appellant Brief at 41. Nevertheless, the State incorrectly argues that section 78B-9-404 
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"makes no comment, either explicitly or implicitly, on the evidentiary basis for 
determining factual innocence." Appellant Brief at 41-42. As explained above, however, 
the plain language of the statute states that the evidentiary basis for a determination of 
factual innocence is whether "all the evidence, [proves] by clear and convincing evidence 
that the petitioner" is factually innocent. The State asks the Court to rewrite this simple 
instruction. This Court should reject the State's request for a revision of the statute. 
During the 2012 Legislative session, the Utah Attorney General's Office lobbied 
for a retroactive amendment to the factual innocence statute. The amendment would 
have required that all determinations of innocence be based on "the newly discovered 
evidence described in the petition." See Proposed Version House Bill 307, 2012, 
Addendum A. The 2012 amendment eventually passed by the Legislature as House Bill 
307 was not made retroactive and does not govern the present appeal. See House Bill 
307, 2012, Addendum B. The 2012 amendment to section 78B-9-404 provides that "after 
considering all the evidence, [the trial court] may not find the petitioner to be factually 
innocent unless . . . (b) the determination is based upon the newly discovered material 
evidence described in the petition . . . " Id. Section 78B-9-402 was also amended to 
explicitly permit the trial court to consider evidence that is not "newly discovered," so 
long as the evidence is material and has never previously been presented to a court. Id. 
Two important lessons may be drawn from the 2012 legislative history. First, 
until the 2012 amendment, there was no requirement in the statute that newly discovered 
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evidence form any basis of an actual innocence determination. Second, and more 
importantly, the Utah Legislature again had the opportunity to instruct courts that newly 
discovered evidence must be the sole or primary evidence on which an innocence 
determination is based. But again, the Legislature declined to do so. It is clear that both 
before and after the 2012 amendments, the trial court may base its determination of 
innocence either on newly discovered evidence alone or a combination of new and old 
evidence, so long as the newly discovered evidence provides at least part of the basis for 
the trial court's determination. 
If the Legislature intended that innocent people not be released from prison simply 
because the evidence proving their innocence includes both newly discovered and 
existing evidence, it would have said so. Consistent with its purpose, the statute requires 
that the Court consider whether "all the evidence," including both old and new evidence, 
proves the petitioner's innocence. If it does, then the petitioner must be exonerated, thus 
"providing] justice . . . for individuals who have been found factually innocent of a 
crime for which they were previously convicted and incarcerated." Miller v. State, 2010 
UTApp25,atTJ7 
b. The trial court's interpretation of the statute's plain language is 
consistent with the statute's purpose. 
The State argues that the trial court may declare an innocent petitioner to be 
"factually innocent" only if the "transformative" evidence demonstrating innocence is 
"newly discovered." According to the State, in a case where the evidence demonstrating 
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the petitioner's innocence is both newly discovered and not newly discovered, the 
Legislature intended the petitioner to remain imprisoned, even if the petitioner is 
factually innocent and has demonstrated that innocence by clear and convincing 
evidence. This position is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute to provide a 
remedy for people who prove their innocence. 
The goal '"when confronted with questions of statutory interpretation is to evince 
the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." Anderson v. BelK 2010 UT 47, f 9, 234 
P.3d 1147. In Miller v. State, the court of appeals explained that the purpose of the 
factual innocence statute is to "provide justice . . . for individuals who have been found 
factually innocent of a crime for which they were previously convicted and incarcerated." 
2010 UT App 25, at T| 7. The legislative history clearly highlights this purpose. During 
the floor debates, Senator Bell stated that the statute was enacted out of "concern for 
those who might be trampled upon in the grinding process of the law" and to 
"compensate[e] folks who have been dealt a very heavy and unjust blow." Id. (citing 
Recording of Utah Senate Floor Debates, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Jan, 23, 2008) (statement 
of Sen. Bell on Senate Bill 016), available at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp). The 
purpose of the statute is to provide justice for innocent people. The statute's purpose is 
not, as the State argues, to deny justice to innocent people merely because the evidence of 
innocence is both newly discovered and not. 
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The district court correctly recognized that the State's position is at odds with the 
purpose of the statute. The trial court held that it would be "unjust to deny these 
petitioners relief who can prove by clear and convincing evidence that they are, in fact, 
innocent simply because they cannot prove their factual innocence based solely upon 
newly discovered evidence." See PCR.002114-002115 (emphasis in original). The 
statutory interpretation that effectuates the intent of the Legislature, as best demonstrated 
by the statute's plain language, is the following: the trial court may base its 
determination of innocence either upon newly discovered evidence alone or a 
combination of evidence, as long as newly discovered material evidence provides at least 
part of the basis for the trial court's determination. 
c. The structure of the statute further supports the trial courfs conclusion. 
The statute establishes a two-step claim process with different requirements at 
each of the two steps. Petitioner must first file a petition that meets the pleading 
requirements of section 78B-9-402. Then, if the petitioner meets those pleading 
requirements, an evidentiary hearing is held wherein the petitioner has the burden of 
proving factual innocence by clear and convincing evidence as outlined in section 78B-9-
404. See Miller v. State, 2010 UT App 25, P7. The structure of the statute demonstrates 
that the requirements at each step are different. Section 78B-9-402 is entitled "Petition 
for determination of factual innocence - Sufficient allegations - Notification of victim." 
This section, as the title makes clear, sets forth the pleading requirements of the petition. 
Section 78B-9-402 does not govern what must be proven at the hearing. Section 78B-9-
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404, entitled "Hearing upon petition - Procedures - Court determination of factual 
innocence," sets forth the procedure at the hearing and defines what evidence the Court 
may or must consider. This section instructs the trial court to consider numerous 
categories of evidence that would not qualify as newly discovered, such as (1) evidence 
that was suppressed at a criminal trial; (2) hearsay evidence (whether newly discovered 
or not); and (3) the records of the original criminal case and any postconviction 
proceedings. Although the trial court is directed to consider this non-newly discovered 
evidence, section 78B-9-404 does not direct that newly discovered evidence be the 
primary or sole proof of innocence. To the contrary, the trial court is told to consider "all 
the evidence." In other words, once the petitioner makes it through the heightened 
review required by section 402, the trial court is instructed to put evidentiary 
technicalities aside and focus on the petitioner's innocence. 
This two-step claim process serves a number of objectives. By imposing a 
heightened pleading burden on petitioners, non-meritorious cases are eliminated before 
significant State and court resources are spent on the petition. By reviewing the petition 
to ensure that it is supported by newly discovered evidence, the trial court ensures that a 
petitioner's claim is not merely an attempt to relitigate the same facts developed in the 
petitioner's criminal trial. The two-step process ensures that once a petition is set for 
evidentiary hearing, the trial court will always consider newly discovered evidence along 
with "all the evidence." 
14697714 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The State ignores the reality that, due to the structure of the statute, a case simply 
does not make it to the hearing unless there is newly discovered evidence showing the 
petitioner's innocence. The State argues that if "a factual innocence determination could 
be based on previously presented evidence, a post-conviction court could improperly 
substitute its judgment for the jury's." Appellant's Brief at 39. Similarly, the State 
argues that if a factual innocence determination "could be based solely on evidence 
available at trial but not presented for tactical reasons or ineffective assistance of counsel, 
that would encroach on the general PCRA provisions." Appellant's Brief at 40. As an 
initial matter, these arguments are irrelevant here because the trial court did not rule that 
its decision could be based solely on the evidence originally presented to the jury or 
solely on evidence that is not newly discovered. To the contrary, the trial court 
concluded that there must be some newly discovered evidence that supports the finding 
of innocence. Accordingly, the State's arguments are simply irrelevant in this case. 
Moreover importantly, the structure of the statute obviates the State's argument. 
As explained above, a petition that lacks any newly discovered evidence fails at the 
pleading stage. The trial court will only hold an evidentiary hearing if sufficient newly 
discovered evidence supports the petition,, At the hearing, the trial court then considers 
all the evidence, which necessarily will include the newly discovered evidence. And, 
because the structure of the statute ensures that the trial court will necessarily be 
9
 This case will be the only case that interprets the version of the statute at issue because the Legislature 
amended the statute, as explained above. 
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considering newly discovered evidence of the petitioner's innocence, the court is not 
simply substituting its judgment for the jury's. In sum, the structure of the statute ensures 
that the trial court will consider newly discovered evidence and that the petitioner will not 
be merely relitigating issues or asking the trial court to second-guess the jury. 
Finally, the statute's structure disproves the State's contention that the Legislature 
intended that a petitioner must prove, as an element of her claim, that the newly 
discovered evidence is the primary or sole evidence of innocence. Section 78B-9-404(4) 
instructs the trial court that its task is to determine, after considering "all the evidence," 
whether the petitioner is "factually innocent". The elements of "factually innocence" or 
"factually innocent" are defined in the statute. A petitioner is "factually innocent" if he 
or she can prove that 
(a) he or she did not engage in the conduct for which the person was convicted; 
(b) he or she did not engage in conduct related to any lesser included offenses 
of the crime for which the person was convicted; or 
(c) he or she did not commit any other felony arising out of or reasonably 
connected to the facts supporting the indictment or information upon which 
the person was convicted. 
Utah Code Ann. 78B-9-401.5(3). If the Legislature had intended to limit claims of 
factual innocence as the State now argues, the foregoing section would surely have said 
so. 
(L The State's argument renders the statute unreasonable and absurd. 
If a statute's plain language "creates an absurd, unreasonable, or inoperable result, 
[the court] assume[s] the legislature did not intend that result." State v. Jeffries, 217 P.3d 
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265 (Utah 2009). The State's interpretation of the statute, would lead to an unreasonable 
and absurd result, as demonstrated by the facts of this case. Here, each piece of evidence, 
both old and new, contributes to the finding of Ms. Brown's factual innocence. Where all < 
the evidence contributes to the ultimate determination, it is impractical and artificial to 
impose upon the trial court the obligation to disregard the probative value of much of the 
evidence, merely because it is not newly discovered. 
One example in the case at hand shows how old and new evidence are inseparably 
intertwined. In the 1995 trial, the prosecutor summarized evidence on the time of death. ( 
He told the jury that the evidence showed Ms. Brown was with her boyfriend until "six, 
6:20, something like that, maybe 6:40" but that "he doesn't see her again," in fact nobody 
sees Ms. Brown until after ten-o'clock. TR. 1568-1569. Arguing that Lael Brown was 
shot in the time period between 6:40 and 10:00, the prosecutor reminded the jury that a 
neighbor, Ms. Nyman, heard shots between 7:00 and 7:15. TR. 1569. The prosecutor 
then concluded by arguing that no one saw Lael Brown in his vehicle on Saturday "out 
going around, doing things" because Lael Brown was "dead . . lying in a pool of blood in 
his bed. The defendant killed him." Id. 
At the 2011 evidentiary hearing, however, Ms. Brown presented a combination of 
new and old evidence, all of which, when considered together, painted an entirely 
different picture. At the evidentiary hearing, the petitioner introduced what the district 
court found was "[n]ewly discovered evidence" that Ms. Nyman actually heard gunshots 
14697714 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on Sunday, not Saturday, morning. PCR.002119. This newly discovered evidence 
constituted "some evidence establishing that Lael was alive Saturday afternoon because 
now there is no longer any clear evidence specifically pinpointing the time of Lael's 
death" at Saturday morning. PCR.002135. Next, a different neighbor testified at the 
1995 criminal trial that she was working outside on Saturday from sometime in the 
morning until 4:00 p.m., that she did not hear any gunshots, and that she would have 
heard gunshots because she was right outside the house. PCR.002135. This evidence 
further supported "a finding that Lael was alive Saturday afternoon." Id. 
The petitioner then presented the testimony of Terry Carlsen, who saw Lael 
Brown at Angle's Cafe on Saturday afternoon. PCR.002135. The trial court found that 
this newly discovered evidence was entitled to "some weight" and "constitute^] some 
evidence in support of a finding that Lael was alive Saturday afternoon." PCR.002136. 
Del Hall then testified that he saw Lael Brown at Angle's Cafe on Saturday afternoon. 
PCR.002136. The trial court found that this testimony was "direct evidence" that Lael 
was alive on Saturday afternoon. PCR.002136. Finally, chief medical examiner Dr. 
Grey testified at the 2011 hearing that based on the physical evidence, Lael Brown's 
murder likely occurred sometime after 9:00 p.m. on Saturday. PCR.002136. 
All this evidence, both old and new, when combined, showed that Ms. Brown 
could not have killed Lael Brown on Saturday morning, which was the only time for 
which she had no alibi. It would be unreasonable and absurd for a trial court to ignore 
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probative evidence of innocence merely because it was not "newly discovered," 
especially when both old and new evidence, considered together, established the 
petitioner's innocence. < 
The trial court must consider all the evidence, both the old and the new, and 
determine, as the trial court did here, whether in combination the old and new evidence 
proves the Petitioner's innocence. The trial court's approach was not only reasonable, it 
is the inevitable result of following the Legislature's command that the court consider 
"all the evidence" in making its determination of factual innocence. ( 
e. The trial court's decision was based on newly discovered evidence. 
The State argues (1) that the "pivotal" evidence underlying the trial court's 
i 
decision was Del Hall's testimony and that (2) the trial court erred in finding Ms. Brown 
factually innocent because Del Hall's testimony was not newly discovered. Assuming 
for the sake of this argument that the statute required "pivotal" evidence to be "newly ( 
discovered," it is clear that Del Hall's testimony was "newly discovered." 
Deb Brown's 1995 trial counsel did not know that Del Hall saw Lael Brown alive 
on Saturday. At the 2011 evidentiary hearing, Shannon Demler testified that he did not 
recall this information, that he did not recall interviewing Mr. Hall, that he did not "recall 
who Mr. Hall is to be honest with you," and that he never saw Detective Ridler?s note 
concerning his conversation with Del Hall. PCR.002256:87,97. Although the State 
provided evidence that trial counsel identified Del Hall as a possible witness in 1995, no < 
evidence was presented to rebut Shannon Demler's testimony that he was unaware of Mr. 
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HalFs connection to the time of death issue. And even if Deb Brown's trial counsel 
knew about Del Hall's testimony, Ms. Brown did not. Although Del Hall's report to 
Detective Ridler was documented in the police file (PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 2, tab 81), 
Ms. Brown testified that her first and second sets of trial counsel never provided her with 
any of the details that they learned about the police investigation. PCR.002257:100-101. 
She testified that she met with her trial counsel for a total of three or four hours before 
her 1995 trial, and that they never shared any information with her about their own 
investigation. PCR.002257:101. She testified that she did not have any information 
about the nature of the police investigation until she learned the information from the 
Rocky Mountain Innocence Center. PCR.002257:102. She testified: 
Q: Did either Mr. Kane or Mr. Demler provide you with any information about 
the police investigation? 
A: Every time I would ask questions Mr. Kane would get a little bit upset. He 
would say, you just worry about your testimony and let me take care of the 
rest. 
Q: Let me ask you again, did either Mr. Kane or Mr. Demler ever provide you 
with any information about the police investigation? 
A: No. 
Q: Did either Mr. Kane or Mr. Demler ever provide you with any information 
about their investigation? 
A: Umm, not that I can think of. The things I asked them to check, they never 
had an answer. 
PCR.002257:101. Regardless of what her trial counsel may have known, Ms. Brown had 
no idea of what the police file contained or what her trial counsel had learned through 
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investigation. Because Ms. Brown had no knowledge of Del Hall or his testimony, it is 
newly discovered, even if her trial counsel knew. 
The factual innocence statute defines "newly discovered evidence" as evidence < 
that was not "available" to the petitioner. Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-401.5(3). The 
question whether trial counsel knew or should have known of the evidence is different 
from the question whether the evidence was "available" to the petitioner. This is clear 
from in the structure of the statute. Section 402 requires a petitioner to allege that newly 
discovered evidence supports his or her petition. Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-402(2)(a)(i). 1 
The same section also requires that petitioner additionally allege that the newly 
discovered evidence was not known by her counsel. Id. §78B-9-402(3)(a)(i). The trial 
court may, however, waive the requirement that the evidence was not known to 
petitioner's counsel. Id. at (3)(b). These provisions make it clear that "newly 
i 
discovered" evidence includes evidence that petitioner's counsel knew about. Otherwise, 
the structure of the statute and its dual pleading requirements make no sense. 
Accordingly, the determinative question is not whether counsel knew of the < 
evidence. The question is whether the evidence was available to Ms. Brown. The answer 
to that question is no. The evidence that Del Hall saw Lael Brown alive on Saturday was 
i 
not "available" to Ms. Brown because she did not know about it. If she did not know 
about the evidence, as a matter of common sense and logic, the evidence may as well 
have not existed because she could make no use of it. ( 
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2. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Finding by Clear and 
Convincing Evidence that Ms. Brown Is Innocent. 
The trial court's innocence finding may not be set aside unless it was "clearly 
erroneous." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-193 (Utah 1987). A factual finding is 
clearly erroneous only if against the clear weight of the evidence, or if this Court reaches 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made. Id This Court must afford "due 
regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah 
R. Civ. Proc. 52(a). 
As detailed in the factual presentation at pages 12 to 24 of this brief, Ms. Brown 
proved that the circumstantial evidence on which her 1995 conviction was based, was 
entirely false. At the 2011 evidentiary hearing, Ms. Brown proved that the Lael Brown 
residence was not secure and could have been entered by anyone. There was no lock on 
the back door. The windows were not painted shut, but were opened by the police. At 
least one other person had a key to Lael Brown's house within months of the murder. 
And Lael Brown frequently left his front door unlocked. In other words, the evidence did 
not support the conclusion that Lael Brown's home was secure and could only have been 
entered by Debra Brown using her key. 
As to motive, Ms. Brown proved that the State's 1995 circumstantial case was 
based on a series of false assumptions. Newly discovered police records and the 
testimony of Detective Ridler showed that Lael Brown's house was in disarray, and his 
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financial records were incomplete. Multiple bank statements were missing and multiple 
checks were missing, including both forged and authentic checks on Mr. Brown's 
account. The State's argument that the killer carefully removed only that evidence that 
incriminated Ms. Brown was false. Moreover, Ms. Brown proved that the October bank 
statement did not arrive before Saturday, November 6, and that other suspects with a 
motive to kill Lael Brown were never investigated. 
Ms. Brown also proved that Lael Brown was alive on the afternoon of Saturday, 
November 6. Because Ms. Brown could account for her whereabouts from 10:00 a.m. 
Saturday morning through Sunday morning, she could not have killed Lael Brown. 
Paulette Nyman recanted her 1995 testimony and in 2011 testified that she heard the 
shots Sunday morning, not Saturday morning. She knew it was Sunday because it was 
the same day as the police investigation. In 2011, the medical examiner testified that the 
probable time of death was Saturday night. He testified that he would have to stretch the 
physical evidence to conclude that Lael Brown died Saturday morning. And multiple 
witness statements and live testimony of two witnesses established that Lael Brown was 
alive as of Saturday afternoon. Ms. Brown presented three documents from the police 
files indicating that three individuals saw Lael Brown alive on Saturday. Ms. Brown also 
called two witnesses who testified that they saw him alive on Saturday afternoon. After 
evaluating the witness5 credibility and truthfulness, the trial court found that these 
witnesses were credible. Because Lael Brown was alive on Saturday and because Ms. 
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Brown could account for her whereabouts for the entire weekend except Saturday 
morning, she proved that she did not kill Lael Brown. 
In an attempt to discredit Ms. Brown's evidence and the trial court's conclusion, 
the State points to nine hearsay statements from people identified as waitresses at Angie's 
Cafe. The State however, called none of these people to testify at the 2011 evidentiary 
hearing, and it laid no foundation with which the trial court could determine the 
credibility or accuracy of this hearsay. The trial court had no information on who these 
witnesses are, how well they knew Lael Brown, how busy Angie's was at the time of 
their observations, where in Angie's they worked and whether they would have served 
Lael Brown. Given the lack of foundation for these hearsay statements, the trial court 
correctly assigned them little weight. Even taken at face value, these statements were of 
limited evidentiary value. One of the waitresses told detectives that she may have seen 
Lael Brown Saturday night, consistent with Terry Carlsen's testimony. PCR.Petitioner's 
Exhibit 2, tab 70, p. 101. Three of the waitresses were not working at the times that Del 
Hall and Terry Carlsen saw Lael Brown. Id. at pp. 104,105,111. Another of these 
waitresses could not remember when she saw Lael Brown. Id. at p. 103. Another 
waitress reportedly said she did not see him Saturday morning, but she said nothing about 
any observations she may have made on Saturday afternoon or evening. Id. at p. 106. 
Only two of the waitress statements are even arguably inconsistent with Terry Carlsen's 
testimony. Id. at pp. 102 and 110. In sum, the trial court did not commit clear error in 
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discounting the State's unsubstantiated hearsay in light of Del Hall and Terry Carlsen's 
live testimony. 
The State next argues that even if Lael Brown was not murdered on Saturday 
morning, Ms. Brown could have killed Lael Brown at some other time. This argument, 
which is based entirely on speculation, deserves two brief comments. 
First, in the 18-year history of this case, the State has never before taken the 
position that Lael Brown was murdered any time other than during the early morning of 
Saturday, November 6, 1993. This Court's prior ruling found that Ms. Brown could 
account for her whereabouts for the entire weekend except Saturday morning. State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d at 339. And the State's own evidence supports the Court's conclusion. 
During the 1995 trial, the State, not Ms. Brown, called Brent Skabelund who provided a 
detailed account of Ms. Brown's whereabouts for the reminder of the relevant weekend. 
TR.614-670. The police testified that they found Mr. Skabelund's account to be accurate. 
PCR.2256:31. Mr. Skabelund accounted for Ms. Brown's whereabouts from Saturday 
morning at 10:00 a.m. until around midnight on Sunday, with the exception of a small 
window just after mid-day Saturday, when Ms. Brown delivered soup to Lael Brown's 
house. TR.633-637. A neighbor (again called by the prosecution) corroborated that Ms. 
Brown went to the house just after mid-day. TR.598-602. There is no evidence that Ms. 
Brown entered the house at this time, killed Lael Brown, left the house covered in blood, 
and then fled the scene. To the contrary, the evidence presented by the State was that Ms. 
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Brown stopped at the house briefly and that she did not enter the house; and the neighbor 
whose house was fifteen to twenty feet away, did not hear gunshots or see Ms. Brown 
flee the scene covered in blood. TR.596-597, 598-602, 613.10 
Second, the State's argument that Ms. Brown might have killed Lael Brown on 
Saturday night has no evidentiary support. In the 1995 trial, the State presented evidence 
that Ms. Brown left Brent Skabelund's house around midnight. TR.637. In the same 
trial, Ms. Brown's son, Ryan Buttars, testified that Ms. Brown arrived home at around the 
same time. TR.913, 920-921. And in the post-conviction proceedings, Ryan Buttars 
presented a declaration and Ms. Brown testified that Ms. Brown remained home until Ms. 
Brown left on Sunday morning for coffee with Lael Brown. PCR.87; PCR.002257;87-
88. The trial court considered this evidence and came to the conclusion, as this Court did 
in 1997, that Ms. Brown accurately accounted for her whereabouts Saturday evening. 
The State, on the other hand, offers no evidence in support of its newfound theory. 
There is no evidence that Ms. Brown drove to Lael Brown's house after leaving Brent 
Skabelund's house at midnight on Saturday and before Ryan Buttars saw her at home 
shortly after midnight. There is no evidence that when Ryan saw her shortly after 
midnight she was covered in blood, or that her truck was covered in blood. The State 
offers no explanation how she could have cleaned the blood from her clothes and her 
10
 Similarly, the State's argument that a granddaughter of Lael Brown saw Ms. Brown's truck at LaePs 
house is irrelevant. Regardless of whether it is true or not, Lael Brown's neighbor, for the reasons 
explained above, proves that Lael Brown was not killed by anyone in the middle of the day on Saturday. 
Moreover, Lael Brown was seen at Angie's after his granddaughter purportedly saw Ms. Brown at Lael 
Brown's house. 
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truck, disposed of the murder weapon, and then arrived home within minutes of leaving 
Brent Skabelund's house to her unsuspecting children. The State's new theory is rank 
speculation unsupported by any evidence. 
The State's argument is based on a misconstruction of the applicable standard of 
review. After spending pages explaining how the "reasonable juror" standard is 
inapplicable to this matter, the State argues that "a reasonable juror could disagree" with 
the trial court's conclusion that Ms. Brown accurately accounted for her whereabouts. 
State Brief at 52. The applicable standard is not what a reasonable juror would conclude. 
The standard is whether the trial court's conclusion was clearly erroneous. Here, it was 
not clearly erroneous for the trial court to conclude that Ms. Brown accurately accounted 
for her whereabouts in light of her testimony, her son's testimony, and Brent Skabelund's 
testimony. This is especially so in light of the fact that at the 2011 evidentiary hearing, 
the State offered no rebuttal evidence. In other words, the only evidence presented by 
either party supported the trial court's conclusion. 
Finally, the State is judicially estopped from claiming in this case that Ms Brown 
may have killed Lael Brown on Saturday night. "[A] person may not, to the prejudice of 
another person, deny any position taken in a prior judicial proceeding between the same 
persons or their privies involving the same subject matter, if such prior position was 
successfully maintained." Nebeker v. State Tax Comm'n, 34 P.3d 180, 187 (Utah 2001). 
The State successfully maintained at the criminal trial that Lael Brown was murdered 
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Saturday morning. And based on this position, the trial court rejected the defense's alibi 
jury instruction. TR.1549 and 1552 (Prosecution: "We've always indicated, even at the 
preliminary hearing, that the time of death was between 6:30 or seven o'clock" . . . Court: 
t h a t ' s relevant is the State saying this is the time the offense occurred . . . [accordingly] 
the instruction will not be given"). Moreover, postconviction counsel had no reason to 
present additional evidence of Ms. Brown's whereabouts on Saturday evening because 
her whereabouts on Saturday evening had never been in dispute and had been 
conclusively established in the criminal trial. State v. Brown, 948 P.2d at 345 (the 
defense established the whereabouts of Debra Brown after 10 a.m. on Saturday). The 
State is estopped from now arguing for a time of death other than the one that it has 
maintained all along (Saturday morning). 
ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF MS. BROWN'S CROSS-APPEAL 
3, The District Court Erred in Granting the State's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Ms. Brown's PCRA Claims. 
(L The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on Ms. 
Brown Js Ineffective Assistance Claim. 
The PCRA provides that a petitioner must file his or her petition within one year 
of the date that the cause of action accrues. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(1) (2008). The 
cause of action accrues on the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based. 
Id § 78B-9-107(2)(e). On March 4, 2009, Ms. Brown brought a claim for ineffective 
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{ 
assistance of counsel, among other claims, based on two theories. PCR.71-73. First, Ms. 
Brown claimed that trial counsel failed to present exculpatory evidence that was available 
to him at the time of trial.11 LI Second, to the extent trial counsel could have, with , 
reasonable diligence, discovered the exculpatory evidence, trial counsel was deficient for 
failing to do so. IdL The State moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ms. Brown's 
{ 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim was time barred by the one-year statute of 
limitations. PCR.997. 
The trial court granted the State's motion, holding that Ms. Brown's ineffective i 
assistance claim accrued when trial counsel knew or should have known of the 
exculpatory evidence. PCR. 1841. The trial court held that because trial counsel knew or 
i 
should have known of the exculpatory evidence at the time of trial, the one-year 
limitations period began to run on the last day for filing a certiorari petition to the United 
States Supreme Court, on January 22, 1998. Id. The trial court held that because Ms. 
Brown did not bring her claim for ineffective assistance by January 22, 1999, it was time 
barred. PCR.1841.
 { 
This Court reviews the district courts grant of summary judgment for correctness, 
"according no deference to its legal conclusions." Warne v. Warne, 2012 UT 13, f 11 
< 
(Utah 2012). The trial court's summary judgment order should be reversed for two 
11
 Ms. Brown's ineffective assistance of counsel was pled as an alternate claim. It is Ms. 
Brown's position that the police and prosecutors withheld exculpatory information and/or critical 
exculpatory evidence was never uncovered by the police or Ms. Brown's trial attorneys. J 
However, if the exculpatory information was available to Ms. Brown's trial counsel, it was not 
investigated by Ms. Brown's counsel and was not presented at trial. 
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reasons. First, the trial court improperly imputed trial counsel's knowledge to Ms. 
Brown. Second, disputed issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. 
L The trial court erred in imputing Ms. Brown ys attorney ys knowledge 
to Ms. Brown. 
Ms. Brown's ineffective assistance of counsel claim accrued at the time she knew 
or should have known of her trial counsel's ineffectiveness. It did not accrue, as the trial 
court erroneously concluded, when trial counsel knew of his own ineffectiveness. As a 
matter of law, an attorney's knowledge of facts and legal defenses cannot be imputed to a 
petitioner that is unaware of those same facts and legal defenses. To hold otherwise 
would render the ineffective assistance of counsel claim meaningless. This is especially 
so where, as here, an imprisoned petitioner has no reason to know that her counsel failed 
to present exculpatory evidence because her counsel never told her about the evidence in 
the first place. Stated otherwise, a petitioner cannot bring a claim that her counsel was 
ineffective when she has no reason to know that her counsel was ineffective. Only when 
she learns of that ineffectiveness does the statute of limitations begin to run. 
This Court has held that imputing counsel's knowledge to an imprisoned petitioner 
is impractical. In Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, fflf 23-24, 123 P.3d 400, this Court 
explained that, 
[w]here a criminal defendant exercises his right to counsel at trial and on direct 
appeal, we decline to put the burden on individuals untrained in the law to 
discover the errors of those whose assistance they were constitutionally 
guaranteed. 
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Id. The Court concluded that a petitioner cannot be held "responsible for understanding 
the legal significance o f the defenses that his or her counsel failed to present. Id. at f 27. 
In other words, trial counsel's knowledge of the law and how the facts apply to the law is < 
not imputed to the criminal defendant, especially when trial counsel did not inform the 
defendant of the exculpatory evidence he failed to present. 
Judge Orme reasoned similarly in his concurrence in Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 
1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The statute at issue in Currier required a habeas corpus 
petition to be filed within three months of when the petitioner or his or her counsel knew { 
of the grounds for the petition. IdL at 1372-73. Judge Orme observed that a statute 
imputing counsel's knowledge to the imprisoned defendant necessarily bars most habeas 
claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 13 75. This is because when the 
"dereliction occurred," the defendant's counsel "in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have known o f his or her own dereliction. Id. And in many cases, a habeas 
petition that accrues on the date of the "dereliction" will not be "forthcoming from a 
prisoner who maintains the same ineffective attorney." IdL, fn.7. Accordingly, a statute of , 
limitations that begins to run on the date of the "dereliction" renders the ineffective 
assistance of counsel remedy "hollow." IdL Put simply, "[p]risoners, who typically are 
not trained in the law, are unlikely to have immediate reason to suspect that their 
representation was inadequate." Id. 
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This is also the conclusion reached by federal courts in cases considering the 
federal statute of limitations relating to post-conviction relief. For example, in United 
States v. Lopez, the Tenth Circuit held that an ineffective assistance claim does not 
accrue on the date of the ineffective assistance, but accrues when the petitioner learns, 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence, of the fact of his or her counsel's ineffective 
assistance. 194 F. App'x 511, 512-13, (10th Cir. 2006); see also Cooper v. Bravo, 36 F. 
App'x 343, 346 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that ineffective assistance claim accrues when 
the petitioner, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, knew or should have learned of the 
ineffective assistance); He v. Gonzales, 160 F. App'x 637, 639 (9th Cir. 2005) (same). 
Utah and federal case law is consistent with the PCRA itself, which carefully 
distinguishes between knowledge held by a petitioner and knowledge held by her 
counsel. Section 78B-9-107(2)(e) sets out the statute of limitations for an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. It provides that the claim accrues "on the date on which 
petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of 
evidentiary facts on which the petition is based." There is no reference to counsel's 
knowledge. But, when the Legislature seeks to impute counsel's knowledge to the 
petitioner, it does so expressly. For example, section 78B-9-104(l)(e) sets out 
requirements for a claim that newly discovered evidence demonstrates no reasonable trier 
of fact could have found the petitioner guilty. In this section of the PCRA, the 
Legislature defined "newly discovered" evidence as evidence that "neither the petitioner 
14697714 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nor petitioner's counsel knew of." The decision to impute the knowledge of counsel to 
the petitioner is not found in the statute of limitations provision at issue here (in § 78B-9-
107) and is not found in the section that sets forth the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim (in § 78B-9-104(l)(d)).12 
In a prior version of the same statute of limitations, the Utah Legislature expressly 
imputed counsel's knowledge to the petitioner. See Currier, 862 P.2d at 1361 (claim 
accrues when the grounds are either known or should have been known by petitioner or 
his or her counsel). In the version of the statute at issue in the present appeal, however, 
the Legislature chose not to impute counsel's knowledge to the petitioner. The provision 
merely provides that the claim accrues "on the date on which petitioner," not petitioner's 
counsel, "knew or should have known" of the facts on which the claim is based. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(2)(e). 
In sum, the PCRA itself and the case law establish that a petitioner's claim for 
ineffective assistance accrues when the petitioner knows or should have known of her 
counsel's ineffectiveness. The trial court erroneously imputed trial counsel's knowledge 
to Debra Brown, which led to the erroneous decision to grant the State's summary 
judgment motion on Debra Brown's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
See also Utah Code Section 78B-9-106(3), which states that although a ground for relief is 
ordinarily barred if it could have been raised at trial or on appeal, a petitioner's claim would not 
be barred if the failure to raise the ground was "due to ineffective assistance of counsel." In 
other words, the Act recognizes that holding a petitioner accountable for his or her own counsel's 
ineffective assistance is improper. 
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2. Ms. Brown raised disputed issues of material fact as to whether Ms. 
Brown exercised reasonable diligence in obtaining the facts 
underlying her ineffective assistance claim. 
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no disputed issues of material 
fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (c). The facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn 
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Higgins 
v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993). Accordingly, "one sworn statement 
under oath is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, thereby precluding summary 
judgment." Am. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Even if the trial court had not erroneously imputed trial counsel's knowledge to Ms. 
Brown, the trial court erred by ignoring disputed issues of fact as to when, through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, Ms. Brown should have discovered the facts underlying 
her ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Ms. Brown's ineffective assistance claim accrued on the date on which she knew 
or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on 
which the petition is based. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(2)(e). "The efforts which a 
party must make before he has exercised 'reasonable diligence' vary." Crellin v. 
Thomas, 247 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1952). In general, reasonable diligence means 
"appropriate action, where there is some reason to awaken inquiry and direct diligence in 
a channel in which it would be successful." Id- Accordingly, "when a plaintiff knew or 
with reasonable diligence should have known of a cause of action is a question of fact." 
P.R. v. Zavaras. 49 Fed. Appx. 836, 840 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002). 
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Ms. Brown based her ineffective assistance claim on her trial counsel's failure to 
either discover or present evidence: (1) that Bobbie Sheen was the likely murderer; and 
(2) that the Logan Police Department conducted an inadequate investigation. The trial 
court concluded, as a matter of law, that Ms. Brown knew or should have known of each 
fact giving rise to her claim for ineffective assistance on or before January 22, 1998. 
PCR.1841. Based on that conclusion, the court found Ms. Brown's ineffective assistance 
claim time-barred. (Id.) 
Ms. Brown raised a disputed factual issue as to whether she knew that Bobbie 
Sheen was a viable suspect. Both before and during trial, Ms. Brown's trial counsel 
shared almost no information with her. In fact, Ms. Brown testified that prior to trial she 
spent no more than three or four hours with trial counsel. PCR.2257:101. When Ms. 
Brown asked a question, she was told to worry only about her testimony and that trial 
counsel would take care of everything else. Id. Even if trial counsel knew of information 
linking Bobbie Sheen to Lael Brown's murder, in light of Ms. Brown's isolation—caused 
by both imprisonment and her counsel's silence—Ms. Brown testified that she did not 
know about it. 
The record also shows that, in 1993, Ms. Brown knew only that Bobbie Sheen was 
an evicted tenant of Lael Brown. She testified that she informed the police of Bobbie 
Sheen only because Lael Brown had evicted him. 
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Q: [D]uring the course of the criminal investigation of this case when 
you spoke to officers, did you ever discuss Bobby Sheen with any of 
the officers? 
A: Actually back when I was being interviewed ... they said did Lael 
have any enemies and I said no. And they said, everybody has got 
enemies, especially a landlord. That's what made me think of 
maybe Bobby because he wasn't too happy with us that day. 
Q: And that's because of the eviction? 
A: Correct. 
PCR.2257:97-98. In her deposition, Ms. Brown confirmed that the reason she told 
her trial counsel about Bobbie Sheen was because he was a disgruntled ex-tenant. 
PCR.2270:71-72. In other words, Ms. Brown did not know the rest of the Bobbie 
Sheen story, that he was seen with a gun that matched the murder weapon and 
cash. It was not until she learned of Sylvan Bassett's statements that she put two 
and two together and recognized that if her trial counsel knew about Sylvan 
Bassett and did nothing to investigate the matter, they were ineffective: 
It was not until my post-conviction counsel asked me to share everything I 
knew about Bobbie Sheen that I understood that he was important and was 
given [an] opportunity to explain the circumstances of his eviction. 
PCR.77. 
Ms. Brown also raised disputed issues concerning when she first learned of the 
Logan Police Department's inadequate investigation into the murder. She testified that 
prior to Rocky Mountain Innocence Center's review of police records in 2008, she had no 
"information about the nature of the police investigation apart from what she was able to 
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see [herjself at the time[.]" PCR.2257:102. Ms. Brown presented unrebutted testimony 
that her attorneys never shared with her any information about the police investigation. 
PCR.2257:100-01. At a minimum, Ms. Brown's unrebutted testimony created a disputed 
issue of fact as to when Ms. Brown learned that her trial counsel either failed to 
investigate—or failed to present any evidence concerning—the shoddy police investigation 
and its consequences for the State's circumstantial case. 
Finally, Ms. Brown raised disputed issues of material fact as to when she knew or 
should have known of the adequacy of her trial counsel's investigation. She 
acknowledged that she thought her trial counsel hired an investigator for her case, but she 
was ultimately unsure whether that occurred. PCR.2270:77. Not until years later did Ms. 
Brown learn that little or no investigation was done by Ms. Brown's trial counsel. She 
learned that although a preliminary investigation was started by an investigator hired by 
Ms. Brown's first attorneys, trial counsel never contacted that investigator to determine 
what he had done. PCR.002257:14-15. Further, she learned years later that her trial 
counsel's normal investigator was contacted to work on the case, but trial counsel never 
followed through to direct that investigator to conduct any investigation. PCR. 1898. 
These facts demonstrate that, at a minimum, there were disputed issues of fact concerning 
when Ms. Brown knew or should have known that her counsel did next to nothing to 
investigate her claim. 
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This Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to Ms. 
Brown's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The trial court erroneously imputed trial 
counsel's knowledge to Ms. Brown and ignored disputed issues of material fact which 
precluded summary judgment. 
b. The District Court erred in granting the state ys motion for summary 
judgment (1) based on the alleged reasonableness of the jury's verdict 
and (2) based on the inadequacy of the police investigation. 
Under the PCRA, a conviction must be vacated when newly discovered evidence 
demonstrates that (1) "no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of 
the offense" or (2) the conviction was obtained in violation of the U.S. or Utah 
Constitutions. Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-104(1 )(a)and(e). A conviction violates due 
process if police failed to preserve exculpatory evidence or, in bad faith, failed to 
preserve potentially exculpatory evidence to the defendant's prejudice. California v. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). 
The district court erroneously held that Ms. Brown's PCRA claims were time barred. In 
doing so, the district court ignored evidence established from categories of disputed facts 
First, the trial court erroneously concluded that in 1995, Ms. Brown was in 
possession of information that Bobby Sheen was a viable suspect whom police should 
have investigated. We have summarized the evidence on this point on pages 22-24 of 
this brief. In summary, Ms. Brown presented evidence that neither she nor her counsel 
knew that Sylvan Bassett possessed facts that suggested Mr. Sheen was a likely suspect. 
Her trial counsel testified that Sylvan Bassett never disclosed any information regarding 
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the murder ofLael Brown to him. PCR.001327. Ms Brown did not know Sylvan 
Bassett had information about Bobbie Sheen. Sylvan Bassett testified that he did not 
share his information because of police intimidation. PCR.001265, 001312, and 001313. 
Although the State offered testimony that Bobbie Sheen, as an ex-tenant, was identified 
as a possible suspect along with all other tenants and ex-tenants, there is no evidence 
that Debra Brown or her trial counsel ever knew about the information provided by 
Sylvan Basset or knew that the police suppressed this information. 
Second, Ms. Brown presented evidence that neither she nor her trial counsel knew 
of documents proving that the October bank statement could not have arrived before 
Saturday. At the 2011 evidentiary hearing, Ms. Brown's post-conviction counsel testified 
that in 2008, the Logan Police Department produced for the first time the envelopes that 
contained prior months' bank statements. PCR.002255:66. These envelopes showed that 
bank statements were never mailed in time to arrive by the fifth of the month. 
PCR.002255:66-67. 
Third, as described in detail at pages 19 to 22 of this brief, Ms. Brown presented 
newly discovered evidence that numerous bank statements and checks were missing at 
the crime scene, thereby disproving the State's circumstantial theory of motive. The trial 
court ignored this newly discovered evidence. 
13
 The trial court also pointed to various documents found in the police file identifying Bobbie Sheen. 
These documents, however, say nothing about Sylvan Bassett and the information he possessed. 
PCR.Petitioner's Exhibit 1, tabs 41 -43. 
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Fourth, Paulette Nyman's admission that her testimony at the 1995 trial was 
wrong was newly discovered. Ms. Brown learned that Paulette Nyman's testimony was 
wrong when Ms. Nyman first admitted that it was wrong - in 2008. PCR.002255:67, 69-
70. 
Months after granting the Statefs motion for summary judgment, after the trial 
court heard and considered all of the evidence, the trial court listed some of the newly 
discovered evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing: 
• "Petitioner provided the Court with new evidence that someone other than 
Petitioner, namely Sheen, was the likely perpetrator of the homicide." 
PCR.002117. 
• "Petitioner also presented credible new evidence challenging the State's theory 
that she was the only person who had access to Lael's home." PCR.002216. 
• Petitioner presented "new evidence" concerning the State's theory that Ms. 
Brown was the only person who had a motive to kill Lael Brown. 
PCR.002116. 
• "Petitioner presented newly discovered evidence at the evidentiary hearing that 
Nyman was unsure of the day on which she heard gunshots." PCR.002118-
002119. 
The foregoing evidence presented at the 2011 evidentiary hearing proved Ms. 
Brown's actual innocence. The trial court found that the burden of proving actual 
innocence is higher than the burden under the PCRA. PCR.002104. Because Ms. Brown 
met the higher burden of proving her innocence, Ms. Brown necessarily met the lower 
burden of proving that no reasonable jury would have found her guilty. Accordingly, if 
the Court reaches Ms. Brown's PCRA claims, it should remand and order that the trial 
court vacate her conviction. 
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4. The Post Conviction Relief Act's Statute of Limitations is Unconstitutional 
Because It Cannot Be Waived in the Interests of Justice. 
The PCRA's statute of limitations14 violates article I, section 11, of the Utah 
Constitution because it unreasonably limits a petitioner's constitutional right to post-
conviction relief. Article I, section 11 provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
"The open courts provision guarantees access to the courts and a judicial procedure that is 
based on fairness and equality, and prevents arbitrary deprivation of effective remedies 
designed to protect basic individual rights." Currier, 862 P.2d at 1361. Although 
legislation generally enjoys a presumption of validity, where a statute of limitations 
"impacts the constitutional right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which as a civil 
remedy is protected under Article 1, Section 1 1 . . . the usual presumption of validity does 
not control " I d at 1362. 
The critical question in an article I, section 11 analysis is "whether a legislative 
enactment denies a litigant 'a remedy by due course of law.'" IdL The analysis consists 
of a two-part inquiry: (i) whether a statute abrogating an existing remedy provides an 
effective and reasonable alternative remedy; and (ii) if no alternative remedy is provided, 
whether the statute eliminates a clear social or economic evil through means that are not 
14
 "A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause of 
action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107. 
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unreasonable or arbitrary. Id The second inquiry is a balancing test under which the 
court must weigh whether abrogation of the remedy is justified by the statute's 
"elimination of a clear economic or social evil through reasonable and non-arbitrary 
means." kLat 1365. 
The PCRA does not provide an alternative remedy after the expiration of its 
statute of limitations. Accordingly, the second inquiry is relevant to the case at hand. 
The PCRA fails the second inquiry because its terms are too rigid relative to the harm it 
is meant to protect. Otherwise stated, the PCRA's statute of limitations is an 
unreasonable method by which to eliminate delayed filings. 
a. The PCRA ys statute of limitations is unreasonable because it does not 
provide an exception for the "interests of justice." 
The PCRA's one-year statute of limitations unreasonably restricts a petitioner's 
ability to seek and obtain post-conviction review. The reasonableness of a statute 
challenged under article I, section 11 depends upon three factors: the nature of the action, 
the interests of government, and the interests of the litigant. Id. at 1369. In Currier, the 
Utah Court of Appeals analyzed each of these factors in determining the constitutionality 
of a 90-day statute of limitations for filing a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 1360. The 
court considered the Legislature's interest in finality, its interest in reducing repeat 
petitions, and its interest in "keeping evidence fresh and records available." Id at 1366. 
It found each of the State's interests irrelevant or insignificant when compared to the 
right to habeas corpus relief: 
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As important as finality[, convenience and efficiency are, they do] not have 
a higher value than constitutional guarantees of liberty. . . . The notion that 
rights of action should be terminated because of the difficulty of proof 
which accompanies the passage of time is not a valid justification for a 
statute which prematurely cuts off a plaintiff s right of action. 
Id. at 1370. Not only did the court hold that the state's interests failed to justify a rigid 
three-month statute of limitations, but the court also concluded that it could "find no 
legitimate governmental interest in keeping a person in prison who may actually have 
done nothing more than miss the deadline" created by the statute. Id at 1372. 
Accordingly, the "inflexible three-month filing period" was declared unreasonable and 
unconstitutional. Id. Importantly, the court suggested that it would likely find any statute 
of limitations to be constitutionally infirm, if it does not excuse a tardy filing when good 
cause is shown. IdL at 1371. 
Consistent with Currier's suggestion, courts have since held statutes of limitations 
unconstitutional where they lack an "interests of justice" exception. See e.g., Julian v. 
State, 966 P.2d 249 (Utah 1998); Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, f l6, 89 P.3d 196, 
202. In Julian, this Court held a four-year statute of limitations unconstitutional because 
it did not provide an "interests of justice" exception. 966 P.2d 249, 253 (Utah 1998). 
Specifically, the court held that the statute of limitations violated two provisions of the 
Utah Constitution: the open court's provision in article I, section 11 and the separation of 
powers provision in article V, section 1. LI In its opinion, the court expressed approval 
of Currier's approach in "aptly" noting that the three-month statute of limitations 
"removed flexibility and discretion from state procedure thereby diminishing the court's 
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ability to guarantee fairness and equity in particular cases." IdL It then went onto hold 
that the same rationale applies to a four-year statute of limitation. The Court reasoned 
that "although the four-year catch-all statue is noticeably longer than the ninety-day 
statute struck down by Currier, it is equally inflexible . . . [and therefore] violates the 
Utah Constitution's open courts provision." Id. at 253. 
In 2004, the Utah Court of Appeals further explained that the "interests of justice 
escape valve alleviates the concern[s]" expressed in Currier about 'rigid' statutes of 
limitations. Manning, 2004 UT App 87, Tfl6 n.4. Importantly, the court concluded that 
the "interests of justice . . . 'must always be considered . . . when a petitioner raises 
meritorious claims.'" Id. In sum, as both Manning and Julian demonstrate, a statute of 
limitations of 30 days, one-year, or four-years is unconstitutional unless it contains an 
"interests of justice" exception. Julian, 966 P.2d at 254 ("[T]he mere passage of time can 
never justify continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived of fundamental 
rights." ... Accordingly, "no statute of limitations [lacking an interests of justice 
exception] may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition"); Frausto v. State, 
966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998) (court "must always consider the 'interests of justice' 
exception . . . when a petitioner raises meritorious claims"); Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 
1029, 1035 (Utah 1989) ("howsoever desirable it may be to adhere to the rules, the law 
should not be so blind and unreasoning that where an injustice has resulted the 
[defendant] should be without remedy"). 
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The right to petition a court to overturn a conviction obtained in violation of a 
person's constitutional rights is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. 
Currier, 862 P.2d at 1365. The State's interests in finality and in avoiding evidentiary 
challenges associated with old claims do not justify a rigid one-year statute of limitations. 
The PCRA's statute of limitations does not pass constitutional scrutiny under article I, 
section 11 of the Utah Constitution because it does not provide for an "interests of 
justice" exception. 
b. The PCRA's tolling provision does not provide a constitutionally 
adequate "escape valve." 
The PCRA's tolling provisions are inadequate because these provisions do not 
reasonably balance the interests of the parties. Pursuant to section 78B-9-107(3), the 
PCRA limitations period is tolled "for any period during which the petitioner was 
prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the United States 
Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity." In its 2011 memorandum 
decision, the trial court found that Debra Brown failed to demonstrate that the PCRA's 
one-year statute of limitations in conjunction with its tolling provision was 
unconstitutionally inflexible. PCR.1847. This combination of procedural safeguards is 
insufficient for two reasons. 
First, prior case law has already rejected this statutory scheme. Julian made it 
clear that this combination of procedural safeguards is insufficient. There the Court held 
that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3) (1992), which provided a four-year statute of 
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limitations, was unconstitutional as applied to a habeas corpus petition because it was 
inflexible. Julian, 966 P.2d at 253. This limitation was also subject to a tolling provision 
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1992): 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real 
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued . . . mentally 
incompetent . . . the time of the disability is not a part of the time limited 
for the commencement of the action. 
Although the PCRA's current tolling provision is broader than section 78-12-36, the 
applicable statute of limitations at issue in Julian was three years longer than that under 
the PCRA. At worst, when each tolling provision is considered in conjunction with its 
associated statute of limitations, they provide the same degree of flexibility. 
Second, unlike the "interests of justice" exception, a tolling provision does not 
allow a court to consider a claim's merit or reasons for delay beyond those enumerated 
by the statute. Conversely, the "interests of justice" exception requires an examination of 
both the reason for a petitioner's untimely filing and the claim's potential merit. Adams 
v. State, 2005 UT 62, f 16, 123 P.3d 400. Under this analysis, a sufficiently meritorious 
claim may require virtually no justification for the late filing. Id This helps to ensure 
that innocent petitioners are not denied a remedy at law. 
The PCRA's tolling provision does not provide a comparable safeguard. Instead, 
even meritorious claims are extinguished. The PCRA's one-year statute of limitations in 
conjunction with the tolling provision does not pass constitutional scrutiny under article I, 
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section 11. This Court should hold the provision unconstitutional and reverse the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's May 2, 2011 
Memorandum Decision Re: Post-Conviction of Factual Innocence. Alternatively, the 
Court should reverse the Trial Court's December 21, 2010 Memorandum Decision Re: 
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
DATED this 9th day of April, 2012. 
Snell&WilmerL.L.J\ 
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Chris J. Martinez 
Elizabeth Fasse 
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1 FACTUAL INNOCENCE AMENDMENTS 
2 2012 GENERAL SESSION 
3 STATE OF UTAH 
4 Chief Sponsor: Brad L. Dee 
5 Senate Sponsor: Todd Weiler 
6 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ^ ^ 
7 LONG TITLE 
8 General Description: 
9 This bill makes clarifying amendments to factual innocence provisions. 
10 Highlighted Provisions: 
11 This bill: 
12 • clarifies the requirement of a hearing if the state does not stipulate to factual 
13 innocence; 
14 • clarifies that all proceedings are governed by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
15 65C; 
16 • sets a standard for the court's determination of factual innocence; 
17 • disallows prejudgment interest on payments made to a person after a finding of 
18 factual innocence; and 
19 • provides that a claim of factual innocence is extinguished upon the death of the 
20 petitioner. 
21 Money Appropriated in this Bill: 
22 None 
23 Other Special Clauses: 
24 None 
25 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
26 AMENDS: 
27 78B-9-402, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2010, Chapter 153 
S3 
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28 78B-9-404, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2010, Chapter 153 
29 78B-9-405, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2011, Chapter 131 
30 = = = = = = = = = ^ ^ 
31 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
32 Section 1. Section 78B-9-402 is amended to read: 
33 78B-9-402. Petition for determination of factual innocence — Sufficient 
34 allegations ~ Notification of victim. 
35 (1) A person who has been convicted of a felony offense may petition the district court 
36 in the county in which the person was convicted for a hearing to establish that the person is 
37 factually innocent of the crime or crimes of which the person was convicted. 
38 (2) (a) The petition shall contain an assertion of factual innocence under oath by the 
39 petitioner, and shall aver, with supporting affidavits or other credible documents, that: 
40 (i) newly discovered material evidence exists that, if credible, establishes that the 
41 petitioner is factually innocent; 
42 (ii) the specific evidence identified by the petitioner in the petition establishes 
43 innocence; 
44 (iii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
45 (iv) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
46 (v) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates 
47 that the petitioner is factually innocent. 
48 (b) The court shall review the petition in accordance with the procedures in Subsection 
49 (9)(b), and make a finding that the petition has satisfied the requirements of Subsection (2)(a). 
50 If the court finds the petition does not meet all the requirements of Subsection (2)(a), it shall 
51 dismiss the petition without prejudice and send notice of the dismissal to the petitioner and the 
52 attorney general. 
53 (3) (a) The petition shall also contain an averment that: 
54 (i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of 
55 trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or 
56 postconviction motion, and the evidence could not have been discovered by the petitioner or 
57 the petitioner's counsel through the exercise of reasonable diligence; or 
58 (ii) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise reasonable 
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59 diligence in uncovering the evidence. 
60 (b) Upon entry of a finding that the petition is sufficient under Subsection (2)(a), the * 
61 court shall then review the petition to determine if Subsection (3)(a) has been satisfied. If the 
62 court finds that the requirements of Subsection (3)(a) have not been satisfied, it may dismiss 
63 the petition without prejudice and give notice to the petitioner and the attorney general of the 
64 dismissal, or the court may enter a finding that based upon the strength of the petition, the 
65 requirements of Subsection (3)(a) are waived in the interest of justice. 
66 (4) If the conviction for which the petitioner asserts factual innocence was based upon 
67 a plea of guilty, the petition shall contain the specific nature and content of the evidence that 
68 establishes factual innocence. The court shall review the evidence and may dismiss the petition 
69 at any time in the course of the proceedings, if the court finds that the evidence of factual 
70 innocence relies solely upon the recantation of testimony or prior statements made by a witness 
71 against the petitioner, and the recantation appears to the court to be equivocal or self-serving. 
72 (5) A person who has already obtained postconviction relief that vacated or reversed 
73 the person's conviction or sentence may also file a petition under this part in the same manner 
74 and form as described above, if no retrial or appeal regarding this offense is pending. 
75 (6) If some or all of the evidence alleged to be exonerating is biological evidence 
76 subject to DNA testing, the petitioner shall seek DNA testing pursuant to Section 78B-9-301. 
77 (7) Except as provided in Subsection (9), the petition and all subsequent proceedings 
78 shall be in compliance with and governed by Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
79 shall include the underlying criminal case number. 
80 (8) After a petition is filed under this section, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, 
81 and crime laboratory personnel shall cooperate in preserving evidence and in determining the 
82 sufficiency of the chain of custody of the evidence which is the subject of the petition. 
83 (9) (a) A person who files a petition under this section shall serve notice of the petition 
84 and a copy of the petition upon the office of the prosecutor who obtained the conviction and 
85 upon the Utah attorney general. 
86 (b) The assigned judge shall conduct an initial review of the petition. If it is apparent 
87 to the court that the petitioner is either merely relitigating facts, issues, or evidence presented in 
88 previous proceedings or presenting issues that appear frivolous or speculative on their face, the 
89 court shall dismiss the petition, state the basis for the dismissal, and serve notice of dismissal 
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90 upon the petitioner and the attorney general. If, upon completion of the initial review, the court 
91 does not dismiss the petition, it shall order the attorney general to file a response to the petition. 
92 The attorney general shall, within 30 days after receipt of the court's order, or within any 
93 additional period of time the court allows, answer or otherwise respond to all proceedings 
94 initiated under this part. 
95 (c) After the time for response by the attorney general under Subsection (9)(b) has 
96 passed, the court shall order a hearing if it finds the petition meets the requirements of 
97 Subsections (2) and (3) and finds there is a bona fide and compelling issue of factual innocence 
98 regarding the charges of which the petitioner was convicted. No bona fide and compelling 
99 issue of factual innocence exists if the petitioner is merely relitigating facts, issues, or evidence 
100 presented in a previous proceeding or if the petitioner is unable to identify with sufficient 
101 specificity the nature and reliability of the newly discovered evidence that establishes the 
102 petitioner's factual innocence. 
103 (d) If the parties stipulate that the evidence establishes that the petitioner is factually 
104 innocent, the court may find the petitioner is factually innocent without holding a hearing. If 
105 the state will not stipulate that the evidence establishes that the petitioner is factually innocent, 
106 no determination of factual innocence may be made by the court without first holding a hearing 
107 under this part. 
108 (10) The court may not grant a petition for a hearing under this part during the period 
109 in which criminal proceedings in the matter are pending before any trial or appellate court, 
110 unless stipulated to by the parties. 
111 (11) Any victim of a crime that is the subject of a petition under this part, and who has 
112 elected to receive notice under Section 77-38-3, shall be notified by the state's attorney of any 
113 hearing regarding the petition. 
114 (12) A petition to determine factual innocence under this part, or Part 3, Postconviction 
115 Testing of DNA, shall be filed separately from any petition for postconviction relief under Part 
116 1, General Provisions. Separate petitions may be filed simultaneously in the same court. 
117 (13) The procedures governing the filing and adjudication of a petition to determine 
118 factual innocence apply to all petitions currently filed or pending and any new petitions filed on 
119 or after [the effective date of this amendment] March 25, 2010. 
120 (14) A claim for determination of factual innocence under this part is extinguished 
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121 upon the death of the petitioner, 
122 Section 2. Section 78B-9-404 is amended to read: 
123 78B-9-404. Hearing upon petition -- Procedures — Court determination of factual 
124 innocence. 
125 (l)(a) In any hearing conducted under this part, the Utah attorney general shall 
126 represent the state. 
127 (b) The burden is upon the petitioner to establish the petitioner's factual innocence by 
128 clear and convincing evidence. 
129 (2) The court may consider: 
130 (a) evidence that was suppressed or would be suppressed at a criminal trial; and 
131 (b) hearsay evidence, and may consider that the evidence is hearsay in evaluating its 
132 weight and credibility. 
133 (3) In making its determination the court shall consider, in addition to the evidence 
134 presented at the hearing under this part, the record of the original criminal case and at any 
135 postconviction proceedings in the case. 
136 (4) If the court, after considering all the evidence, determines by clear and convincing 
137 evidence that the petitioner: 
138 (a) is factually innocent of one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, 
139 the court shall order that those convictions: 
140 (i) be vacated with prejudice; and 
141 (ii) be expunged from the petitioner's record; or 
142 (b) did not commit one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, but the 
143 court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner did not commit any 
144 lesser included offenses relating to those offenses, the court shall modify the original 
145 conviction and sentence of the petitioner as appropriate for the lesser included offense, whether 
146 or not the lesser included offense was originally submitted to the trier of fact. 
147 (5) (a) If the court, after considering all the evidence, does not determine by clear and 
148 convincing evidence that the petitioner is factually innocent of the offense or offenses the 
149 petitioner is challenging and does not find that Subsection (4)(b) applies, the court shall deny 
150 the petition regarding the offense or offenses. 
151 (b) If the court finds that the petition was brought in bad faith, it shall enter the finding 
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152 on the record, and the petitioner may not file a second or successive petition under this section 
153 without first applying to and obtaining permission from the court which denied the prior 
154 petition. 
155 (6) At least 30 days prior to a hearing on a petition to determine factual innocence, the 
156 petitioner and the respondent shall exchange information regarding the evidence each intends 
157 to present at the hearing. This information shall include: 
158 (a) a list of witnesses to be called at the hearing; and 
159 (b) a summary of the testimony or other evidence to be introduced through each 
160 witness, including any expert witnesses. 
161 (7) Each party is entitled to a copy of any expert report to be introduced or relied upon 
162 by that expert or another expert at least 30 days prior to hearing. 
163 (8) The court, after considering all the evidence, may not find the petitioner to be 
164 factually innocent unless: 
165 (a) the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner did not 
166 commit one or more of the offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, as defined in 
167 Subsection 78B-9-401.5(7); and 
168 (b) the determination is based upon the newly discovered material evidence described 
169 in the petition, pursuant to Subsection 78B-9-402(2Ka), and as defined in Subsection 
170 78B-9-401.5G). 
171 Section 3. Section 78B-9-405 is amended to read: 
172 78B-9-405. Judgment and assistance payment. 
173 (1) (a) If a court finds a petitioner factually innocent under [Title 78B, Chapter 9,] Part 
174 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or under this part, and if the petitioner has served a period 
175 of incarceration, the court shall order that, as provided in Subsection (2), the petitioner shall 
176 receive for each year or portion of a year the petitioner was incarcerated, up to a maximum of 
177 15 years, the monetary equivalent of the average annual nonagricultural payroll wage in Utah, 
178 as determined by the data most recently published by the Department of Workforce Services at 
179 the time of the petitioner's release from prison. 
180 (b) As used in this Subsection (1), "petitioner" means a United States citizen or an 
181 individual who was otherwise lawfully present in this country at the time of the incident that 
182 gave rise to the underlying conviction. 
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183 (2) Payments pursuant to this section shall be made as follows: 
184 (a) The Utah Office for Victims of Crime shall pay from the Crime Victim Reparations 
185 Fund to the petitioner within 45 days of the court order under Subsection (1) an initial sum 
186 equal to either 20% of the total financial assistance payment as determined under Subsection 
187 (1) or an amount equal to two years of incarceration, whichever is greater, but not to exceed the 
188 total amount owed. 
189 (b) The Legislature shall appropriate as nonlapsing funds from the General Fund, and 
190 no later than the next general session following the issuance of the court order under 
191 Subsection (1): 
192 (i) to the Crime Victim Reparations Fund, the amount that was paid out of the fund 
193 under Subsection (2)(a); and 
194 (ii) to the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, as a separate line item, the 
195 amount ordered by the court for payments under Subsection (1), minus the amount reimbursed 
196 to the Crime Victim Reparations Fund under Subsection (2)(b)(i). 
197 (c) Payments to the petitioner under this section, other than the payment under 
198 Subsection (2)(a), shall be made by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice quarterly 
199 on or before the last day of the month next succeeding each calendar quarterly period. 
200 (d) Payments under Subsection (2)(c) shall: 
201 (i) commence no later than one year after the effective date of the appropriation for the 
202 payments; 
203 (ii) be made to the petitioner for the balance of the amount ordered by the court after
 ( 
204 the initial payment under Subsection (2)(a); and 
205 (iii) be allocated so that the entire amount due to the petitioner under this section has 
206 been paid no later than 10 years after the effective date of the appropriation made under 
207 Subsection (2)(b). i 
208 (3) (a) Payments pursuant to this section shall be reduced to the extent that the period 
209 of incarceration for which the petitioner seeks payment was attributable to a separate and 
210 lawful conviction. 
211 (b) (i) Payments pursuant to this section shall be tolled upon the commencement of any ' 
212 period of incarceration due to the petitioner's subsequent conviction of a felony and shall 
213 resume upon the conclusion of that period of incarceration. 
_7 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
H.B. 307 01-27-12 7:34 AM 
214 (ii) As used in this section, "felony" means a criminal offense classified as a felony 
215 under Title 76, Chapter 3, Punishments, or conduct that would constitute a felony if committed 
216 in Utah. 
217 (c) The reduction of payments pursuant to Subsection (3)(a) or the tolling of payments 
218 pursuant to Subsection (3)(b) shall be determined by the same court that finds a petitioner to be 
219 factually innocent under [Title 78D, Chapter 9,] Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or this 
220 part. 
221 (4) (a) A person is ineligible for any payments under this part if the person was already 
222 serving a prison sentence in another jurisdiction at the time of the conviction of the crime for 
223 which that person has been found factually innocent pursuant to [Title 78D, Chapter 9,] Part 3, 
224 Postconviction Testing of DNA, or this part, and that person is to be returned to that other 
225 jurisdiction upon release for further incarceration on the prior conviction. 
226 (b) Ineligibility for any payments pursuant to this Subsection (4) shall be determined by 
227 the same court that finds a person to be factually innocent under [Title 78D, Chapter 9,] Part 3, 
228 Postconviction Testing of DNA, or this part. 
229 (5) Payments pursuant to this section: 
230 (a) are not subject to any Utah state taxes; and 
231 (b) may not be offset by any expenses incurred by the state or any political subdivision 
232 of the state, including expenses incurred to secure the petitioner's custody, or to feed, clothe, or 
233 provide medical services for the petitioner. 
234 (6) If a court finds a petitioner to be factually innocent under [Title 78D, Chapter 9,] 
235 Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or this part, the court shall also: 
236 (a) issue an order of expungement of the petitioner's criminal record for all acts in the 
237 charging document upon which the payment under this part is based; and 
238 (b) provide a letter to the petitioner explaining that the petitioner's conviction has been 
239 vacated on the grounds of factual innocence and indicating that the petitioner did not commit 
240 the crime or crimes for which the petitioner was convicted and was later found to be factually 
241 innocent under [Title 78D, Chapter 9,] Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or this part. 
242 (7) A petitioner found to be factually innocent under [Title 78D, Chapter 9,] Part 3, 
243 Postconviction Testing of DNA, or this part shall have access to the same services and 
244 programs available to Utah citizens generally as though the conviction for which the petitioner 
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245 was found to be factually innocent had never occurred. 
246 (8) Payments pursuant to this part constitute a full and conclusive resolution of the 
247 petitioner's claims on the specific issue of factual innocence. Pre-judgment interest may not be 
248 awarded in addition to the payments provided under this part. 
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1 FACTUAL INNOCENCE AMENDMENTS 
2 2012 GENERAL SESSION 
3 STATE OF UTAH 
4 Chief Sponsor: Brad L. Dee 
5 Senate Sponsor: Todd Weiler 
6 Cosponsors: V. Lowry Snow 
7 Richard A. Greenwood 
8 
9 LONG TITLE 
10 General Description: 
11 This bill makes clarifying amendments to factual innocence provisions. 
12 Highlighted Provisions: 
13 This bill: 
14 * clarifies the requirement of a hearing if the state does not stipulate to factual 
15 innocence; 
16 • clarifies that all proceedings are governed by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
17 65C; 
18 • sets a standard for the court's determination of factual innocence; 
19 • disallows prejudgment interest on payments made to a person after a finding of 
20 factual innocence; and 
21 • provides that assistance payments on a claim of factual innocence are extinguished 
22 upon the death of the petitioner. 
23 Money Appropriated in this Bill: 
24 None 
25 Other Special Clauses: 
26 None 
27 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
28 AMENDS: 
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29 78B-9-402, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2010, Chapter 153 
30 78B-9-404, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2010, Chapter 153 
31 78B-9-405, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2011, Chapter 131 
32 = = = ^ ^ = = = = = = = = = = = 
33 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
34 Section 1. Section 78B-9-402 is amended to read: 
35 78B-9-402. Petition for determination of factual innocence — Sufficient 
36 allegations - Notification of victim. 
37 (1) A person who has been convicted of a felony offense may petition the district court 
38 in the county in which the person was convicted for a hearing to establish that the person is 
39 factually innocent of the crime or crimes of which the person was convicted. 
40 (2) (a) The petition shall contain an assertion of factual innocence under oath by the 
41 petitioner, and shall aver, with supporting affidavits or other credible documents, that: 
42 (i) newly discovered material evidence exists that, if credible, establishes that the 
43 petitioner is factually innocent; 
44 (ii) the specific evidence identified by the petitioner in the petition establishes 
45 innocence; 
46 (iii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
47 (iv) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
48 (v) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates 
49 that the petitioner is factually innocent. 
50 (b) The court shall review the petition in accordance with the procedures in Subsection 
51 (9)(b), and make a finding that the petition has satisfied the requirements of Subsection (2)(a)„ 
52 If the court finds the petition does not meet all the requirements of Subsection (2)(a), it shall 
53 dismiss the petition without prejudice and send notice of the dismissal to the petitioner and the 
54 attorney general. 
55 (3) (a) The petition shall also contain an averment that: 
56 (i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of 
Enrolled Copy 
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57 trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or 
58 postconviction motion, and the evidence could not have been discovered by the petitioner or 
59 the petitioner's counsel through the exercise of reasonable diligence; or 
60 (ii) a court has found ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to exercise reasonable 
61 diligence in uncovering the evidence. 
62 (b) Upon entry of a finding that the petition is sufficient under Subsection (2)(a), the 
63 court shall then review the petition to determine if Subsection (3)(a) has been satisfied. If the 
64 court finds that the requirements of Subsection (3)(a) have not been satisfied, it may dismiss 
65 the petition without prejudice and give notice to the petitioner and the attorney general of the 
66 dismissal, or the court may [enter a finding that based upon the strength of the petition, the 
67 requirements of Subsection (3)(a) arc waived in the interest of justice.] waive the requirements 
68 of Subsection (3)(a) if the court finds the petition should proceed to hearing based upon the 
69 strength of the petition, and that there is other evidence that could have been discovered 
70 through the exercise of reasonable diligence by petitioner or petitioner's counsel at trial, and the 
71 other evidence: 
72 (i) was not discovered by petitioner or petitioner's counsel; 
73 (ii) is material upon the issue of factual innocence; and 
74 (iii) has never been presented to a court. 
75 (4) If the conviction for which the petitioner asserts factual innocence was based upon 
76 a plea of guilty, the petition shall contain the specific nature and content of the evidence that 
77 establishes factual innocence. The court shall review the evidence and may dismiss the petition 
78 at any time in the course of the proceedings, if the court finds that the evidence of factual 
79 innocence relies solely upon the recantation of testimony or prior statements made by a witness 
80 against the petitioner, and the recantation appears to the court to be equivocal or self-serving. 
81 (5) A person who has already obtained postconviction relief that vacated or reversed 
82 the person's conviction or sentence may also file a petition under this part in the same manner 
83 and form as described above, if no retrial or appeal regarding this offense is pending. 
84 (6) If some or all of the evidence alleged to be exonerating is biological evidence 
-3-
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85 subject to DNA testing, the petitioner shall seek DNA testing pursuant to Section 78B-9-301. 
86 (7) Except as provided in Subsection (9), the petition and all subsequent proceedings 
87 shall be in compliance with and governed by Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
88 shall include the underlying criminal case number. 
89 (8) After a petition is filed under this section, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, 
90 and crime laboratory personnel shall cooperate in preserving evidence and in determining the 
91 sufficiency of the chain of custody of the evidence which is the subject of the petition. 
92 (9) (a) A person who files a petition under this section shall serve notice of the petition 
93 and a copy of the petition upon the office of the prosecutor who obtained the conviction and 
94 upon the Utah attorney general. 
95 (b) The assigned judge shall conduct an initial review of the petition. If it is apparent 
96 to the court that the petitioner is either merely relitigating facts, issues, or evidence presented in 
97 previous proceedings or presenting issues that appear frivolous or speculative on their face, the 
98 court shall dismiss the petition, state the basis for the dismissal, and serve notice of dismissal 
99 upon the petitioner and the attorney general. If, upon completion of the initial review, the court 
100 does not dismiss the petition, it shall order the attorney general to file a response to the petition. 
101 The attorney general shall, within 30 days after receipt of the court's order, or within any 
102 additional period of time the court allows, answer or otherwise respond to all proceedings 
103 initiated under this part. 
104 (c) After the time for response by the attorney general under Subsection (9)(b) has 
105 passed, the court shall order a hearing if it finds the petition meets the requirements of 
106 Subsections (2) and (3) and finds there is a bona fide and compelling issue of factual innocence 
107 regarding the charges of which the petitioner was convicted. No bona fide and compelling 
108 issue of factual innocence exists if the petitioner is merely relitigating facts, issues, or evidence 
109 presented in a previous proceeding or if the petitioner is unable to identify with sufficient 
110 specificity the nature and reliability of the newly discovered evidence that establishes the 
111 petitioner's factual innocence. 
112 (d) If the parties stipulate that the evidence establishes that the petitioner is factually 
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113 innocent, the court may find the petitioner is factually innocent without holding a hearing. If 
114 the state will not stipulate that the evidence establishes that the petitioner is factually innocent, 
115 no determination of factual innocence may be made by the court without first holding a hearing 
116 under this part. 
117 (10) The court may not grant a petition for a hearing under this part during the period 
118 in which criminal proceedings in the matter are pending before any trial or appellate court, 
119 unless stipulated to by the parties. 
120 (11) Any victim of a crime that is the subject of a petition under this part, and who has 
121 elected to receive notice under Section 77-38-3, shall be notified by the state's attorney of any 
122 hearing regarding the petition. 
123 (12) A petition to determine factual innocence under this part, or Part 3, Postconviction 
124 Testing of DNA, shall be filed separately from any petition for postconviction relief under Part 
125 1, General Provisions. Separate petitions may be filed simultaneously in the same court. 
126 (13) The procedures governing the filing and adjudication of a petition to determine 
127 factual innocence apply to all petitions currently filed or pending in the district court and any 
128 new petitions filed on or after [the effective date of this amendment] June 1. 2012. 
129 (14) A claim for determination of factual innocence under this part is not extinguished 
130 upon the death of the petitioner. The assistance payment provisions of Section 78B-9-405 may 
131 not apply, and financial payments may not be made, if the finding of factual innocence occurs 
132 after the death of the petitioner. In addition, any payments already being made under Section 
133 78B-9-405 shall cease upon the death of the petitioner. 
134 Section 2. Section 78B-9-404 is amended to read: 
135 78B-9-404. Hearing upon petition — Procedures — Court determination of factual 
136 innocence. 
137 (1) (a) In any hearing conducted under this part, the Utah attorney general shall 
138 represent the state. 
139 (b) The burden is upon the petitioner to establish the petitioner's factual innocence by 
140 clear and convincing evidence. 
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141 (2) The court may consider: 
142 (a) evidence that was suppressed or would be suppressed at a criminal trial; and 
143 (b) hearsay evidence, and may consider that the evidence is hearsay in evaluating its 
144 weight and credibility. 
145 (3) In making its determination the court shall consider, in addition to the evidence 
146 presented at the hearing under this part, the record of the original criminal case and at any 
147 postconviction proceedings in the case. 
148 (4) If the court, after considering all the evidence, determines by clear and convincing 
149 evidence that the petitioner: 
150 (a) is factually innocent of one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, 
151 the court shall order that those convictions: 
152 (i) be vacated with prejudice; and 
153 (ii) be expunged from the petitioner's record; or 
154 (b) did not commit one or more offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, but the 
155 court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner did not commit any 
156 lesser included offenses relating to those offenses, the court shall modify the original 
157 conviction and sentence of the petitioner as appropriate for the lesser included offense, whether 
158 or not the lesser included offense was originally submitted to the trier of fact. 
159 (5) (a) If the court, after considering all the evidence, does not determine by clear and 
160 convincing evidence that the petitioner is factually innocent of the offense or offenses the 
161 petitioner is challenging and does not find that Subsection (4)(b) applies, the court shall deny 
162 the petition regarding the offense or offenses. 
163 (b) If the court finds that the petition was brought in bad faith, it shall enter the finding 
164 on the record, and the petitioner may not file a second or successive petition under this section 
165 without first applying to and obtaining permission from the court which denied the prior 
166 petition. 
167 (6) At least 30 days prior to a hearing on a petition to determine factual innocence, the 
168 petitioner and the respondent shall exchange information regarding the evidence each intends 
- 6 -
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169 to present at the hearing. This information shall include: 
170 (a) a list of witnesses to be called at the hearing; and 
171 (b) a summary of the testimony or other evidence to be introduced through each 
172 witness, including any expert witnesses. 
173 (7) Each party is entitled to a copy of any expert report to be introduced or relied upon 
174 by that expert or another expert at least 30 days prior to hearing. 
175 (8) The court, after considering all the evidence, may not find the petitioner to be 
176 factually innocent unless: 
177 (a) the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner did not i 
178 commit one or more of the offenses of which the petitioner was convicted, as defined in 
179 Subsection 78B-9-401.5(2): and 
180 (b) the determination is based upon the newly discovered material evidence described 
181 in the petition, pursuant to Section 78B-9-402, and as defined in Subsection 78B-9-40L5(3). 
182 Section 3. Section 78B-9-405 is amended to read: 
183 78B-9-405. Judgment and assistance payment. 
184 (1) (a) If a court finds a petitioner factually innocent under [Title 78D, Chapter 9,] Part 
185 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or under this part, and if the petitioner has served a period 
186 of incarceration, the court shall order that, as provided in Subsection (2), the petitioner shall 
187 receive for each year or portion of a year the petitioner was incarcerated, up to a maximum of 
188 15 years, the monetary equivalent of the average annual nonagricultural payroll wage in Utah, j 
189 as determined by the data most recently published by the Department of Workforce Services at 
190 the time of the petitioner's release from prison. 
191 (b) As used in this Subsection (1), "petitioner" means a United States citizen or an 
192 individual who was otherwise lawfully present in this country at the time of the incident that 
193 gave rise to the underlying conviction. 
194 (2) Payments pursuant to this section shall be made as follows: 
195 (a) The Utah Office for Victims of Crime shall pay from the Crime Victim Reparations i 
196 Fund to the petitioner within 45 days of the court order under Subsection (1) an initial sum 
- 7 -
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197 equal to either 20% of the total financial assistance payment as determined under Subsection 
198 (1) or an amount equal to two years of incarceration, whichever is greater, but not to exceed the 
199 total amount owed. 
200 (b) The Legislature shall appropriate as nonlapsing funds from the General Fund, and 
201 no later than the next general session following the issuance of the court order under 
202 Subsection (1): 
203 (i) to the Crime Victim Reparations Fund, the amount that was paid out of the fund 
204 under Subsection (2)(a); and 
205 (ii) to the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, as a separate line item, the 
206 amount ordered by the court for payments under Subsection (1), minus the amount reimbursed 
207 to the Crime Victim Reparations Fund under Subsection (2)(b)(i). 
208 (c) Payments to the petitioner under this section, other than the payment under 
209 Subsection (2)(a), shall be made by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice quarterly 
210 on or before the last day of the month next succeeding each calendar quarterly period. 
211 (d) Payments under Subsection (2)(c) shall: 
212 (i) commence no later than one year after the effective date of the appropriation for the 
213 payments; 
214 (ii) be made to the petitioner for the balance of the amount ordered by the court after 
215 the initial payment under Subsection (2)(a); and 
216 (iii) be allocated so that the entire amount due to the petitioner under this section has 
217 been paid no later than 10 years after the effective date of the appropriation made under 
218 Subsection (2)(b). 
219 (3) (a) Payments pursuant to this section shall be reduced to the extent that the period 
220 of incarceration for which the petitioner seeks payment was attributable to a separate and 
221 lawful conviction. 
222 (b) (i) Payments pursuant to this section shall be tolled upon the commencement of any 
223 period of incarceration due to the petitioner's subsequent conviction of a felony and shall 
224 resume upon the conclusion of that period of incarceration. 
- 8 -
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225 (ii) As used in this section, "felony" means a criminal offense classified as a felony 
226 under Title 76, Chapter 3, Punishments, or conduct that would constitute a felony if committed 
227 in Utah. 
228 (c) The reduction of payments pursuant to Subsection (3)(a) or the tolling of payments 
229 pursuant to Subsection (3)(b) shall be determined by the same court that finds a petitioner to be 
230 factually innocent under [Title 78D, Chapter 9,] Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or this 
231 part. 
232 (4) (a) A person is ineligible for any payments under this part if the person was already 
233 serving a prison sentence in another jurisdiction at the time of the conviction of the crime for 
234 which that person has been found factually innocent pursuant to [Title 78D, Chapter 9,] Part 3, 
235 Postconviction Testing of DNA, or this part, and that person is to be returned to that other 
236 jurisdiction upon release for further incarceration on the prior conviction. 
237 (b) Ineligibility for any payments pursuant to this Subsection (4) shall be determined by 
238 the same court that finds a person to be factually innocent under [Title 78D, Chapter 9,] Part 3, 
239 Postconviction Testing of DNA, or this part. 
240 (5) Payments pursuant to this section: 
241 (a) are not subject to any Utah state taxes; and 
242 (b) may not be offset by any expenses incurred by the state or any political subdivision 
243 of the state, including expenses incurred to secure the petitioner's custody, or to feed, clothe, or 
244 provide medical services for the petitioner. 
245 (6) If a court finds a petitioner to be factually innocent under [Title 78D, Chapter 9,] 
246 Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or this part, the court shall also: 
247 (a) issue an order of expungement of the petitioner's criminal record for all acts in the 
248 charging document upon which the payment under this part is based; and 
249 (b) provide a letter to the petitioner explaining that the petitioner's conviction has been 
250 vacated on the grounds of factual innocence and indicating that the petitioner did not commit 
251 the crime or crimes for which the petitioner was convicted and was later found to be factually 
252 innocent under [Title 78D, Chapter 9,] Part 3, Postconviction Testing of DNA, or this part. 
- Q -
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253 (7) A petitioner found to be factually innocent under [Title 78D, Chapter 9,3 Part 3, 
254 Postconviction Testing of DN A, or this part shall have access to the same services and 
255 programs available to Utah citizens generally as though the conviction for which the petitioner 
256 was found to be factually innocent had never occurred. 
257 (8) Payments pursuant to this part constitute a full and conclusive resolution of the 
258 petitioner's claims on the specific issue of factual innocence. Pre-judgment interest may not be 
259 awarded in addition to the payments provided under this part. 
- 10-
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Article I, Section 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 




STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
m 
- 1 ZQtt 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE: 
POST-CONVICTION DBTE 
OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE 
Case No. 100903670 
FStEP 
MAY - 2 2011 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
Judge Michael D. DiReda 
THIS MATTER COMES BEFORE THE COURT for a determination of factual 
innocence pursuant to Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Determination of Factual 
Innocence filed on March 4, 2009. The Court held an evidentiary hearing in this matter from 
January 18-24, 2011, and on March 7, 2011. Petitioner, Ms. Debra Brown, was present and 
represented by her counsel Alan Sullivan, Christopher Martinez, and Jacqueline Hopkinson. The 
State of Utah was present and represented by Assistant Attorneys General Scott Reed and Patrick 
Nolan. 
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the pleadings in this case, the supporting exhibits, the 
arguments of counsel, the relevant case law, and all applicable statutory provisions. 
Additionally, the Court has carefully considered all of the evidence presented at the 
aforementioned hearing held in this case as well as the evidence contained in the record of the 
•original criminal case. Having done so, and now being fiilly advised, the Court issues the 
following decision determining that Petitioner is factually innocent of the offense for which she 
was convicted. 
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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On the morning of November 7, 1993, Petitioner discovered the body of her long-time 
friend and employer Lael Brown ("Lael"). He had been shot three times in the head while he lay 
in his bed. Approximately ten months later, Petitioner was arrested, and on September 12, 1994, 
the Cache County Attorney's Office charged her with one count of aggravated murder. 
Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted on October 18, 1995, of the crime of aggravated 
murder as charged and was subsequently sentenced to life in prison on December 11, 1995. On 
January 19, 1996, Petitioner timely filed an appeal challenging the sufficiency of evidence used 
to convict her. The Utah Supreme Court entered its decision affirming Petitioner's conviction on 
October 24, 1997. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997). Petitioner did not seek review 
of the decision from the United States Supreme Court. 
In 2002, the Rocky Mountain Innocence Center ("RMIC") began an investigation into 
Petitioner's case. On March 3, 2005, Petitioner filed a Verified Petition for Post-Conviction 
DNA Testing in the First Judicial District and Judge Gordon Low was assigned. On July 28, 
2005, Judge Low granted the petition, and the Utah State Crime Laboratory tested a DNA 
sample collected from a bullet and a fingerprint collected from a shell casing. The Utah State 
Crime Laboratory determined that the DNA profile matched the victim's blood standard and did 
not detect and/or identify any comparable ridge detail on the shell casings. In light of this 
outcome, Judge Low ultimately dismissed the case on September 6, 2006. 
On March 4, 2009, Petitioner filed both a petition for post-conviction relief1 pursuant to 
Part 1 of the Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") and a petition for post-conviction 
1
 On December 21, 2010, the Court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the petition for 
post-conviction relief. The Court denied Petitioner's request for reconsideration on January 14, 2011. 
2 
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determination of factual innocence under Part 4 of the PCRA. Both cases were assigned to 
Judge Kevin Allen. In response to the petition filed under the factual innocence statute, the State 
filed a motion to dismiss on May 11, 2009. Petitioner filed her memorandum in opposition to 
the motion on June 11, 2009. On August 3, 2009, Judge Allen denied the State's motion and 
specifically found that "a bona fide issue does exist as to whether Petitioner is factually 
innocent." Mem. Decision, August 3, 2009, at 10. The parties subsequently engaged in 
discovery, and on January 19, 2010, the Court scheduled five days in May of 2010 for an 
evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 78B-9-402(9)(c). 
However, on May 11, 2010, prior to the evidentiary hearing, Judge Allen recused himself 
from hearing the case in accordance with Canon 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct due to 
unsolicited communications made to him about the case. Petitioner's case was then promptly 
transferred from the First Judicial District in Logan to the Second Judicial District in Ogden, and 
the undersigned judge was assigned to the case. Following the resolution of various legal issues, 
the Court held an evidentiary hearing on January 18-24, 2011. On January 26, 2011, the Court 
convened a telephone conference with counsel and raised a concern with respect to two pieces of 
evidence. After further investigation by the parties, the Court re-opened the case for the limited 
purpose of receiving additional testimony on these items of evidence. At the conclusion of the 
evidentiary hearing on March 7, 2011, the Court took the case under advisement. 
II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner 
Petitioner argues that, in the context of her case, she establishes that she is factually 
innocent if she demonstrates that the State's circumstantial case against her was and is factually 
unsupportable. In other words, Petitioner argues that she must demonstrate by clear and 
3 
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convincing evidence that in light of the new evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing as 
well as all the evidence presented in the underlying criminal case, no reasonable juror could have 
found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.2 Petitioner argues that she has satisfied this burden. 
According to Petitioner, during the State's case at trial, the jury was asked to consider the facts 
that separated her from all other persons who may have had some connection to Lael—for 
example, people who owed Lael money, who might have had a grudge or harbored ill-will 
against him, who knew he had guns and cash at his home, who may have had insurance on him, 
and anyone else who may have had a motive to kill him. Petitioner further asserts that the 
prosecutors argued to the jury that after a careful investigation of all possible suspects, they 
focused on Petitioner because she was the only person who could not account for her 
whereabouts at the time the prosecutors argued the murder was committed and because she was 
the only person who had the motive and opportunity to kill Lael. 
However, based upon evidence Petitioner characterizes as newly discovered, she argues 
that it is clear there is no longer any support for the State's circumstantial case against her. This 
new evidence includes the following: (1) information from the Logan City Police Department 
("LPD") that Bobbie Sheen was a possible suspect; (2) statements from Sylvan Bassett 
identifying Sheen as the likely perpetrator of the homicide, including that Sheen was angry with 
2
 Counsel for Petitioner repeated this standard—"no reasonable jury could have found her guilty"—several 
times during his closing argument. Counsel also referred the Court to two decisions from the United States Supreme 
Court to support his contention that this is the correct standard that should apply under Utah's factual innocence 
statute. However, in the first case counsel provided, House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006), the Supreme Court set 
forth the standard as follows: "[Prisoners asserting innocence as a gateway to defaulted claims must establish that, 
in light of new evidence, 'it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt."' Id at 536-37 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, in the second case, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986), the standard was expressed in terms of 
"showfing] a fair probability t h a t . . . the trier of the facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt." 
Id. at 454 (emphasis added). 
4 
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Lael, that he had a gun similar in appearance to the gun that was likely used to kill Lael, that he 
had a large amount of cash sometime after the homicide was committed, and that he drove a blue 
and white Ford Bronco similar to a car seen at LaePs home by neighbors the day Lael was 
murdered; (3) witness statements and information from LPD files showing that neighbors of 
Lael, including Paulette Nyman, heard gunshots at times contrary to the time of death relied 
upon by the prosecution and only at times when Petitioner had a solid alibi; (4) police notes and 
bank documents indicating that Petitioner reported to police that she owed Lael $3,000, that the 
October bank statement never arrived at-Lael's home, that many people knew that Lael had guns 
in his house and large amounts of money, that Lael's home was not secure, but was easily 
accessible, and that Petitioner was not the only person with a key to Lael's home; and (5) internal 
law enforcement notes indicating that LPD mishandled the crime scene, failed to collect 
important physical evidence, failed to test blood evidence, and failed to properly follow-up on 
leads in the case that could have identified the true perpetrator. 
Petitioner asserts that in light of all of the forgoing newly discovered evidence, she has 
shown that each element of the State's circumstantial case, namely motive, opportunity, the lack 
of other possible suspects, and time of death, is false and factually unsupportable. She argues, 
therefore, that she has established by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable juror 
could have found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt had the jury been presented with these 
newly discovered facts. On this basis she asserts that she has shown that she is factually 
innocent of the crime for which she was convicted. 
B. Respondent 
In response, the State argues that the factual innocence statute requires Petitioner to 
establish that she did not engage in the conduct for which she was convicted. In other words, it 
5 
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is not enough for Petitioner to show that the police investigation could have been better or that 
her trial attorneys should have done more to avoid a conviction. Indeed, according to the State, 
regardless of how poorly the police investigated the case and/or how deficiently trial counsel 
performed, these facts, in and of themselves, do not demonstrate that Petitioner did not commit 
the murder. The State argues that Petitioner cannot be found factually innocent because, despite 
all of the alleged newly discovered evidence presented by her, a rational basis still exists for the 
conviction. In sum, the State contends that the evidence presented at trial regarding Petitioner's 
conduct and both her motive and opportunity to commit the murder have not been rebutted. 
Thus, because Petitioner has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that she did not engage 
in the conduct for which she was convicted, the State argues that she has not shown that she is 
factually innocent, and there is no legal reason to disturb the guilty verdict. 
HI. ANALYSIS 
A. Introduction 
In 2008 "the Utah Legislature enacted the Factual Innocence Statute, the core purpose of 
which is to provide justice, in the form of monetary compensation, for individuals who have 
been found factually innocent of a crime for which they were previously convicted and 
incarcerated." Miller v. State, 2010 UT App 25, T[ 7, 226 P.3d 743. Citing to the floor debates in 
the Utah State Senate, the Court of Appeals noted that the statute was enacted "out of 'concern 
for those who might be trampled upon in the grinding process of the law, which happens,' and to 
'compensate] folks who have been dealt a very heavy and unjust blow.'" Id (citing Recording 
of Utah Senate Floor Debates, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Jan. 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. Bell on 
Senate Bill 016), available at http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp). Procedurally, the factual 
innocence statute establishes a "two-step claim process: an individual must first petition the court 
6 
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for a hearing to determine factual innocence, and if the petition meets the requirements of section 
78B-9-402, a hearing will be held at which the petitioner bears the burden of proving factual 
innocence by clear and convincing evidence." Id. 
As required by step one, on March 4, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction 
determination of factual innocence. Judge Allen performed an initial review of the petition and 
determined that the petition identified with specificity newly discovered material evidence that, 
if credible, would establish Petitioner's factual innocence; that the evidence was not merely 
cumulative of evidence already known, that the evidence was not merely impeachment evidence; 
and that; when "viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered evidence demonstrates 
that [Petitioner] is factually innocent." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(v). Judge Allen also 
necessarily found that it was not apparent that Petitioner was "either merely relitigating facts, 
issues, or evidence presented in previous proceedings or presenting issues that appear[ed] 
frivolous or speculative on their face." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(9)(b). After completing 
the initial review, on March 11, 2009, Judge Allen issued an order requiring the State to respond. 
In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition. After considering the State's 
motion to dismiss, on July 16, 2009, Judge Allen found that "there [was] a bona fide and 
compelling issue of factual innocence regarding the charges of which the petitioner was 
convicted." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(9)(c). Although not expressly stated in his ruling, 
Judge Allen also necessarily determined that the petition satisfied subsections (2) and (3) of 
section 78B-9-402, that Petitioner was not "merely relitigating facts, issues, or evidence 
presented in a previous proceeding . . . [and that Petitioner was] []able to identify with sufficient 
specificity the nature and reliability of the newly discovered evidence that establishes [her] 
factual innocence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(9)(c). In light of these findings, Judge Allen 
7 
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granted the petition and proceeded to step two by ordering that a hearing be convened for the 
purpose of allowing the parties to present evidence relevant to the determination of factual 
innocence. 
B. The Factual Innocence Statute 
1. Legal Standard 
Under Utah's factual innocence statute, Petitioner is factually innocent if, based upon a 
consideration of all the evidence presented at the hearing on the petition as well as all the 
evidence in the record of the original criminal case,3 the Court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence4 that Petitioner 
did not (a) engage in the conduct for which [she] was convicted; (b) engage in 
conduct relating to any lesser included offenses of the crime for which [she] was 
convicted; or (c) commit any other felony arising out of or reasonably connected 
to the facts supporting the indictment or information upon which [she] was 
convicted.5 
2
 See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(3). 
4See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(4) (trial court must consider "all the evidence" and "determine[] by 
clear and convincing evidence" that the petitioner is factually innocent). 
5
 In the Court's view, only subsection (a) is relevant to Petitioner's case. The State has not argued that 
Petitioner is not factually innocent because she engaged in conduct relating to a lesser included offense of the crime 
for which she was convicted. However, in arguing for involuntary dismissal under rule 41 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure at the conclusion of Petitioner's presentation of evidence at the January 18-24, 2011, evidentiary 
hearing, the State asserted that the Court could not find Petitioner factually innocent in part because the jury, in 
convicting her of aggravated murder, necessarily also concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that she had forged at 
least one of Lael's checks and, therefore, that the homicide was committed under the pecuniary gain aggravating 
circumstance. Moreover, Petitioner herself testified during the evidentiary hearing that she, in fact, forged several of 
Lael's checks. Based upon this evidence, the State argued that since commission of the forgeries is a felony offense 
"arising out of or reasonably connected to the facts supporting the . . . information upon which [Petitioner] was 
convicted," Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-401.5(2)(c), Petitioner cannot show that she did not engage in conduct 
reasonably connected to the facts supporting the information upon which she was convicted. Therefore, she cannot 
demonstrate that she is factually innocent as that term is defined under Section 78B-9-401.5(2)(c). For the reasons 
set forth below, the Court rejected the State's argument. 
Under the State's interpretation of Section 78B-9-401.5(2)(c), because Petitioner has admitted that she 
forged Lael's checks, which is the offense constituting the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance under which 
Petitioner was charged, no set of facts exists that would warrant concluding that she is factually innocent of 
aggravated murder. Clearly, however, the State's interpretation could result in an absurd and obviously unjust 
outcome. Under the State's interpretation, even if a petitioner unequivocally demonstrates that she did not 
8 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-401.5(2)(a)-(c). A plain reading of the statute's language requires that 
in order to be found factually innocent, Petitioner must demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence6 that she did not, in fact, cause the death of Lael Brown. In the context of Petitioner's 
case, this is accomplished if she affirmatively establishes, based upon all the evidence, that she is 
not the person who committed the homicide. Importantly, this standard is different from 
establishing one's legal innocence. A person is legally innocent when the trier of fact concludes 
based upon the evidence presented, that a reasonable doubt exists that the person committed the 
crime for which she was tried. "[BJecause of the heavy burden of proof in a criminal case, an 
acquittal doesn't mean that the defendant did not commit the crime for which [the defendant] 
was tried; all it means is that the government was not able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
intentionally or knowing cause the death of the victim, that petitioner must still be held responsible for the victim's 
death because she has admitted to committing the crime constituting the aggravating circumstance. This would 
mandate that a petitioner continue serving a sentence for a capital offense even though she has established that she 
did not engage in conduct constituting the capital offense. Clearly, the Utah legislature could not have intended 
such an absurd result. Because "a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if its plain meaning works 
an absurd result or is 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express purpose of a 
statute,'" Savage v. Utah Youth Village, 2004 UT 102, f 18, 104 P.3d 1242 (quoting Perrine v. Kennecott Mining 
Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1992)), the Court rejected the State's argument. 
6
 As explained by the Utah Supreme Court, "for a matter to be clear and convincing to a particular mind it 
must at least have reached the point where there remains no serious or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the 
conclusion," Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 205 (Utah 1949), and "the existence of the [facts at issue is] very 
highly probable." Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 286 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1955); see also Colorado v. 
New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (the "clear-and-convincing standard [means] . . . the ultimate factfinder [has 
an] abiding conviction that the truth of [the] factual contentions [is] 'highly probable.'" (citing C. McCormick, Law 
of Evidence § 320, p. 679 (1954))); Hamlin v. Niedner, 955 A.2d 251, 254 (Me. 2008) ("Evidence is 'cleair and 
convincing' when it places in the ultimate fact finder an 'abiding conviction' that it is 'highly probable' that the 
factual contentions of the party with the burden of proof are true."); Adoption ofZoltan, 881 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2008) ("In order to be clear and convincing, the 'evidence must be sufficient to convey "a high degree of 
probability" that the proposition is true. . . . The requisite proof must be strong and positive; it must be "full, clear 
and decisive."'" (quoting Adoption ofRhona, 784 N.E.2d 22, 28 (2003))); State v. Smith, 749 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2008) ("Evidence is clear and convincing when it is highly probable that it is true."); Riley Hill General 
Contractor, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 737 P.2d 595, 602 (Or. 1987) ("To be 'clear and convincing,' evidence must 
establish that the truth of the facts asserted is 'highly probable.'"). 
9 
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that [the defendant] committed it." Levine v. Kling, 123 F.3d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1997).7 This 
distinction between factual and legal innocence cannot be overemphasized in this case because 
even if the level of doubt raised by Petitioner is so great that no reasonable juror could convict 
her in a retrial if presented with all of the newly discovered evidence, this still would not 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that she did not, in fact, engage in the conduct for 
which she was convicted. At best, such an outcome only demonstrates that no reasonable person 
would contest the existence of reasonable doubt that Petitioner committed the crime.8 
This conclusion is bolstered when the Court reads Chapter 9 of Title 78B as a whole. See 
Zissi v. State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 854 (Utah 1992) ("A general rule of statutory 
construction is that a statute should be construed as a comprehensive whole."). First, under Part 
1, a petitioner is entitled to relief if she can show that newly discovered material evidence, when 
'Viewed with all the other evidence . . . , demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could 
have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(iv) (emphasis added). 
7
 Further support for this proposition is found in the following cases: Shaw v. Department of Admin., 861 
P.2d 566, 570 (Alaska 1993) ("We make a distinction in this case between the 'actual' guilt or innocence of a 
defendant and the 'legal' guilt or innocence of a defendant. 'Legal' guilt or innocence is that determination made by 
the trier of fact in a criminal trial. Thus a defendant found 'legally' guilty has been found guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt by a jury of his peers in a criminal adjudication."); Moore v. Owens, 698 N.E.2d 707, 709 (111. 
App. Ct. 1998) ("We do not believe that even if a criminal defendant is acquitted on retrial, that alone will suffice as 
proof of innocence, although it may be evidence for a fact-finder to consider."); Glenn v. Aiken, 569 N.E.2d 783, 
789 (Mass. 1991) (Liacos, C.J., concurring) ("A criminal trial is an adjudication of a defendant's legal guilt. As a 
result, a jury verdict does not address necessarily the issue of a defendant's actual guilt."). 
8
 Consider, for example, cases where evidence conclusively establishes that the defendant committed the 
crime for which she was tried and convicted, but an appellate court on review vacates the conviction on the basis 
that the evidence supporting the conviction was unconstitutionally obtained and should have been suppressed. All 
may agree that, without the evidence, no reasonable juror could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but this would not mean that the defendant did not engage in the conduct for which she was originally tried and 
convicted. Again, as explained in the body of the Court's memorandum decision, had the Legislature wanted to 
define factual innocence by reference to reasonable doubt, as the federal courts have done, it could easily have done 
so. The fact that the Legislature did not do so suggests that the "no reasonable jury" or "no reasonable trier of fact" 
standard is not the correct standard for determining factual innocence. 
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In contrast, under Part 4, Petitioner is entitled to relief if she can show that the newly 
discovered material evidence, when viewed with all the other evidence, demonstrates that 
Petitioner "did not... engage in the conduct for which [she] was convicted" Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-9-401.5(2)(a) (emphasis added). Had the Legislature intended the legal standard to be the 
same under both Parts 1 and 4, it certainly had the language readily available in Part 1 to import 
into Part 4, the factual innocence statute. The fact that the Legislature elected not to do so 
strongly suggests to this Court that the "no reasonable jury" or "no reasonable trier of fact" 
standard is not the correct standard for determining factual innocence. 
Second, under Part 4, if a petitioner establishes that she is factually innocent, the trial 
court must order that her conviction "be vacated with prejudice." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
404(4)(a)(i). Under Part 1, however, if a petitioner establishes that, based upon newly 
discovered evidence, no reasonable trier of fact could have found her guilty of the offense for 
which she was convicted, then the trial court must "vacate the original conviction . . . and order a 
new trial." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-.9-108(l)(b). Clearly, if factual innocence means that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, then it 
would be inconsistent, on the one hand, to vacate the conviction but order a new trial under Part 
1 and, on the other hand, vacate the conviction with prejudice under Part 4. This inconsistency 
provides yet another basis for the Court's conclusion that the "no reasonable jury" or "no 
reasonable trier of fact" standard is not the correct standard for determining factual innocence. 
Accordingly, based upon a careful reading of the factual innocence statute, as well as the 
entire PCRA, it is the Court's conclusion, as a matter of law, that factual innocence is only 
established if Petitioner affirmatively demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that she did 
not, in fact, commit the homicide. Therefore, while demonstrating that no reasonable jury could 
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have found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt had the jury been presented with all of the 
newly discovered evidence may warrant relief in certain settings, it is not the same relief 
available to Petitioner under the factual innocence statute. Stated differently, raising doubt as to 
her underlying conviction, even strong doubt, is not the legal equivalent under the factual 
innocence statute of establishing that she did not, in fact, cause Lael Brown's death. 
2. Pleading Requirements and Meaning of "Newly Discovered Material 
Evidence" 
Among the various pleading requirements in Part 4 of the PCRA, subsection (3)(a) of 
section 78B-9-402 requires a petitioner to include in her petition an averment that is remarkably 
similar to the definition of "newly discovered material evidence" under Part 1. This does not 
mean, however, that the definitions of "newly discovered material evidence" in both Parts 1 and 
4 are the same. Under Part 1, "newly discovered material evidence" is defined in terms of what 
petitioner and her counsel knew or could have discovered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence. Under Part 4, on the other hand, "newly discovered material evidence" is defined only 
in terms of what was available to the petitioner. Significantly, evidence could be known to a 
petitioner, but not available to her. For example, suppose a defendant (now petitioner) was 
aware of or knew about a material witness who could provide relevant testimony in her murder 
case, but the witness was in a coma during the time of trial. Testimony from this witness would 
not constitute newly discovered evidence under Part 1 because the defendant-petitioner was 
aware of the testimony when she was tried for her offense. The testimony would, however, be 
newly discovered evidence under Part 4 because, while known, the evidence was not available or 
accessible to her. In the Court's view, whether evidence is known or not known to a petitioner or 
whether it could have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence is not 
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determinative of whether the evidence averred in the factual innocence petition or presented at 
the evidentiary hearing is newly discovered. 
Importantly, this view that the definitions of "newly discovered material evidence" under 
Parts 1 and 4 are not the same does not render superfluous the averment required under 
subsection (3)(a). The averment in subsection (3)(a) creates a separate, independent requirement 
that the petition must meet apart from the definition of "newly discovered material evidence." In 
order to understand the interplay between the definition of "newly discovered material evidence" 
identified in subsection (3) of section 78B-9-401.5 and the averment required in subsection 
(3)(a), the Court will walk through its interpretation of the petition requirements found in 
subsections (2)(a) and (3)(a) of section 78B-9-402. 
Section 78B-9-402 outlines the requirements a petitioner must satisfy in order to have the 
petition granted by the reviewing court. Subsection (2)(a) states that a petition for the 
determination of factual innocence must contain, among other things, an averment that "newly 
discovered material evidence exists that, if credible, establishes that the petitioner is factually 
innocent." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(2)(a)(i). When deciding whether a petition meets this 
requirement, the reviewing court must apply the definition of "newly discovered material 
evidence" outlined in section 78B-9-401.5(3). Significantly, this definition contains a strict 
timeframe of unavailability which extends from the time of "thai [to] . . . the resolution on the 
merits by the trial court of any motion to withdraw a guilty plea or motion for new trial," which 
is usually 10 days after sentencing. 
Now, consider again the example above of a material witness in a murder case who is in a 
coma during the time of trial. The defendant-petitioner is tried, convicted, and sentenced without 
the witness' testimony. Suppose 11 days after the defendant-petitioner is sentenced, the witness 
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wakes up from the coma. As explained above, the witness is still "newly discovered material 
evidence" as defined by the statute because the witness was unavailable to the defendant-
petitioner during the time of trial until 10 days after sentencing. It is immaterial at this juncture 
that the witness was known about or that the witness became fully available to testify on day 11 
after the defendant-petitioner was sentenced. Thus, if a reviewing court finds, among other 
things, that the witness' testimony, if credible, establishes that the petitioner is factually 
innocent, then the requirements under subsection (2)(a) are met. If not, the reviewing court must 
dismiss the petition without prejudice. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(3)(b). 
Having found that the petitioner satisfies subsection (2)(a), the reviewing court must then 
make another independent determination of whether the requirements under subsection (3)(a) are 
met as well. Subsection (3)(a) requires the petitioner to include in the petition the following 
averment: 
[NJeither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time 
of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed 
post-trial motion or postconviction motion, and the evidence could not have been 
discovered by the petitioner or the petitioner's counsel through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence . . . ." 
Again, the subsection articulates a timeframe for knowledge of the evidence by the petitioner or 
petitioner's counsel. However, this timeframe—unlike the definition for "newly discovered 
material evidence"—extends from the time of trial until the time of any previous post-conviction 
motion or petition. If the petitioner is unable to make this averment in the petition, regardless of 
whether the evidence being averred is newly discovered or not, then the reviewing court may 
dismiss the petition. Even so, subsection (3)(b) contains a waiver provision that allows the 
reviewing court, based upon the strength of the petition and in the interest of justice, to waive the 
requirements of subsection (3)(a). The waiver provision does not, however, extend to the 
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definition of "newly discovered material evidence" and whether the evidence was not avsrilable. 
It also does not extend to waive the requirements of subsection (2)(a). 
In the example above, the witness who was in a coma during the time of trial until day 11 
after the defendant-petitioner was sentenced meets the requirements for newly discovered 
material evidence and the requirements of subsection (2)(a). However, the witness does not meet 
the requirements of subsection (3)(a) because the witness was known about during the time of 
trial. The reviewing court then has the option to waive the requirements of subsection (3)(a) 
based upon the strength of the witness' testimony in establishing the petitioner's factual 
innocence. If, however, the petitioner has known about the evidence for a significant amount of 
time without bringing a claim of factual innocence, then the reviewing court may decide that it is 
not in the interest of justice to waive subsection (3)(a). Thus, subsection (3)(a) is a diligence 
provision that is present to encourage petitioners to bring their claims of factual innocence in a 
timely manner or risk having the petition dismissed. It is not linked to the definition of "newly 
discovered material evidence" as defined in Part 4. 
3. Evidentiary Basis 
Section 78B-9-404, which addresses the hearing on the petition, places no restrictions on 
the type of evidence the parties may present. Because of the broad language in the section, the 
Court concludes that all relevant evidence may be presented at the hearing. This includes the 
newly discovered evidence averred in the petition and any evidence previously presented at trial 
or in a prior post-conviction proceeding. Furthermore, evidence may be presented that, while not 
newly discovered, was not presented in any prior proceeding because of tactical decisions, 
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ineffective assistance of counsel,9 or other reasons.10 Finally, the statute explicitly states that the 
Court may consider evidence that is hearsay in nature and evidence that was suppressed or would 
have been suppressed at trial. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(2)-(3). 
In determining whether Petitioner is factually innocent, the factual innocence statute 
states that the Court "shall consider, in addition to the evidence presented at the hearing [on the 
petition], the record of the original criminal case and at any postconviction proceedings in the 
case." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(3). While the statute is clear about what evidence the 
Court must consider in determining Petitioner's factual innocence, it does not expressly indicate 
what the evidentiary basis must be for a finding of factual innocence. That is, the statute does 
not give the Court definitive direction on whether a finding of factual innocence (1) must be 
based exclusively on newly discovered evidence, (2) may be based exclusively on non-newly 
discovered evidence presented at the hearing, or (3) may be based upon a combination of newly 
discovered evidence and non-newly discovered evidence. 
9
 It may be unusual for evidence that was not presented at trial for tactical reasons to be relevant to a 
determination of factual innocence. Nevertheless, it is certainly possible that evidence counsel believed at the time 
of trial would not be helpful may be viewed differently in light of the newly discovered evidence. In addition, 
evidence that was not presented at trial because trial counsel was ineffective would ordinarily be raised and 
presented in a petition for post-conviction relief filed under Part 1 of the PCRA and, therefore, may be presented at 
the hearing on the petition for determination of factual innocence. It is possible, however, that a petition for 
determination of factual innocence could be raised prior to the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief or the 
petitioner may have missed her opportunity under the PCRA's statute of limitations to raise a petition for post-
conviction relief. There is no reason to believe that evidence the petitioner could have raised in a post-conviction 
petition had such a petition been filed, should be excluded from the hearing on the petition for determination of 
factual innocence if it is relevant to determining factual innocence. 
10
 The presentation of such evidence is almost inevitable at this type of proceeding. One example is the 
testimony of a witness who testified at the original trial and is called to testify again at the hearing. Unless the 
witness gives the same testimony, verbatim, that he gave in the original trial, at least some part of his testimony will 
be neither "old evidence" nor "newly discovered evidence." Further, the witness may be asked to answer questions 
that he was not asked at the original trial. Clearly, the Court should not be precluded from considering such 
testimony simply because it does not conform exactly to the testimony given at the original trial. Another example 
of such evidence would be evidence that was available to a petitioner at the original trial, but was not presented 
because it only became relevant in light of the newly discovered evidence. Again, the Court should not be precluded 
from considering such evidence that aids a petitioner's presentation of factual innocence simply because it is not 
"newly discovered." 
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Thus, the question before the Court is one of statutory interpretation, the principles of 
which the Utah Supreme Court has well-defined: 
Our goal when confronted with questions of statutory interpretation is to evince 
the true intent and purpose of the Legislature. . . . It is axiomatic that the best 
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute itself... . But our 
plain language analysis is not so limited that we only inquire into individual 
words and subsections in isolation; our interpretation of a statute requires that 
each part or section be construed in connection with every other part or section so 
as to produce a harmonious whole. Moreover, the purpose of the statute has an 
influence on the plain meaning of a statute. 
Anderson v Bell, 2010 UT 47, If 9, 234 P.3d 1147 (alteration in the original) (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, 
Our duty to give effect to the plain meaning of a statute . . . should give way if 
doing so would work a result so absurd that the legislature could not have 
intended i t . . . . Where a statute's plain language creates an absurd, unreasonable, 
or inoperable result, we assume the legislature did not intend that result. To avoid 
an absurd result, we endeavor to discover the underlying legislative intent and 
interpret the statute accordingly. 
State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 5, % 8, 201 P.3d 1004 (internal citations omitted). 
The non-restrictive, plain language of section 78B-9-404 suggests that a finding 
of factual innocence need not be based upon newly discovered evidence. Instead, the 
factual innocence statute mandates that the Court must vacate a petitioner's conviction 
"[i]f the court, after considering all the evidence, determines by clear and convincing 
evidence that the petitioner . . . is factually innocent." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(4) 
(emphasis added). Even though a strict reading of the plain language of the statute allows 
a broad consideration of any evidence, the Court finds that this reading could lead to at 
least three unreasonable, if not absurd or inoperable, results. 
First, if the Court's determination can be based upon any evidence, then it is 
possible that a court could base its determination solely upon the record of the original 
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trial. This runs afoul of the pleading requirements found in section 78B-9-402(9)(c), 
which precludes petitions that "merely relitigat[e] facts, issues, or evidence presented in a 
previous proceeding." Moreover, this broad reading theoretically allows a judge to 
substitute his or her view of the original evidence for that of a jury's—a substitution this 
Court refuses to make. 
Second, if the Court's determination can be based upon any evidence, then it is 
possible that a court could base its determination solely upon evidence that was available 
to the petitioner at trial, but was not presented for tactical reasons or because of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. While basing the Court's determination on this 
evidence presents no danger of substituting a judge's judgment for a jury's, a 
determination based solely upon this evidence encroaches upon Part 1 of the PCRA, 
which allows a petitioner to receive a new trial because of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. In essence, the evidentiary bases for the two petitions would be identical, but 
the results to the petitioner would be vastly different. Under Part 1 of the PCRA, a 
petitioner would only receive a new trial. Using the same evidence under Part 4, a 
petitioner's conviction would be vacated and she would be monetarily compensated. 
Thus, a petitioner could be dilatory under Part 1 and not bring her claim within the 
required statute of limitations, but be rewarded for her lack of diligence under Part 4, 
which has no statute of limitations. 
Finally, a non-restrictive reading of the language of section 78B-9-404 seems to 
undermine the pleading requirements in section 78B-9-402. Although section 78B-9-404, 
which governs the hearing on the petition, nowhere uses the term "newly discovered 
material evidence," section 78B-9-402, which governs the pleadings, uses the term 
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repeatedly. In the pleadings, a petitioner is required to aver that "newly discovered 
material evidence exists that, if credible, establishes that the petitioner is factually 
innocent . . . ." and that "viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered 
evidence demonstrates that the petitioner is factually innocent." Id. (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the statute requires the reviewing judge to find that there is a "bona fide and 
compelling issue of factual innocence regarding the charges of which the petitioner was 
convicted." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(9)(c). The statute defines a "bona fide and 
compelling issue of factual innocence" as meaning that "the newly discovered material 
evidence presented by the petitioner, if credible, would clearly establish the factual 
innocence of the petitioner." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-401.5(l) (emphasis added). 
Thus, section 78B-9-402 specifically mandates newly discovered material 
evidence as the expected evidentiary basis for a finding of factual innocence during the 
pleading stage of the claim process. If a petitioner does not satisfy this basis, the judge 
must dismiss the petition without a hearing. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-402(3)(b). It 
would be peculiar if a similar evidentiary basis did not apply during the hearing stage. If 
the Legislature is not concerned about whether "newly discovered material evidence" 
contributes to the determination of factual innocence at the hearing, then in the Court's 
view it is pointless and unduly harsh to impose such a strong averment requirement in the 
petition. Therefore, after reading the factual innocence statute as a whole, the Court is 
not convinced that the pleading requirements are mere procedural hurdles; instead, the 
Court is convinced that the pleading requirements create an expectation that newly 
discovered material evidence will be presented at the hearing and will have at least some 
bearing on the Court's determination of factual innocence. 
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The only question left for the Court is whether the determination of factual 
innocence must be based exclusively upon newly discovered material evidence or 
whether it can be based upon a combination of the newly discovered evidence plus any 
other relevant evidence. The Court recognizes that the primary purpose behind bringing 
other evidence to the hearing is either to bolster or impugn the credibility of the newly 
discovered evidence. In this evaluation, however, it is possible that the newly discovered 
evidence alone does not clearly demonstrate that the petitioner is factually innocent, but 
instead the newly discovered evidence together with all the other evidence does rise to 
the required clear and convincing standard for demonstrating factual innocence. While 
newly discovered evidence is required to be the sole basis for factual innocence at the 
pleading stage of the petition, the Court finds that such a strict requirement at the hearing 
stage would be adverse to the overall intent and purpose of the statute. 
As stated above, the core purpose of the factual innocence statute is to "provide 
justice . . . for individuals who have been found factually innocent of a crime for which 
they were previously convicted and incarcerated." Miller v. State, 2010 UT App 25 at % 7. 
Furthermore, the legislative history clearly highlights the mischief the statute was created 
to remedy. During the floor debates, Senator Greg Bell stated that the statute was 
enacted out of "concern for those who might be trampled upon in the grinding process of 
the law" and to "compensate[e] folks who have been dealt a very heavy and unjust blow." 
Id (citing Recording of Utah Senate Floor Debates, 58th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Jan. 23, 2008) 
(statement of Sen. Bell on Senate Bill 016), available at http://le.utah.gov/asp/ 
audio/index.asp). Clearly, the Legislature's primary concern is the factual innocence of 
the petitioner—not the status of the evidence that proves factual innocence. It would be 
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unjust to deny these petitioners relief who can prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that they are, in fact, innocent simply because they cannot prove their factual innocence 
based solely upon newly discovered evidence. Instead, the Court finds that it may base 
its determination of factual innocence either upon newly discovered evidence alone or a 
combination of evidence—as long as the newly discovered material evidence provides at 
least part of that basis. By considering "all of the evidence," the Court effectuates not 
only the plain language of the statute, but also the overall intent and purpose of the 
Legislature. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(4) 
C. Consideration of the Evidence 
1. Evidence Presented on January 18-24,2011 
It is clear that Petitioner has relied upon an incorrect legal standard in presenting and 
arguing her case. This error obscured her view of what evidence was important to establishing 
factual innocence and dramatically undermined her ability to demonstrate by clear and 
convincing evidence that she did not, in fact, cause the death of Lael Brown. It is fair to say that 
most of the new evidence presented by her at the evidentiary hearing convened on January 18-
24, 2011, when viewed with the facts of the underlying criminal case, at best raises doubts about 
the State's circumstantial case against her, but does not establish that she did not engage in the 
conduct for which she was convicted. Furthermore, even if the legal standard Petitioner relied 
upon were the correct standard, she still would not have prevailed on her claim of factual 
innocence based upon the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. While the new 
evidence may undermine the State's case in significant respects and would have, in all 
likelihood, made it more difficult for the State to obtain a conviction had it been presented to the 
jury, it is the Court's view that reasonable jurors still could have differed on what the old and 
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new facts established and whether the prosecution could have proven its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
First, Petitioner presented credible evidence challenging the State's theory that she was 
the only person who had a motive to kill Lael. This included evidence that Lael never 
discovered Petitioner's forgeries prior to his death; that numerous bank statements, and not 
simply the October bank statement, were missing from his home; that Petitioner relied upon Lael 
for money through loans and employment and, therefore, it would have been contrary to her 
financial well-being to kill Lael; that many people knew Lael kept large amounts of cash in his 
home; and that Sheen was angry with Lael for having evicted him. Importantly, however, 
Petitioner acknowledged that she did commit the forgeries as alleged by the State at trial. While 
the new evidence may raise doubts that she had a motive to kill Lael or, at a minimum, that it is 
at least questionable whether she was the only person who had such a motive, it does not 
establish, either on its own or when viewed with all the other evidence, that she did not, in fact, 
cause Lael's death. Clearly, had this evidence been presented at Petitioner's original trial, 
reasonable minds still could have differed on whether Petitioner had a motive to commit the 
murder. 
Second, Petitioner also presented credible new evidence challenging the State's theory 
that she was the only person who had access to Lael's home. This included evidence that she 
was not the only person with a key to Lael's house; that the front and back doors to Lael's house 
were not secure; and that the bathroom window could be opened. Again, at best this evidence 
raises doubts about the State's theory, but it does not affirmatively establish, either on its own or 
when viewed with all the other evidence, that she was not the one who entered Lael's home on 
the morning of November 6th or that she did not, in fact, cause Lael's death. 
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Third, Petitioner provided the Court' with new evidence that someone other than 
Petitioner, namely Sheen, was the likely perpetrator of the homicide and, therefore, that the 
State's theory that she was the only possible person who could have committed the murder was 
erroneous. Petitioner presented evidence that LPD failed to investigate Sheen even though the 
police knew he was a possible suspect; that the overall investigation was less than adequate and 
that police failed to collect or analyze important evidence at the crime scene; and that Sheen may 
have been in possession of a gun similar to the one used to kill Lael, may have been 
uncharacteristically carrying a large sum of cash sometime after Lael's murder, may have been 
angry at Lael for having evicted him, and may have been driving a car similar to one seen at 
Lael's house on the day of the murder. Although this evidence certainly would have assisted 
Petitioner in undermining the State's circumstantial case against her, at most it merely creates a 
circumstantial case against Sheen. Reasonable minds still could differ on which circumstantial 
case to believe. This evidence, therefore, does not establish, either on its own or when viewed 
with all the other evidence, that no reasonable juror could have convicted Petitioner had this 
evidence been presented at the original trial or, more importantly, that Petitioner did not, in fact, 
cause Lael's death. 
Finally, Petitioner also sought to provide new evidence challenging the time of death the 
State established at trial. The State argued to the jury that Lael was murdered at approximately 
7:00 a.m. on Saturday, November 6, 1993, a time when Petitioner did not have a clear alibi. 
Prosecutors established the time of Lael's death first through the testimony of Dr. Grey, the 
medical examiner, who testified that the post-mortem interval,11 based upon the physical 
11
 Post-mortem interval is the time that has elapsed since a person has died. 
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evidence, was 36 hours from the time the autopsy was performed at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, 
November 8th. In addition, Dr. Grey also testified that, given the condition of the body at the 
time it was discovered, it was highly unlikely that Lael was killed after 3:00 a.m. Sunday 
morning. Thus, based upon the physical evidence, Lael's murder likely occurred sometime 
around 9:00 p.m. on Saturday, November 6th, and no later than 3:00 a.m. on Sunday, November 
7th. 
However, Dr. Grey also testified that "association factors," such as Lael's routines, his 
appointments, and the last time he was seen alive, could justify expanding the post-mortem 
interval. With respect to these association factors, the State called witnesses at trial who testified 
that although Lael's normal routine was to have coffee at Angie's Restaurant and work around 
his home on Saturday mornings, he was not seen at any time on Saturday. In addition, Lael 
normally spoke to his former spouse on Saturday mornings about business matters, but Lael 
never answered his telephone, although witnesses heard the phone ringing. Moreover, on Friday 
evening Lael made an appointment to meet with a tenant to do some plumbing repairs on 
Saturday morning, but he failed to keep his appointment. Finally, testimony from witnesses at 
trial established that Lael was last seen alive at 5:00 p.m. on Friday, November 5th. When all of 
the physical evidence and association factors are coupled with Nyman's testimony that she heard 
what she believed to be gunshots coming from the direction of Lael's house at 7:00 a.m. on 
November 6th, the State argued that Lael was murdered at approximately 7:00 a.m. on Saturday 
morning. 
In an effort to cast doubt on the State's time of death argument, Petitioner presented 
12
 As explained by Dr. Grey, physical evidence relevant to determining the post-mortem interval includes 
body cooling, stiffening of the limbs (rigor mortis), settling of the blood (liver mortis), and decomposition. 
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newly discovered evidence at the evidentiary hearing that Nyman was unsure of the day on 
which she heard gunshots. Despite her trial testimony, which included a statement that she was 
nearly certain she heard gunshots on Saturday morning, at the evidentiary hearing she testified 
that she was not sure when she heard gunshots, but that it was on the same day there was police 
activity at LaePs house, which would have been on Sunday, November 7th. Interestingly, 
Nyman also apparently told Officer Collins that she heard gunshots Saturday evening. In any 
event, based upon the uncontroverted testimony of Dr. Grey and Officer Andrews concerning the 
physical condition of Lael's body when it was discovered Sunday morning, it is simply not 
possible that if Nyman heard gunshots at 7:00 a.m. on Sunday that those gunshots were in any 
way connected to Lael's murder. The most that can be concluded in Petitioner's favor from 
Nyman's current and prior testimony is that it is unclear whether she heard gunshots at 7:00 a.m. 
on Saturday, November 6th. The newly discovered evidence from Nyman does not establish, 
either on its own or when viewed with all the other evidence presented at the hearing, that no 
reasonable juror could have convicted Petitioner had her evidentiary hearing testimony been 
presented at the original trial or that Petitioner did not, in fact, cause Lael's death. 
While all of the foregoing evidence certainly raises doubts about the State's case against 
Petitioner, it clearly does not establish that Petitioner did not, in fact, cause the death of Lael 
Brown at 7:00 a.m. on Saturday, November 6th. Therefore, it also does not establish that she is 
factually innocent of the crime for which she was convicted.13 
13
 Given the Court's conclusion with respect to the proper legal standard that applies and the Court's 
assessment of the evidence presented by Petitioner at the January 18-24, 2011, evidentiary hearing, one may 
question whether the original petition for determination of factual innocence should have been granted. In finding 
that a bona fide issue of factual innocence existed, Judge Allen's ruling specifically stated that "Petitioner has pled 
factual innocence, and alleged that newly discovered evidence establishes such. Petitioner's new evidence, if taken 
as true, creates substantial doubts as to the State's original case" Mem. Decision, August 3, 2009, at 10 (emphasis 
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2. Evidence Presented on March 7,2011 
a) Background 
On January 26, 2011, just two days after the presentation of evidence by Petitioner, the 
Court convened a telephone conference with counsel for the purpose of raising a concern with 
respect to two items of hearsay evidence admitted as Exhibit 82 and Exhibit 34. The first item of 
evidence was a case information sheet prepared by Detective Ridler that memorialized his 
interview with a man by the name of Del win Hall. According to Detective Ridler, Hall stated 
that he was sure he saw Lael at Angie's Restaurant on Saturday, November 6th, at 2:30 p.m. The 
second item of evidence was another case information sheet prepared by Dennis Simonson that 
memorialized his interview with Dexter Taylor who stated that he heard, third hand, that a 
secretary at Cache Valley Insurance had observed Lael walking with an associate of Michael 
Wayne Philips on November 6th. The Court indicated to counsel its belief that these two items 
of evidence were critical pieces of information in the case.14 Moreover, the Court also stated that 
added). However, as explained in the body of the memorandum decision, even when newly discovered evidence 
exists, if it only raises doubts about the State's original case against Petitioner, it does not demonstrate that she did 
not engage in the conduct for which she was convicted and, therefore, that she is factually innocent. 
Nevertheless, it is important to point out that unlike the argument raised by the State at the conclusion of 
the evidentiary hearing, in its motion to dismiss the petition before Judge Allen the State only argued that none of 
the evidence raised in the petition constituted newly discovered evidence. The State never challenged the legal 
standard relied upon by Petitioner to claim that she was factually innocent. This is significant because Judge Allen 
could not have been expected to review the petition and make the required findings under section 78B-9-402 based 
upon a legal standard other than the one asserted by Petitioner and, more importantly, uncontested by the State. 
In addition, it is noteworthy that at the motion hearing convened on January 14, 2011, although the State 
argued that it disagreed with Judge Allen's conclusion that a bona fide issue of factual innocence existed, the State 
also acknowledged that Judge Allen made the threshold finding required by section 78B-9-402 and that, in light of 
his decision, Petitioner was entitled to a hearing on the merits of her factual innocence claim. The State never 
contested whether the evidentiary hearing should go forward or whether Petitioner should be allowed to present her 
evidence. Rather, the State only argued that it must be permitted to challenge, at the conclusion of the presentation 
of evidence, whether Petitioner was able to demonstrate that the evidence in her possession was, in fact, newly 
discovered evidence that supported a finding of factual innocence. 
14
 The Court first raised its concerns about Exhibit 82 and Exhibit 34 and inquired whether any follow-up 
had been done or whether any additional information was available in an off-the-record discussion with counsel in 
chambers immediately prior to the presentation of closing arguments on January 24, 2011. The State responded that 
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it would be willing to reopen the case in order to consider additional evidence if the parties were 
inclined to do any additional investigation or follow-up that might assist the Court in evaluating 
the credibility and weight of these two pieces of evidence. Counsel for Petitioner expressed a 
desire to do additional investigation, which was granted by the Court. At a subsequent telephone 
conference convened on February 14, 2011, Petitioner's counsel indicated that they had located 
Hall, that they had also located another relevant witness, Terry Carlsen,15 and that they were both 
prepared to testily. The State informed the Court that it would call Mike Brown, Lael's son, to 
testify as a rebuttal witness to Carlsen. 
At the March 7, 2011, evidentiary hearing, Hall, who was a friend of Lael's, testified that 
he provided Detective Ridler with a statement concerning the last time he saw Lael alive. The 
case information sheet created by Detective Ridler states, verbatim, that 
Del is a friend/coffee drinking buddy of Lael's from Angie's. Dell related that he 
saw Lael Friday night at Angies and also Saturday, 11-6-93 at aprox. 1430 hours 
in Angies. Dell is sure of the time, because he was stopping in Angie's before 
going to work at albertson at 1500 hours. 
According to Hall's statement, he stopped in Angie's Restaurant on his way to work at 2:30 p.m. 
the evidence was not newly discovered and, therefore, no follow-up was necessary. Petitioner responded that 
Exhibits 82 and 34 were simply additional illustrations of how the police failed to properly investigate the case. The 
Court also asked counsel how it should evaluate these exhibits without additional information. Neither the State nor 
Petitioner provided the Court with helpful guidance as to the weight and credibility it should attribute to these 
exhibits. 
15During the telephone conference, Petitioner's counsel told the Court about Terry Carlsen for the first time 
and disclosed that Carlsen had seen Lael at Angie's on the evening of Saturday, November 6th. Counsel stated that 
they had "actually met [Carlsen] through Del Hall and trying to find where Del Hall was." Based upon this 
representation, the Court believed Carlsen to be a previously unknown witness with pertinent information regarding 
Lael's time of death, and the Court allowed Carlsen to testify at the hearing on March 7th. Carlsen's testimony at 
the hearing, however, revealed that he was not a previously unknown witness. Carlsen testified on cross-
examination that he had first spoken to one of Petitioner's attorneys in 2008 about seeing Lael at Angie's. The 
Court is concerned that the failure to disclose Petitioner's prior knowledge of Carlsen was not simply an oversight, 
but a material omission that misled the Court. Moreover, the Court is perplexed as to why such an important piece 
of evidence about which RMIC was aware was not included in the original petition especially because Carlsen's 
testimony is newly discovered material evidence as defined by the factual innocence statute which, if credible, 
would establish Petitioner's factual innocence. 
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on Saturday, November 6th, and saw Lael Brown. While Hall does not now have an 
independent recollection of what he told Detective Ridler, he testified at the evidentiary hearing 
that at the time he gave his statement he was "quite sure" he saw Lael on Saturday. Hall also 
stated twice that he saw Lael before 3:00 p.m. Hall described going into Angie's Restaurant and 
seeing Lael sitting at the counter near the cash register with another man. He recognized Lael 
because he saw his face, but he did not recognize the man with whom Lael was sitting. Not 
wanting to interrupt them, Hall walked to the other end of the counter without saying hello. 
When asked whether he saw Lael leave Angie's, Hall stated that Lael and the other man left 
before Hall was finished drinking his coffee. 
Next, Carlsen, who was also a good friend of Lael's, testified that he saw Lael and his 
son Mike in Angie's Restaurant between 7:15 and 7:45 p.m. on Saturday, November 6th. 
Carlsen testified that he was sitting at the back counter at Angie's when Lael and Mike walked in 
and sat at the end of the counter. He could see that Lael and Mike were having a conversation, 
but he could not hear what was being said. Carlsen testified that he is certain about the day and 
time he saw Lael at Angie's. According to Carlsen, on Sunday, November 7th a friend of his, 
Keith Eames, came by the service station where Carlsen worked and told him that the police 
were at Lael's house and that Lael had been murdered. Carlsen testified that he remembers 
being shocked and thinking to himself that he had just seen Lael alive the night before. 
The State, however, argued that both Hall and Carlsen were mistaken about seeing Lael 
alive on Saturday. In its cross-examination of Hall, the State referred to several case information 
sheets of interviews with waitresses from Angie's Restaurant, all of whom stated that they either 
did not think Lael was at Angie's on Saturday or that they did not remember or did not recall 
seeing Lael at Angie's on Saturday. After Hall and Carlsen were made aware of the content of 
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these police case notes, they were asked whether they had been mistaken about when they had 
seen Lael alive. Both reaffirmed that they saw at Angie's on Saturday. 
In addition, the State also elicited testimony from Carlsen that the State argues calls into 
question the believability of his testimony. Carlsen testified that he was friends with Petitioner at 
the time of the homicide. After Petitioner was arrested, Carlsen conceded that Petitioner called 
him from jail on a few occasions. Moreover, since Petitioner has been in prison, Carlsen has 
maintained regular contact with Petitioner's aunt, Judy Bodrero. 
Finally, the State called Lael's son Mike as a rebuttal witness. Mike testified that, 
contrary to Carlsen's testimony, he was not with Lael at any time on Saturday, November 6th. 
The last time he saw his father was on Monday, November 1 st. He recalled that this was the day 
because, although he lived in Box Elder County at the time, he has a check that he wrote to 
Shopko in Logan on Monday of the week Lael was killed and it was his recollection that he did 
not come back to Logan any other time that week. 
b) Terry Carlsen's Testimony 
Carlsen's testimony is newly discovered evidence as defined by the factual innocence 
statute because, based upon the evidence presented, he was unavailable to Petitioner at trial and 
during the resolution of any post-trial motion. Carlsen testified that the police never spoke with 
him about Petitioner's case and no evidence was presented establishing that he personally spoke 
with Petitioner or her counsel about the information he possessed. Since he was unavailable, 
Carlsen's testimony constitutes newly discovered evidence. 
The central concerns with respect to Carlsen's testimony are whether he is accurate and 
credible. Carlsen testified that while he was sitting at the back counter, he saw Lael walk into 
Angie's with his son Mike. Carlsen specifically stated that he observed the two of them having a 
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conversation not more than 20 feet from where he was sitting. These circumstances establish 
that when Carlsen was in Angie's he was in a position to actually see Lael. In addition, there is 
little question that if Lael entered Angie's Restaurant around 7:15 p.m. on Saturday, Carlsen 
would have recognized Lael. Carlsen testified that he was good friends with Lael and that in 
1993 he would sometimes see Lael twice a day at Angie's. In addition, he and Lael would 
occasionally drive together to Franklin, Idaho, on Tuesdays or Wednesdays in order to purchase 
lottery tickets. They would then get together on Wednesday evening around 8:00 p.m. to watch 
the lottery results. Certainly, if Lael was in Angie's on Saturday evening, Carlsen would not 
have mistaken someone else for Lael. 
Just as important, however, is whether Carlsen accurately testified that he saw Lael at 
Angie's the evening of Saturday, November 6th. Carlsen stated that he was certain about the 
day. Mike Brown, however, was just as emphatic that he was not in Angie's on Saturday 
evening with his father. Mike initially testified that he last saw his father alive on Monday night 
the week Lael was killed, which would have been November 1st. He indicated that he 
remembers it was Monday because he has a check he wrote to the Shopko in Logan on that day, 
and he has no recollection of returning to Cache County any other time that week. On cross-
examination, however, Mike admitted that he could have last seen his father on Tuesday, but that 
it was most likely Monday. Then, on re-direct, he testified that he could have seen his father as 
late as Wednesday. When queried on cross-examination about whether he could have seen his 
father as late as Thursday, Mike testified that he definitely did not see Lael on that day. 
However, counsel for Petitioner pointed out that at the preliminary hearing Mike testified 
that he and Lael drove together to Angie's Restaurant for coffee on Thursday evening. When 
confronted with this discrepancy, Mike testified that he did not see Lael on Thursday, that he 
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does not recall testifying to those facts at the preliminary hearing, and that if he did testify that 
way at the preliminary hearing, he does not know why he would have done so. Importantly, 
Mike also acknowledged that during the 1993 to 1994 timeframe he could have had problems 
with his memory, likely as a result of alcohol abuse. Based upon Mike's inconsistent 
recollection of when he last saw Lael alive and his apparent memory problems, the Court finds 
that the mere fact that Mike remembers events differently from Carlsen is not, in itself, 
conclusive with respect to the accuracy of Carlsen's testimony concerning the day Carlsen last 
saw Lael alive. 
When Carlsen was cross-examined by the State, he was presented with information from 
one of the waitresses at Angie's, Debbie Keller, that was recorded on a police case information 
sheet. Keller apparently worked at Angie's on Saturday evenings from 3:00 to 11:00 p.m. 
According to the case information sheet, she allegedly told police that she did not see Lael 
Saturday night. She indicated that Lael is always in Angie's around 8:00 p.m. and that the last 
time she saw him was Thursday, although it may have been Friday evening. Keller was not 
called to testify at the evidentiary hearing and so the veracity of her statement was never 
subjected to testing under cross-examination. However, a single waitress stating that she did not 
see Lael during her shift on Saturday evening has, at best, only marginal value. Not seeing 
someone has less persuasive effect, in the Court's view, than actually seeing someone because 
there are a variety of reasons why a person may be present at a location but not noticed. 
Moreover, the fact that Keller was not sure whether she last saw Lael on Thursday or Friday is at 
least some evidence that she may not be sure about not seeing Lael on Saturday. It is also 
noteworthy that another waitress, Holly Crocket, who also worked at Angie's on Satuirday 
evenings, indicated that she believed she saw Lael Saturday night, although she is very unsure. 
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In any event, it is significant that in response to questioning about Keller's statement that she did 
not see Lael in Angie's Saturday evening, Carlsen stated that while he would have expected one 
of the waitress to have seen Lael, if a waitress stated that Lael was not in Angie's Saturday night, 
then the waitress must be mistaken. Carlsen then provided the reasonable explanation that if 
Lael was not seen by the waitresses it was because Angie's Restaurant is very busy on Saturday 
nights and it would not be unusual for a waitress not to take notice of a patron who regularly 
frequents Angie's. Even the case information sheet concerning Crocket states that Lael is in 
Angie's all the time and that she does not pay any attention to him. Thus, the Court finds that the 
mere fact of a single waitress's hearsay statement that she did not see Lael in Angie's on 
Saturday evening is insufficient to undermine the accuracy of Carlsen's testimony concerning the 
day on which he last saw Lael alive. 
In addition, if true, the circumstances under which Carlsen learned of Lael's death 
strongly suggest that Carlsen has accurately remembered seeing Lael Saturday evening. 
According to Carlsen, around 2:00 p.m. on Sunday, November 7th, a friend of his, Keith Eames, 
came to the service station where Carlsen worked and informed him that the police were at 
Lael's house and that Lael had been shot the previous night. Carlsen testified that he 
remembered to thinking to himself that he had seen Lael just the night before and that it shocked 
him that Lael could be dead. Common experience alone confirms that when a person is 
informed of a close friend or family member's death in close proximity to when the friend or 
family member was last seen alive, the shock or trauma of the event often engraves on the 
person's memory the day, and even the time, when the person last encountered his or her friend 
or family member. 
Furthermore, it is also significant that Carlsen's testimony is consistent with Dr. Grey's 
32 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
time of death estimate based upon the physical evidence. Dr. Grey testified at trial that the 
physical findings he observed on Lael's body were most consistent with or most typical of a time 
of death approximately 36 hours prior to the autopsy, which began at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, 
November 8th. This testimony strongly suggests that Lael was likely killed around 9:00 p.m. on 
Saturday, November 6th, and would have been alive during the time Carlsen testified he saw 
Lael at Angie's. Thus, notwithstanding Mike Brown's testimony to the contrary and the hearsay 
information about what Keller remembers, the Court is of the opinion, based upon the foregoing 
evidence, that it is highly probable Carlsen accurately remembered seeing Lael in Angie's 
Restaurant on Saturday, November 6th. 
With respect to Carlsen's credibility, the State pointed out, and Carlsen admitted, that he 
has previously been convicted of the offense of tampering with a witness. Although the details 
of Carlsen's offense are not known to the Court, his conviction suggests at least some 
willingness on Carlsen's part to alter or manipulate evidence. In addition, although Petitioner 
argued that there is no obvious reason why Carlsen would not testify truthfully about seeing Lael 
alive in Angie's Restaurant on Saturday evening, his friendship with Petitioner is clearly a 
circumstance the Court must take into account in determining whether Carlsen testified 
truthfully. It is contrary to human nature for a witness not to at least want to testify or provide 
evidence that assists a friend, and the closer or more intimate a friendship the greater the 
likelihood that the witness will color the truth for the sake of the friendship. Nevertheless, mere 
friendship alone is insufficient to categorically conclude that a witness is not being truthful. 
Carlsen testified that he is "good friends" with Petitioner, but there is no indication that they ever 
had, or have now, a close friendship. While Petitioner apparently contacted and spoke with 
Carlsen a few times while she was incarcerated after her arrest, no evidence was presented 
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suggesting that they have communicated with each other since Petitioner was sentenced to prison 
in 1995. In terms of Carlsen's friendship with Petitioner's aunt, Judy Bodrero, it is unclear how 
close this friendship is. Carlsen appears to have a closer relationship with Bodrero than with 
Petitioner. The testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing indicates that Carlsen has 
maintained regular contact with Bodrero, and at times has spoken with her on a daily basis, since 
1995. Again, although mere friendship is insufficient to conclude that a witness is being 
untruthful, Carlsen's friendship with Petitioner and Bodrero constitutes some evidence that 
Carlsen may have a motive to fabricate a story about seeing Lael at Angie's on Saturday 
evening. 
Also affecting the credibility of Carlsen's testimony is the fact that he never came 
forward with the information in his possession until 2008, when he apparently spoke with 
attorneys for RMIC. Moreover, he never publicly revealed the information in his possession 
until the evidentiary hearing, over seventeen years after Lael's death. It may be true, of course, 
that he told Bodrero prior to trial about seeing Lael alive in Angie's on Saturday evening and that 
he expected her to speak with Petitioner's attorneys about this information, which he testified she 
told him she did. But no explanation was ever provided as to why Carlsen himself did not go to 
law enforcement with the information he had. Given Carlsen's friendship with Petitioner and 
Bodrero, it stretches the imagination to think that he was not aware that the State was 
prosecuting Petitioner on the theory that Lael was murdered sometime Saturday morning on 
November 6th. Furthermore, if what Carlsen testified to is true, then after trial, believing as he 
must have that a "good friend" had been wrongfully convicted, one would have expected 
Carlsen, at some point within a reasonable time following the conviction, to publicly disclose 
that he saw Lael alive at a time when the State argued he was dead. The fact that he did not do 
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so raises a legitimate question concerning the veracity of Carlsen's testimony. 
On the other hand, Carlsen's testimony was never internally inconsistent and the manner 
of his responses did not suggest he was being untruthful. Furthermore, if it was Carlsen's 
objective to help Petitioner by providing false testimony that would undermine the State's theory 
concerning time of death, it is peculiar that he would manufacture a story that includes Lael's 
son Mike. Certainly Carlsen must have known that in testifying that Lael was with Mike on 
Saturday evening, his story could easily be contradicted simply by Mike denying that he was 
with his father at any time on November 6th, which is how he testified at the evidentiary hearing. 
It is all the more unusual given that Carlsen could have easily fabricated a virtually unassailable 
account simply by saying that he saw Lael at Angie's with an unknown acquaintance. Thus, the 
nature of Carlsen's account provides some support for the believability of his testimony. 
While there are a variety of reasons to question the veracity of Carlsen's testimony, there 
are also reasons suggesting that he is telling the truth. Carlsen's account is certainly believable. 
Overall, however, it is the Court's considered view that Carlsen's testimony that he saw Lael 
alive on Saturday evening at Angie's Restaurant is not sufficiently credible to independently 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that Lael was alive at a time when the State argued he 
must have been dead. 
c) Del win Hairs Testimony 
Evidence presented at the hearing convened on January 18-24, 2011, indicated that Hall's 
name was included on a defense witness list at the time of trial. One of Petitioner's trial counsel, 
Shannon Demler, testified that he had no recollection whatsoever of Hall. Nevertheless, 
although Petitioner stated that she had limited conversations with her appointed attorneys and 
that they told her not to worry about the details of the case, she did not carry her burden of 
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( 
establishing that she was unaware of Hall as a potential witness or that Hall was not available to 
testify at trial. Thus, Hall's evidentiary hearing testimony does not constitute newly discovered 
material evidence as defined by the factual innocence statute. Importantly, however, Hall's 
testimony is evidence that has never previously been presented in any proceeding. < 
A careful consideration of Hall's testimony and statement to police convinces the Court 
that it is highly likely Hall was not mistaken when he told Detective Ridler in 1993 that he saw 
Lael at Angie's Restaurant on Saturday, November 6th. The circumstances described by Hall 
establish that when he was in Angie's he was in a position to actually see Lael. Hall testified that 
he was on his way to work when he stopped at Angie's for coffee. Lael was already there and 
was sitting at the counter conversing with an unidentified man. Hall ordered coffee without 
saying hello to Lael because he did not want to interrupt Lael's conversation with the other man. 
While Hall was still drinking his coffee, Lael and the unidentified man left the restaurant. Hall 
specifically testified at the evidentiary hearing that he saw Lael's face. There is no question, 
based upon this testimony, that if Lael was in Angie's Restaurant on Saturday when Hall entered, 
Hall was in a position to see Lael. In addition, Hall would not have mistaken someone else for 
Lael. Hall testified that he knew and was friends with Lael. His statement to Detective Ridler 
indicates that he was one of Lael's "coffee-drinking buddies." If Lael was in Angie's on 
Saturday, Hall would have certainly recognized him sitting at the counter. 
The only remaining issue with respect to accuracy is whether Hall was mistaken about 
the day on which he saw Lael at Angie's Restaurant. Significantly, Hall's statement to Detective 
Ridler was made on November 10, 1993, at 10:15 a.m., less than 4 days after Hall saw Lael at 
Angie's. This close proximity in time is crucially important because Hall's recollection about 
what day he saw Lael would have been fresh in his mind. Moreover, because there were no 
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intervening weekends to cause confusion, it is highly likely that Hall would not have been 
mistaken about seeing Lael at Angie's on Saturday afternoon. Furthermore, the fact that Hall 
stated to Detective Ridler that he saw Lael Friday night as well as Saturday afternoon also 
strongly suggests that Hall was not mistaken about seeing Lael on Saturday. In addition, Hall 
indicated that he was "sure" he saw Lael on Saturday, November 6th, and no evidence was 
presented suggesting that in 1993 Hall was easily confused about dates or that he had short-term 
memory problems. Finally, in response to questioning at the evidentiary hearing about his level 
of certainty concerning what day he saw Lael, Hall testified that he was "quite sure" he saw Lael 
on Saturday. Clearly, based upon the foregoing evidence, Hall has a high degree of certainty that 
the day on which he saw Lael at Angie's Restaurant was Saturday, November 6th. 
The State vigorously challenged the accuracy of HalPs report to Detective Ridler. 
According to the State, several waitresses who were working at Angie's on Saturday made 
statements to law enforcement that they did not see Lael. On the basis of these statements, the 
State argues that Hall was simply mistaken about the day he saw Lael at Angie's Restaurant16 
However, a careful examination of the statements made by the waitresses reveals that none of 
them affirmatively stated that they did not see Lael Saturday afternoon. As noted above, the case 
information sheets for both Crockett and Keller indicate that they worked at Angie's on 
Saturdays from 3:00 to 11:00 p.m. and that Lael was always there around 8:00 p.m. Crocket 
stated that she thought she saw Lael Saturday evening, but she was very unsure. Keller stated 
that she did not see Lael in Angie's Saturday night. Neither one of these statements, however, is 
16
 None of the waitresses were called to testify at the evidentiary hearing and their statements to law 
enforcement are hearsay. While the Court is permitted to consider hearsay statements under the factual innocence 
statute, the Court "may also consider that the evidence is hearsay in evaluating its weight and credibility." Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-404(2)(b). 
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inconsistent with Hall's statement to Detective Ridler. As Hall firmly pointed out during cross-
examination, Crockett and Keller did not begin their shifts until 3:00 p.m. and he saw Lael prior 
to that time. More importantly, Hall testified that Lael left Angie's before he did. This fact is 
significant to the Court because Hall told Detective Ridler that he had to be to work by 3:00 p.m. 
The case information sheet on Cindy Smith indicates that she worked at Angie's on 
Saturdays from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., but also makes reference to the hours of "8 to 11:00." 
Whether this notation is indicative of the hours Smith actually worked and whether they actually 
refer to morning hours rather than evening hours is unclear. In any event, her statement makes 
no reference at all to whether she did or did not see Lael during her shift, only that she would 
contact law enforcement if she thought of anything. Her statement is not, therefore, inconsistent 
with Hall's statement. The case information sheet for Sally Peterson indicates that she worked at 
Angie's on Saturdays from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. She stated that while Lael frequented Angie's 
like clockwork, she did not think he was in Angie's Saturday morning. Clearly, this statement is 
not inconsistent with Hall's statement that he saw Lael Saturday afternoon. Jenny Kemp's case 
information sheet indicates that she worked at Angie's on Saturdays from 5:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. 
and that she could not remember seeing Lael on Saturday. Significantly, Kemp statement that 
she did not remember seeing Lael at Angie's on Saturday is not the same as saying that Lael was 
not there on Saturday. At best her statement only indicates that she was uncertain. It is possible 
Lael could have been at Angie's on Saturday, but she simply did not remember seeing him. 
Thus, Kemp's statement is not necessarily inconsistent with Hall's statement that he is sure Lael 
was in Angie's Saturday afternoon. Furthermore, if Hall saw Lael at 2:30 p.m., and not 1:00 
p.m., Kemp's statement that she did not see Lael on Saturday would not be inconsistent with 
Hall's statement because Kemp only worked until 2:00 p.m. Finally, the case information sheets 
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for Kim Churchill and Lori Craig indicate that they worked at Angie's on Saturdays from 10:00 
a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., respectively. Churchill stated that she did not see 
Lael Saturday morning. Likewise, Craig stated that she worked Saturday morning and did not 
think Lael was there. As with the statement from Peterson, these statements from Churchill and 
Craig are not inconsistent with Hall's assertion that he saw Lael in Angie's Saturday afternoon. 
Furthermore, it is significant that Hall's statement is consistent with, and in fact bolstered 
by, Dr. Grey's time of death estimate based upon the physical evidence. As explained 
previously, Dr. Grey testified at trial that the physical findings he observed on Lael's body were 
most consistent with or most typical of a time of death approximately 36 hours prior to the 
autopsy, which began at 9:00 a.m. on Monday, November 8th. This testimony strongly suggests 
that Lael was likely killed around 9:00 p.m. on Saturday, November 6th, and would have been 
alive in the early afternoon when Hall said he saw Lael at Angie's.17 In light of the foregoing 
assessment of Hall's evidentiary hearing testimony and his statement to police, as well as Dr. 
Grey's testimony concerning time of death, the Court finds that Hall was not mistaken when he 
stated that he saw Lael at Angie's Restaurant during the early afternoon hours on Saturday, 
November 6th. 
With respect to Hall's credibility, no evidence was presented that he would have gained 
any advantage by fabricating a story in 1993, or that he would gain any advantage now by stating 
17
 It is true that the State presented testimony at trial concerning the existence of other facts that could 
suggest a time of death earlier than 9:00 p.m. on Saturday. But these facts are not necessarily inconsistent with 
Hall's statement. Evidence was presented by the State that Lael's telephone was not answered Saturday morning, 
that he did not keep a previous appointment to do plumbing work for a tenant Saturday morning, that he never 
picked up the soup left on the porch by Petitioner, that he was never seen outside working in the yard as was his 
routine, and that his car was apparently not moved throughout the day. The State's explanation for these facts, and 
the one apparently believed by the jury, is that Lael was dead. But clearly other plausible explanations, including 
that Lael was simply not feeling well, could also easily account for these facts. Thus, the existence of these facts is 
not necessarily inconsistent with Hall's statement to Detective Ridler that he saw Lael alive Saturday afternoon. 
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that he saw Lael alive during the afternoon hours of Saturday, November 6th. In addition, no 
evidence was presented that Hall had any connection to the people involved in the case and he 
testified without contradiction that he was unacquainted with Petitioner at the time of the 
homicide and that he is unacquainted with her now. Furthermore, there was nothing about the 
manner in which Hall testified that suggested to the Court he was not being truthful. It is true, of 
course, that Hall was less than consistent concerning the time of day he saw Lael alive. In his 
statement to Detective Ridler, Hall indicated that he saw Lael at 2:30 p.m. on November 6th. At 
the evidentiary hearing he testified that he believes it would have been closer to 1:00 p.m. 
However, there is nothing about this inconsistency that raises an issue with respect to 
HalFs truthfulness. First, it is not a material inconsistency. Hall has not changed his account 
from one that does not benefit Petitioner to one that does. Whether he saw Lael at Angie's 
Restaurant at 1:00 p.m. or 2:30 p.m. does not alter in any way the overall character of his 
statement or its significance. Second, all other relevant aspects of Hall's testimony are consistent 
with his statement to Detective Ridler; for example, that he was on his way to work wrhen he 
stopped in at Angie's and that the day this occurred was Saturday. Third, there is a reasonable 
explanation for the discrepancy. After the passage of more than seventeen years it is not 
completely unexpected that Hall's recollection now about what he told Detective Ridler is 
different in a minor respect than the statement he provided in 1993. Based upon the Court's 
observations, Hall was simply doing his best to recall events that transpired many years ago. 
Finally, the fact alone that Hall would testify now that he believes he may have seen Lael at 1:00 
p.m. instead of 2:30 p.m., when he could have easily refrained from saying anything inconsistent 
with what he told Detective Ridler in 1993, is also evidence of Hall's truthfulness. In short, no 
evidence was presented to suggest that Hall had any motive whatsoever to manufacture the 
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information he provided to Detective Ridler in 1993 or that the testimony he provided during the 
evidentiary hearing was a fabrication. In the Court's view, Hall testified truthfully about what he 
saw. 
d) Conclusion on Time of Death 
Taking into consideration the record of Petitioner's underlying criminal case and all of 
the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearings, the Court finds by clear and convincing 
evidence that Lael Brown was alive Saturday afternoon on November 6, 1993. Therefore, 
Petitioner could not have killed Lael Saturday morning. Nyman testified at the evidentiary 
hearing that she heard gun shots Sunday morning. While the Court has no reason to disbelieve 
her testimony, the Court ascribes to it relatively little weight given the fact that she testified at 
trial that she was nearly certain she heard gun shots Saturday morning. Nevertheless, Nyman's 
testimony constitutes some evidence establishing that Lael was alive Saturday afternoon because 
now there is no longer any clear evidence specifically pinpointing the time of Lael's death at 
7:00 a.m. Saturday morning. Furthermore, Stanbridge testified at trial that she was working 
outside her home on Saturday from sometime in the morning to approximately 4:00 p.m. in the 
afternoon and indicated that she did not hear any gun shots. She further testified, however, that 
had there been gunshots she would have heard them. Again, this is at least some evidence that 
supports a finding that Lael was alive Saturday afternoon. 
With respect to Carlsen, as the Court previously concluded, there are a variety of reasons 
to question his credibility, but there are also reasons suggesting that he is telling the truth. 
Nevertheless, while his claim of seeing Lael alive Saturday evening is certainly believable, the 
Court simply does not have a high degree of confidence that his testimony should be believed. 
This does not mean, however, that the Court must disregard Carlsen's testimony or that his 
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testimony has no evidentiary value whatsoever on the issue of time of death. Rather, it only 
means that the weight the Court is willing to afford his testimony will be directly proportional to 
the Court's confidence that he is telling the truth. Because the Court's confidence is low in this 
regard, Carlsen's testimony is not entitled to a significant amount of weight. But it is entitled to 
some weight. Thus, Carlsen's testimony constitutes some evidence in support of a finding that 
Lael was alive Saturday afternoon. 
Finally, and most importantly, is Hall's testimony which, as previously explained, has 
never before been presented in any proceeding. In the Court's considered view, there is no 
question that Hall testified truthfully and that he was accurate in his statement that he saw Lael 
alive on Saturday afternoon. The significance of the evidence provided by Hall cannot be 
overstated. Unlike the circumstantial evidence presented by the State at trial that Lael was dead 
sometime Saturday morning, Hall's testimony and statement to police are direct evidence that 
Lael was alive Saturday afternoon. This is directly supported by Dr. Grey's testimony, based 
upon the physical evidence, that Lael's murder likely occurred sometime around 9:00 p.m. on 
Saturday and no later than 3:00 a.m. on Sunday. 
It is particularly noteworthy that when Dr. Grey was asked at trial by the prosecution if it 
was "also true that the time of death could have been any time from the point when Lael Brown 
was last seen alive to the point that he was actually found dead," Dr. Grey responded by saying, 
"[t]hat is the most certain statement I can make." Clearly, in light of all the evidence which, in 
the Court's view, clearly and convincingly demonstrates that Lael was alive Saturday afternoon, 
if the most certain statement that can be made is that the time of death was sometime between the 
last time Lael was seen alive and when his body was discovered, he could not have been dead 
during the morning hours of Saturday, November 6th. 
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e) Evidence of Petitioner's Whereabouts 
The State points out, however, that even if Petitioner did not kill Lael Saturday morning, 
she still could have caused his death sometime after Carlsen and Hall saw Lael alive. This is 
true, of course, unless Petitioner has adequately accounted for her whereabouts between 1:00 
p.m. on Saturday and 3:00 am. on Sunday. In light of the evidence presented, the Court finds 
that she has. First, as an initial matter, although Dr. Grey testified that Lael was likely killed 
around 9:00 p.m. on Saturday, but no later than 3:00 a.m. on Sunday, no evidence has ever been 
presented even suggesting that it was Petitioner who committed the homicide during this 
timeframe. Second, following a comprehensive review of the record, one of the specific facts set 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in its decision on Petitioner's direct appeal was that she "could 
account for her whereabouts for the entire weekend except the hours between 6:40 a.m. and 10 
a.m. on Saturday, November 6." Brown, 948 P.2d at 340 (emphasis added). This is particularly 
noteworthy because the Supreme Court "review[ed] the record facts in a light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict." Id. at 338. Additionally, in addressing Petitioner's sufficiency of evidence 
claim, the Supreme Court stated that 
in determining whether [Petitioner] was involved in this murder, . . . the jury had 
the following evidence to consider: . . . (6) The defense was unable to establish 
[Petitioner's] whereabouts for the period between 6:40 a.m. on Saturday, when 
[Petitioner] was heard leaving a friend's house, where she had spent the night, and 
10 a.m. on Saturday, when [Petitioner's] son saw his mother when he awoke. The 
defense established the whereabouts of Debra Brown for the remaining period 
when the murder could have occurred. 
Id. at 345 (emphasis added). 
Finally, based upon this Court's independent assessment of the record in the case, the 
contents of the various exhibits admitted at the evidentiary hearing, and Petitioner's own 
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unrebutted testimony, it is clear that Petitioner's whereabouts are accounted for from 10:00 
a.m. Saturday afternoon until Sunday morning at 3:00 a.m. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on 
Saturday, Petitioner's son Ryan Buttars saw his mother when he awoke. Shortly thereafter, at 
approximately 10:20 a.m., Brent Skabelund, who was Petitioner's boyfriend at the time, arrived 
at Petitioner's home to accompany her to her son's basketball game at Skyview High School in 
Smithfield. They left for the game at approximately 10:40 or 10:45 a.m. From 11:00 a.m. to 
12:15 p.m., Petitioner and Skabelund watched the basketball game. Following the game, she and 
Skabelund stopped at R&G's, a local drive-in, for lunch. After lunch, Skabelund took Petitioner 
to her house where she took a nap. Between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m. Petitioner delivered chicken 
soup to Lael's house, possibly her daughter's house as well, and then went to anew store at the 
Pine Crest shopping area. She then went back home and called Skabelund around 4:00 p.m.19 
At 4:30 p.m., Skabelund drove to Petitioner's home, and together they went shopping at Macey's 
grocery store. They then went back to Petitioner's home to put away the groceries at 
approximately 5:40 p.m. and had pizza for dinner that Petitioner's sons brought home. 
Given Petitioner's obvious interest in the outcome of the Court's factual innocence determination, her 
evidentiary hearing testimony must be viewed with some skepticism. However, based upon a careful consideration 
of her testimony, the Court finds that her statements were credible. In the Court's view, the manner in which 
Petitioner testified and her demeanor on the witness stand did not suggest that she was lying or simply providing 
self-serving responses. In addition, despite having denied for years that she stole money from Lael, she candidly 
admitted that she had, if fact, forged checks belonging to Lael as the State alleged at trial. She also provided a 
believable account of her whereabouts on Saturday. Importantly, her testimony was internally consistent. She did 
not testily to one version of events on direct examination and then a slightly altered version of events on cross-
examination. Finally, Petitioner's version of events has basically remained unchanged since 1993 and is materially 
consistent with facts provided by third parties. Overall, the Court finds that Petitioner testified truthfully at the 
. evidentiary hearing. 
19
 It is also important to point out at this juncture that even though Petitioner may have been alone during a 
portion of the afternoon on Saturday, no evidence has ever been presented establishing that Lael was killed during 
the time period she was by herself To the contrary, evidence was presented suggesting that Lael was not killed 
during this timeframe. Kimberly Stanbridge, who was a neighbor of Lael's, indicated that she was outside working 
around her house from sometime Saturday morning until approximately 4:00 p.m. Saturday afternoon. She stated 
that she did not hear any gunshots while she was outside, and that had there been gunshots, she would have heard 
them. 
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Skabelund stayed at Petitioner's residence until approximately 6:45 p.m., and then they both 
drove to Skabelund's house to watch movies. They arrived there around 7:00 p.m. Petitioner 
fell asleep at 8:00 or 8:30 p.m. while she was watching the movie and slept until midnight. At 
midnight she awoke and drove herself home. After arriving home she saw her two sons who 
were playing video games. Petitioner went to bed shortly after midnight Sunday morning. 
Buttars indicated that his mother stayed at home the rest of the night. 
Significantly, no evidence was presented to suggest that the foregoing account of 
Petitioner's whereabouts is inaccurate. Nor was evidence presented suggesting that the 
chronology set out above has changed in any way since 1993. Based upon the foregoing 
accounting, and recognizing that it is virtually impossible to chronicle every minute of one's life, 
given the extended periods of time on Saturday that Petitioner was in the presence of others, the 
Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner's whereabouts from Saturday 
afternoon on November 6th to the early morning hours of Sunday, November 7th, have been 
firmly established. 
J) Conclusion on Factual Innocence 
The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Lael was alive Saturday afternoon 
on November 6th and, therefore, that Petitioner could not have killed Lael Saturday morning. 
Furthermore, the Court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner has 
established her whereabouts for Saturday afternoon and early Sunday morning and, therefore, 
that she could not have killed Lael during the remaining time period when the murder could have 
occurred. Accordingly, the Court now determines by clear and convincing evidence that 
Petitioner did not engage in the conduct for which she was convicted and is, therefore, factually 
innocent of the aggravated murder of Lael Brown. 
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ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY DETERMINED that Petitioner is factually innocent of the offense of 
Aggravated Murder for which she was previously convicted. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's conviction for Aggravated Murder is 
vacated with prejudice. 
This Memorandum Decision and Order constitute the final order of the Court with 
respect to the determination of factual innocence. No further order is necessary to effectuate the 
Court's decision. 
DATED this d ^ day of May, 2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
Michael D. DiReda 
Second District Judge 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 




STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
uee- .nw 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS TO PiETITI 
POST-CONVICTION RELI 
Case No. 100903670 
Judge Michael D. DiReda 
DEC 2 ! 2919 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT on the State's Motion for Summary 
Judgment as to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on April 23, 2010. Oral arguments on 
the motion were heard on November 9, 2010. Although Petitioner was not present at the 
hearing, she was represented by her counsel, Alan Sullivan, Christopher Marline?:, and 
Jacqueline Hopkinson. The State was represented by Erin Riley and Patrick Nolan. The Court 
has thoroughly reviewed the parties' memoranda, the relevant case law, and all applicable 
statutory provisions. Additionally, the Court has carefully considered the oral arguments 
provided by counsel. Now being fully advised, the Court issues this decision granting the State's 
motion. 
I. Procedural History 
On September 12, 19942 Petitioner was charged with one count of aggravated murder in 
the death of Lael Brown, a long-time friend and employer. Following a jury trial, on October 18, 
1995, she was convicted as charged and subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. On 
January 19, 1996, Petitioner timely filed an appeal. The Utah Supreme Court entered its decision 
affirming Petitioner's conviction on October 24, 1997. She did not seek review of the decision 
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from the United States Supreme Court. In 2002, the Rocky Mountain Innocence Center began 
an investigation into Petitioner's case. Based upon this investigation, on March 4, 2009, 
Petitioner filed both a petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act ("PCRA") and a petition for post-conviction determination of factual innocence.1 
On May 11, 2009, the State filed a motion to dismiss and Petitioner responded on June 11, 2009. 
On July 16, 2009, the Court entered its memorandum decision denying the State's motion and 
the parties began the discovery process, which included requests for interrogatories and the 
taking of depositions. Following discovery, on April 23, 2010, the State filed a motion for 
summary judgment with respect to the petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner responded 
on May 7, 2010 and the State filed its reply on May 10, 2010. Oral arguments on the motion 
were heard on November 9, 2010. 
II, Summary of the Arguments 
A. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
Petitioner raises five separate claims in support of post-conviction relief. First, she 
argues that newly discovered evidence establishes that she is factually innocent. Second, she 
contends that newly discovered evidence that was either unavailable to trial counsel or that was 
not discovered by trial counsel as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, establishes that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. According to 
Petitioner, new evidence suggests that the likely perpetrator of the homicide was Bobbie Sheen. 
This evidence includes statements from Sylvan Bassett that Sheen was angry with Brown, that he 
The petition for post-conviction determination of factual innocence is not the subject of the State's motion 
for summary judgment or the Court's memorandum decision. 
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had a gun similar in appearance to Brown's gun, that he had a large amount of cash, and that he 
drove a blue and white Ford Bronco. Also, neighbors reported seeing a blue and white Ford 
Bronco at Brown's home on the day of the homicide. 
In addition, Petitioner also asserts that new evidence undermines the State's theory on 
which Petitioner was convicted. This evidence includes statements by Paulette Nyman that she 
heard shots at a time when Petitioner had an alibi, police documents showing that Brown's death 
did not occur Saturday morning, Petitioner's statements to police that she owed Brown $3,000, 
evidence that the October bank statement never arrived at Brown's home, that many people 
knew that Brown had guns in his house and large amounts of money, that Brown's home was not 
secure and easy access was available, that Petitioner was not the only person with a key to 
Brown's home, and that Petitioner's statements concerning the soup she made and its placement 
on Brown's doorstep were not inconsistent. 
Third, Petitioner argues that her conviction was obtained in violation of her right to due 
process of law because there was an inadequate police investigation and a "rush to judgment" 
that Petitioner was the real perpetrator. According to Petitioner, the State failed to preserve 
exculpatory evidence at the crime scene, such as hairs, fibers, blood, sheets, blankets, an alarm 
clock, a bloody hand print, and failed to investigate other more likely suspects. Fourth, 
Petitioner argues that her conviction was obtained in violation of her right to due process of law 
because the police and prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence and the prosecutors presented 
evidence they knew could be contradicted. This includes police reports concerning three 
witnesses who heard possible gun shots, witness reports of a blue and white Ford Bronco at 
Brown's home, Bassett's attempts to provide information about Sheen to law enforcement 
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authorities, police reports showing that Petitioner admitted borrowing $3,000 from Brown, and 
bank statements showing that Brown had not yet received his October bank statement. 
Finally, Petitioner argues that she is entitled to post-conviction relief because both her 
trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective representation. According to Petitioner, counsel 
failed to present exculpatory evidence that was available at the time of trial, including evidence 
concerning the likely possibility of forced entry and the overall condition of Brown's home. In 
addition, she contends that counsel also failed to conduct an adequate investigation and discover 
exculpatory evidence including evidence that contradicted the State's theory that Petitioner was 
the only person with a key to Brown's home, evidence that Brown was killed at a time when 
Petitioner had an alibi, and evidence that the police mishandled the crime scene and destroyed 
key physical evidence that could have identified the actual perpetrator. 
B. State's Motion for Summary Judgment 
The State argues that summary judgment is warranted on all cf Petitioner's post-
conviction claims. With respect to Claim 1, the State argues that the PCRA itself mandates that 
relief cannot be granted based upon a claim that Petitioner is factually innocent. As for the other 
claims, under the PCRA Petitioner's post-conviction petition is timely only if it was filed within 
one year after her cause of action accrued. For any claim not based on newly discovered 
evidence, the accrual date was January 22, 1998 and, therefore, all claims not based upon newly 
discovered evidence should have been raised no later than January 22, 1999. With respect to 
Claim 2, the State argues that all the evidence Petitioner asserts is newly discovered is not, in 
fact, newly discovered evidence as defined by the PCRA and, therefore, that Claim 2 is untimely 
because it was not raised until March 4, 2009. 
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Specifically, the State argues that (1) trial counsel talked to and investigated Sheen and 
both trial counsel and Petitioner were aware that Sheen was a possible suspect; (2) trial counsel 
were aware that neighbors of Brown reported hearing gunshots at times that were inconsistent 
with the State's case and that trial counsel interviewed the neighbors; (3) trial counsel were 
aware that Nyman, who was one of Brown's neighbors, could not remember whether she heard 
gunshots on the day of the minder or the day after the murder; (4) both Petitioner and trial 
counsel were aware at the time of trial that Petitioner had borrowed $3,000 from Brown and that 
she had told the police about this fact; (5) both Petitioner and trial counsel were aware of the date 
on which Brown's October bank statement was mailed and, therefore, the mailing dates of other 
bank statements is irrelevant; (6) trial counsel were aware that issues related to time of death 
were extremely important and were aware that the medical examiner had testified at the 
preliminary hearing that his findings would be consistent with a time of death 36 hours from the 
time the autopsy was performed; (7) the security of Brown's house, or lack thereof, was known 
to trial counsel, trial counsel considered whether someone could have entered the house without 
a key, and trial counsel knew that Brown's grandson, Todd Brown, was a suspect; and (8) with 
respect to critical evidence that was not collected at the crime scene, trial counsel were provided 
police reports, the prosecution had an open file policy, and law enforcement testified at trial 
about what physical evidence was collected, including a small bloody hand print. Since 
Petitioner did not raise this claim until March 4, 2009, over ten years beyond the date on which 
her post-conviction petition should have been filed, Claim 2 is time-barred and, therefore, the 
Court should grant summary judgment. 
For similar reasons, the State also argues that summary judgment is appropriate on 
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Claims 3 and 4. According to the State, these claims, which allege a due process violation, are 
not based upon newly discovered evidence, but are based upon evidence that was either already 
known to Petitioner, or her counsel, or that could have been discovered with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence. Because Claims 3 and 4 should have been raised no later than January 22, 
1999, they are time-barred and, therefore, summary judgment should be granted. Finally, with 
respect to Claim 5, which alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the State argues that 
Petitioner either knew or could have discovered with reasonable diligence how her counsel 
performed at trial and on appeal. Therefore, Claim 5 is not based upon newly discovered 
evidence and is, therefore, time-barred. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate. Furthermore, 
even if the evidence on which Petitioner bases her ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 
newly discovered evidence, summary judgment is still appropriate because, by definition, newly 
discovered evidence is evidence that could not have been discovered by exercising reasonable 
diligence and, therefore, the failure by trial or appellate counsel to discover it could not have 
been the result of deficient performance. 
C. Petitioner's Response 
In response to the State's motion, Petitioner argues that all of her post-conviction claims 
are based upon newly discovered evidence. With respect to Sheen as a possible suspect, 
Petitioner asserts that Bassett's statements on this claim are newly discovered because there is no 
evidence in the record that trial counsel were ever aware of Bassett's connection to Sheen or of 
the information contained in Bassett's statements concerning Brown's death. In addition, trial 
counsel never received any information concerning Sheen, either from Petitioner or police 
reports, until after the trial. In relation to the State's case, Petitioner argues that Nyman has now 
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stated that her trial testimony that she heard gunshots on the day of the murder is incorrect. 
In addition, new evidence shows that neighbors who heard gunshots did not hear them on 
the day of the murder and the medical examiner's estimate of the time of death was 
inappropriately influenced by prosecutors. Furthermore, contrary to testimony that Brown's 
October bank statement was the only bank statement missing from Brown's home, new evidence 
from Officer Greg Riddler shows that numerous bank statements and checks were missing and 
that the October bank statement was likely not received at Brown's house until after the murder. 
Finally, new evidence demonstrates that Brown's home was not secure, that Petitioner did not 
have the only other key to the residence, and that there were signs of forced entry. 
With respect to the violation of Petitioner's right to due process as a result of the 
inadequate police investigation, she argues that newly discovered evidence shows that law-
enforcement failed to preserve critical financial information at Brown's house by allowing 
Brown's family to "clean out" the house within 36 hours of the murder. In addition, law 
enforcement failed to interview witnesses or investigate Sheen as a likely suspect, compromised 
the crime scene, and failed to photograph the blood evidence in Brown's house. Concerning the 
violation of Petitioner's right to due process as a result of the State's failure to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, she argues that the State failed to disclose that Warren Brown and Bassett 
identified Sheen as the likely killer, that Brown's home was turned over to Brown's family even 
though family members were key suspects, and that the prosecutors influenced the medical 
examiner's testimony concerning time of death. In addition, prosecutors presented evidence 
during trial that they knew was not accurate. With respect to the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims, Petitioner argues that if the Court concludes that trial counsel either had or could 
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have had access to all the evidence she argues is newly discovered, then the Court must find that 
trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to use this evidence at trial. 
Finally, Petitioner argues that none of her claims are time-barred because all of her 
claims accrued well within the time frames established by the PCRA's statute of limitations. 
Bassett signed his affidavit on March 4, 2008, Nyman was interviewed on February 21, 2009, 
and law enforcement documents were not discovered until July 14, 2008. Nevertheless, even if 
the Court concludes that Petitioner's post-conviction claims are time-barred, Petitioner argues 
that the Court should set aside the default in order to avoid an obvious injustice or, in the 
alternative, find that the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional because it 
does not include an interests of justice exception. 
D. State's Reply 
In reply, the State first reiterates that Petitioner is not entitled to relief under the PCRA 
based upon her claim of factual innocence. In addition, the State argues that summary judgment 
should be granted on all claims that are not based upon newly discovered evidence. According 
to the State, neither Petitioner's newly discovered evidence claim nor her two due process claims 
are based upon newly discovered evidence because the evidence relied upon is evidence that 
Petitioner and her counsel either knew before or at the time of trial or could have discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Because these claims are not based upon newly 
discovered evidence, they are time-barred under the PCRA. 
With respect to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleging that trial 
counsel failed to present exculpatory evidence available to them at the time of trial and 
perfonned deficiently in failing to discover the newly discovered evidence she sets forth in her 
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post-conviction petition, the State argues that if the evidence was available to trial counsel or 
could have been discovered by them, then it cannot qualify as newly discovered evidence and 
Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is untimely. On the other hand, if the 
evidence Petitioner sets forth does qualify as newly discovered evidence, then, by definition, it is 
evidence that could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence and, 
therefore, trial counsel could not have been ineffective in not discovering it or presenting it at 
trial. Thus, summary judgment on Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
appropriate. • 
As for Petitioner's argument that even if her claims are time-barred the Court should set 
aside the default in order to avoid an obvious injustice or, in the alternative, find that the PCRA's 
one-year statute of limitations is unconstitutional, the State argues that Petitioner's reliance on 
federal caselaw cannot justify setting aside the PCRA's statute of limitations. In addition, the 
State argues that the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations is constitutional because it allows a 
reasonable time in which to bring a cause of action and includes provisions that allow the 
limitations period to be tolled when a petitioner is prevented from filing a petition due to 
physical or mental incapacity, or due to state action in violation of the United States 
Constitution. 
III. Legal Standards 
A. Introduction 
The PCRA is "the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence 
for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal/' 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102. See also Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(a) (the PCRA "sets forth the 
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manner and extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and 
i 
sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal . . . or the time 
to file such an appeal has expired."). Generally, the function of post-conviction review is to 
determine whether a petitioner's constitutional rights were denied in the proceedings that ' 
resulted in the petitioner's conviction and sentence. This review is purposely limited. Under the 
PCRA,a 
person is not eligible for [post-conviction] relief... upon any ground that. . . was 
raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;. . . could have been but was not raised at 
trial or on appeal; . . . [or] was raised or addressed in any previous request for 
post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request 
for post-conviction relief. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(b)-(d). Moreover, a petitioner cannot obtain relief on claims 
that are untimely raised. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(e) ("A person is not eligible for 
[post-conviction] relief . . . upon any ground that . . . is barred by the limitation period 
established in Section 78B-9-107."). 
In most cases, post-conviction review allows the petitioner an opportunity to (1) locate 
and present newly discovered evidence that requires the petitioner's conviction or sentence to be 
set aside, and (2) assess whether the petitioner received the trial and appellate representation 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Post-conviction review is not, however, a 
platform for a petitioner to retry the criminal case on an alternate theory. The petitioner bears the 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to obtain relief, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-105(1), and establishing c'that there would be a reasonable likelihood of 
a more favorable outcome in light of the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed 
with the evidence and facts introduced at trial or during sentencing." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
10 
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104(2). Significantly, under the general provisions of the PCRA, a post-conviction court "may 
not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for 
which convicted except as provided [under the] . . . Post-Conviction Determination of Factual 
Innocence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(3). 
B. Newly Discovered Evidence under the PCRA 
As noted above, one of the primary purposes of the PCRA is to allow a petitioner to 
locate newly discovered material evidence. However, what constitutes newly discovered 
material evidence is strictly circumscribed by the PCRA. As explained by the Utah Supreme 
Court, 
a petitioner may file a claim for [post-conviction] relief based on "newly 
discovered material evidence" if: (1) neither the petitioner nor his counsel knew 
of, or could have discovered through reasonable diligence, the evidence before or 
at the time of trial; (2) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence 
already known; (3) the evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and (4) 
"viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence 
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty 
of the offense or subject to the sentence received." 
Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, TJ49, 184 P.3d 1226 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)). 
More succinctly, "under the PCRA, as well as our due process case law, newly discovered 
evidence merits post-conviction relief only if the evidence would create a reasonable doubt as to 
the [petitioner's] guilt." IcL at f51. 
Importantly, the newly discovered evidence must be material in nature. Although the 
PCRA does not expressly define the word "material," the requirement that the new evidence 
"demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense 
or subject to the sentence received" suggests that evidence is material only if it is relevant to the 
issues of the case and, had it been available and presented at trial, the outcome of the 
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proceedings, either as to guilt or punishment, would have been different. This is consistent with 
the meaning of "material" in other contexts. See e.g., State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989) ("To qualify as newly discovered evidence justifying a new trial, defendant must 
. . . establish that the newly discovered evidence is material in the sense that it might have 
affected the outcome of the trial."). 
C. Statute of Limitations under the PCRA 
A petitioner can obtain relief on a post-conviction claim only if it is raised "within one 
year after the cause of action has accrued." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(l). Any "claim for 
relief is barred if the petition is not timely filed." Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, [^60, 234 P.3d 
1115. A claim is timely raised under the PCRA only if it is asserted by the latest of the 
following dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of 
conviction, if no appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over the 
case, if an appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme 
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is 
filed; 
.(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the 
decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is 
filed; 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or 
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(l)(f) is 
This portion of the PCRA states that a person may seek collateral review of her conviction and sentence 
on the ground that 
(0 the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the United States 
Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after conviction and 
sentence became final on direct appeal, and that: 
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction or 
sentence became final; or 
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime for which the 
petitioner was convicted. 
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established. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(f). 
Notwithstanding the requirement that a claim must be raised within one year after the 
cause of action accrued, the limitations period is tolled (1) "during any period of time during 
which the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the 
United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity," Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-
107(3); and (2) "during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting . . . exoneration 
through DNA testing . . . or . . .factual innocence." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(4). 
Importantly, no statutory exceptions exist for failing to raise a post-conviction claim in a timely 
manner. 
D. Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). According to the Utah Supreme Court, 
[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility 
of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evidence. Neither is it 
to deny parties the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is 
to eliminate the time, troublef,] and expense of trial when upon any view taken of 
the facts as asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail. 
Holbrock Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). Indeed, any showing in support of 
summary judgment "must preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a trial, 
produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor." Bullock v. Deseret 
Dodge Truck Or.. 354 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1960). See also Burningham v. Ott 525 P.2d 620, 
621 (Utah 1974) (same). "Only when it so appears, is the court justified in refusing such a party 
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the opportunity of presenting [her] evidence and attempting to persuade the fact trier to [her] 
views." Holbrook, 542 P.2d at 193. However, if the party moving for summary judgment 
satisfies his burden of "informing the trial court of the basis for the motion and identifying the 
portions of the pleadings or supporting documents which [it] believes demonstrates an absence 
of a genuine issue of material fact," TS 1 Partnership v. Allred 877 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994), then the opposing party cannot simply "rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
[her] pleading, but [her] response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. If [she] does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against [her]." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). 
IV. Discussion 
A. Claim 1: Newly Discovered Evidence Establishes that Petitioner Is Innocent Under 
the Utah Determination of Factual Innocence Statute 
In Claim 1, Petitioner asserts that "newly discovered evidence in [her] case proves her 
innocence under the Utah Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence | s]tatute." Pet, 
for Post-Conviction Relief at 5. However, the PCRA expressly states that the "court may not 
grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for 
which convicted." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(3). In light of this statutory prohibition, the 
State is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Claim 1 of Petitioner's post-conviction 
petition. 
B. Claim 2: Newly Discovered Evidence Demonstrates that No Reasonable Trier of 
Fact Could Have Found Petitioner Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
In Claim 2, Petitioner argues that "newly discovered evidence in [her] case, when viewed 
with all of the other evidence available at the time of trial contradicting the state's case, 
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demonstrates that a reasonable jury would not have found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 5. The State argues that none of the evidence that Petitioner 
relies upon is newly discovered under the PCRA because it is evidence that Petitioner or her trial 
counsel either knew about at the time of trial or could have discovered with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence. Therefore, the State contends, Petitioner should have raised Claim 2 no 
later than January 22, 1999. Because Claim 2 was not raised until March 4, 2009, the State 
argues that Claim 2 is untimely and summary judgment is warranted. 
1. Alleged Newly Discovered Evidence 
Petitioner does not dispute that the decision on her direct appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court was entered on October 24, 1997, and that the last day for filing a petition for writ of 
certiorari in the United States Supreme Court was January 22, 1998. It follows, therefore, that 
for any claim not based upon newly discovered evidence, the PCRA required the claim, and the 
evidence in support, to be raised no later than January 22, 1999. The central issue with respect to 
Claim 2, then, is whether the evidence set forth below that Petitioner asserts is newly discovered 
is, in fact, newly discovered evidence. 
a} Gunshots Heard at Times Inconsistent with the State's Theory 
Petitioner asserts that newly discovered record evidence shows that law enforcement was 
in possession of reports from neighbors of Brown who heard gunshots on a day and time 
contrary to the State's theory of when the murder occurred and on a day and time when 
Petitioner had an alibi. At trial, the State presented evidence and argued that the murder 
occurred sometime around 7:00 a.m. on Saturday, November 6th. The alleged newly discovered 
police reports show that Juanita Hale reported hearing three gunshots at approximately 1:44 a.m. 
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on November 6th; that Susan Nelson reported that a man named "Dino" (Dino Blau) heard two 
gunshots at approximately 2:30 a.m. on November 6th; and that Layne Rich reported hearing 
three gunshots sometime between 11:30 p.m. on Friday, November 5th and 12:00 a.m. on 
November 6th. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 13; Pet'r Mem. in 
Opp. at 35. However, although trial counsel has indicated that he does not now remember the 
names of the persons who reported hearing gunshots at different times and at different locations, 
he does remember that at the time of trial he was aware of this information. Furthermore, trial 
counsel has also indicated that the defense team investigated Brown's neighbors and what they 
heard. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 8-11, 27; State's Reply Mem. at 5; Dep. of Shannon Demler 
at 28-29. Because this evidence was known to trial counsel at the time of trial, it cannot qualify 
as newly discovered evidence. 
b) Paulette Nyman's Recollection of Gunshots 
Nyman was called by the prosecution to establish that gunshots were heard in the vicinity 
of Brown's home on Saturday morning, November 6th, between 6:40 and 10:00 a.m. She now 
declares that she always felt uncomfortable about the police timeline and that it seemed to her 
that law enforcement wanted hei to have heard gunshots at a time when she in fact had not heard 
them. Based upon her recollection that she heard possible gunshots around 6:00 a.m., and no 
later than 6:30 a.m., on the day her husband went hunting, which was Sunday, November 7th, 
she asserts that her trial testimony pinpointing November 6th as the day on which she may have 
heard gunshots was incorrect. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 12-
13, 23-24; Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 34. Trial counsel, however, was aware of the substance of this 
information at the time of trial. First, trial counsel specifically questioned Nyman about when 
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she heard gunshots. See Dep. of Shannon Demler at 29. Second, Nyman herself testified that 
sometime prior to trial she stated to a defense investigator that she could not remember whether 
she heard gunshots on Saturday or on Sunday. Furthermore, as noted above, the defense team 
investigated Brown's neighbors and what they heard. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 10-11, 27; 
State's Reply Mem. at 5; Dep. of Shannon Demler at 28-29. Because the information concerning 
Nyman's uncertainty about the day she heard gunshots was known to trial counsel at the time of 
trial, it cannot qualify as newly discovered evidence. 
c} Bobbie Sheen as a Possible Suspect in the Case 
Petitioner argues that new evidence shows that the State withheld exculpatory evidence 
that Sheen was a possible suspect in the murder of Brown. According to Petitioner, new 
evidence disclosed by Bassett indicates (1) that Sheen possessed a gun that was similar to the 
gun used to kill Brown, (2) that Sheen bragged about using the gun and disposing of it in the 
Benson Marina, (3) that he was in possession of a large amount of cash ($1,500), (4) that he was 
angry at Brown for having evicted him, and (5) that he drove a blue and white truck. In addition, 
new evidence also shows that others, who were apparently friends of Sheen at one time or 
another, have indicated that they believe Sheen was responsible for Brown's murder. See; Pet'r 
Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 14-16, 21-22; Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 32. 
However, the existence of three discovery documents establishes that law enforcement, 
and by extension trial counsel, was aware that Sheen was a possible suspect in the case. A case 
information sheet, Bates-stamped 0092, indicates that Warren Brown told police that he believed 
Sheen was responsible for the death of Brown. Two police investigative notes, Bates-stamped 
0142 and 0147, also list "Bob Sheen" as another possible suspect and refer to "Bob Sheen" with 
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the notation of "$1,500" next to the name. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 7-8, 17-18, 26-27; 
State's Reply Mem. at 6-8. These documents were available to trial counsel prior to or at the 
time of trial and, therefore, trial counsel were on notice that Sheen was a possible suspect in the 
case. In addition, according to trial counsel, the possibility of Sheen as the perpetrator of the 
murder was investigated by the defense team and it was determined that he was not a viable 
suspect.4 See Pep, of Shannon Demler at 36; 73-74. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Petitioner expressly told her trial counsel about 
Sheen as a possible suspect. In her deposition, the following questions and answers were 
recorded: 
Q. (Scott Reed): Do you recall meeting with either Shannon Demler or John 
Caine and talking about your case? 
A: (Petitioner): Yes. 
Q. And the same thing, what did you tell them about your case? 
A. UI didn't do it." 
Q. And did you tell Caine or Demler who might have done it.? 
A. I don't remember at what point, but somewhere in there, yeah, I gave them a 
few ideas I had. 
Q. Do you remember what those were? 
A. Tenants and ex-tenants. 
Q. Do you recall names? 
A. One of them. 
Q. Which one? 
Trial counsel indicated in his deposition that documents provided by prosecutors in response to discovery 
requests were usually, if not always, Bates-stamped on the bottom of each page of the document. The inference, of 
course, is that Bates-stamped documents were provided to trial counsel by the State during the discovery process. 
Petitioner has not rebutted this inference. Rather, she simply asserts that because a document is Bates-stamped does 
not necessarily mean it was actually provided to trial counsel. While it may be true that a Bates-stamped document 
is not conclusive evidence that the document was provided to trial counsel during the discovery process, based upon 
trial counsel's representations it is strong evidence that it was, in fact, disclosed. Furthermore, when discovery is 
provided, unless rebutted, trial counsel is necessarily deemed to be personally aware of the contents of the 
documents. 
Trial counsel first indicated in his deposition that he may have learned of Sheen as a possible suspect after 
the trial. See Dep. of Shannon Demler at 23. However, later he stated that, in fact, he may have learned of Sheer 
after Petitioner's arrest. See |d. at 35. Given Petitioner's statements that she told her attorneys about Sheen as a 
possible suspect prior to trial, it is reasonable to conclude that trial counsel learned of Sheen after Petitioner's arrest. 
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A. Bobby Sheen. 
Dep. of Debra Brown at 71-72. Moreover, later in the deposition Petitioner again states that she 
told her trial counsel about Sheen as a possible suspect in the case: 
Q. (Erin Riley): And you said that you told your attorneys, Mr. Caine and Mr. 
Demler, about Bobby Sheen. What did you tell them? 
A. (Petitioner): That I thought he could be a possible suspect.... 
Q. Did you tell your attorneys any more than just his name Bobby Sheen? 
A. Yeah. I shared with them just some stuff that we knew about Bobby when we 
cleaned out the apartment.... 
Id. at 95-96. Petitioner then explained that she told her counsel that Sheen was a "shady person," 
that he had been behind on his rent, that he was stealing power from a neighboring tenant, and 
that he had been evicted. .See id at 96. Thus, the fact that Sheen was a possible suspect in the 
murder of Brown is not newly discovered evidence. 
d) Blue and White Ford Bronco Linked to Bobbie Sheen 
Kimberly Stanbridge, who was a neighbor of Brown, testified that she saw a blue and 
white Ford Bronco at Brown's home on Saturday, November 6th. She stated, however, that she 
was unable to see the driver because the Bronco drove into the side yard of the house and did not 
pull into the gravel driveway. According to Petitioner, new evidence from police reports shows 
that several days following the murder a person named Warren Brown told law enforcement that 
Sheen drove a vehicle matching the description and color of the vehicle seen on November 6th 
and that Sheen was responsible for the murder. Furthermore, Sheen's former girlfriend, April 
Geary, has provided new evidence confirming that, at the time of the murder, Sheen drove a blue 
and white Ford Bronco. She also indicated that Sheen would sometimes drive her vehicle, which 
was a blue and white Blazer. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 16, 
22. Finally, Bassett has provided new information that Sheen drove a truck (a Ford F250 pickup) 
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that was at least similar to the vehicle seen on November 6th insofar as Sheen's truck was blue 
and white. See Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 32. 
None of the foregoing information constitutes newly discovered evidence. First, trial 
counsel has indicated that, at the time of trial, he was aware of information concerning the 
presence of several vehicles at Brown's house on November 6th, including a blue and white 
Bronco or Blazer, and that he and co-counsel had a discussion about the vehicles. See State's 
Mem. in Supp. at 17; State's Reply Mem. at 6. Second, the police investigative note with 
information from Warren Brown linking Sheen to a blue and white Ford Bronco was provided to 
trial counsel during the discovery process and, therefore, Petitioner's attorneys were on notice 
that Sheen was linked to a blue and white Ford Bronco. 
Finally, with respect to the Geary affidavit, there is no indication that Petitioner or trial 
counsel knew Geary prior to or at the time of trial or that they could have discovered the 
information in her possession with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Thus, because the 
information from Geary was only discovered by Petitioner's post-conviction counsel on March 
1, 2009, see Aff. of April Geary at 1, and Petitioner's post-conviction petition was filed on 
March 4, 2009, it has been timely raised in support of Claim 2. However, as just noted, trial 
counsel were aware of the link between Sheen and a blue and white Bronco and, therefore, the 
substance of Geary's affidavit was already known to counsel. Because the definition of "newiy 
discovered evidence" requires that "the material evidence [cannot be] merely cumulative of 
evidence that was already known," Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(ii), even though the 
information from Geary was not known and could not have been discovered from her through 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, it is, nevertheless, merely cumulative of evidence that was 
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already known to trial counsel and, therefore, is not newly discovered evidence as defined by the 
PCRA and cannot serve as a basis for relief under Claim 2. 
For the foregoing reasons, the information from Warren Brown and, ultimately, the link 
between Sheen and a blue and white Ford Bronco does not constitute newly discovered evidence. 
Moreover, even though the information from Geary could not have been discovered with 
reasonable diligence and has been timely raised, it is merely cumulative of evidence that was 
already known and, therefore, cannot be a basis for relief under Claim 2. 
e] Information Disclosed by Sylvan Bassett 
Petitioner argues that new evidence shows that the State withheld exculpatory evidence 
concerning Bassett's attempts to report to police and Brown's wife his suspicions about Sheen as 
the actual killer. As noted above, Bassett has asserted that Sheen possessed a gun that was 
similar to the gun used to kill Brown, that Sheen bragged about using the gun and disposing of it 
in the Benson Marina, that he was in possession of a large amount of cash ($1,500), that he was 
angry at Brown for having evicted him, and that he drove a blue and white truck. Bassett has 
further asserted that, based upon this information and his encounters with Sheen, he is convinced 
that Sheen murdered Brown. According to Petitioner, new evidence also shows that when 
Bassett attempted to speak to law enforcement about his suspicions, he was told "that if he 
persisted with this story he would be in fcbig trouble.'" Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-
Conviction Relief at 15. Bassett made no further attempts to contact the police. See Pet'r Mem. 
in Opp. at 32-33. 
As explained previously, Petitioner and her trial counsel were already aware that Sheen 
was a possible suspect in the case and that he was linked to a blue and white Ford Bronco. 
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Moreover, in the context of advising her attorneys that Sheen was a possible suspect, Petitioner 
told her counsel that Sheen had been evicted by Brown. In addition, based upon a police 
investigative note, Bates-stamped 0147 and which references the name "Bob Sheen" with 
"$1,500" written next to the name, trial counsel were aware that Sheen may have been in 
possession of $1,500. All of this information concerning Sheen was known to trial counsel 
independently from Bassett. Furthermore, trial counsel were aware of Bassett prior to trial and 
both Petitioner and the defense team knew that Bassett had information about Sheen. According 
to Petitioner, sometime in 1994 her attorneys told her that Basset "seems to believe he knows 
something about the case that could clear [her], but they didn't feel he was credible." Dep. of 
Debra Brown at 86. When asked what her attorneys thought Bassett knew, Petitioner stated. 
"[t]he location of the gun, I believe it was." Id. Based upon these statements, Petitioner and her 
attorneys also knew at the time of trial that Bassett was making claims that Sheen had a gun, 
which would only have been relevant had it been similar to the one used to commit the murder, 
and that Bassett knew where the gun was located. Thus, none of the evidence in the possession 
of Bassett in support of Sheen as a possible suspect in the case constitutes newly discovered 
evidence. 
f) Bank Statement Envelopes 
Petitioner argues that the State withheld exculpatory evidence which showed that at the 
time of his murder, Brown had not yet received his October bank statement. At trial, the State 
claimed that Petitioner killed Brown because she had stolen $3,000 from him by forging checks 
and that he had discovered the theft when he received his October statement. Prosecutors argued 
that, in order to cover up this fact, Petitioner stole the October bank statement. According to 
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Petitioner, new evidence in the form of envelopes from Brown's prior bank statements, which 
the police withheld, show that the October bank statement was not mailed until after the fourth 
day of the month, and possibly not until the seventh day of the month. Thus, the new evidence 
shows that the October bank statement could not have been received before November 6th and, 
therefore, that Petitioner could not have stolen the October statement as the prosecution had 
claimed at trial. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 17-18, 23, 25, 29, 
38; Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 17-18,27, 35-36. 
However, as the State points out, and as Petitioner herself appears to acknowledge, bank 
and postal employees testified at the preliminary hearing that the October bank statement "had 
been 'cut' by the bank on October 29 and mailed four business days later on Thursday November 
4. With delivery time, it would have arrived two days later, or Saturday, November 6." Pet'r 
Mem. in Supp. of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief at 17-18. See also State's Mem. in Supp. at 
25, 28. Because Petitioner and her trial counsel already knew when the October bank statement 
had been mailed and that the statement would not have arrived until November 6th, the 
information provided by the bank statement envelopes does not qualify as newly discovered 
evidence. 
Nevertheless, Petitioner insists in her opposition memorandum that she "and her [post-
conviction] counsel did not know when the October bank statement was mailed until they 
discovered the bank statement envelopes in the police file on July 14, 2008." Pet'r Mem. in 
Opp. at 18. It is not clear, however, how discovery of the bank statement envelopes from other 
months, which specify mailing dates of the 4th, 5th, 7th, and 8th day of the month, warrants the 
logical inference that the October statement was mailed on a specific day of the month. Indeed, 
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the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing by bank and postal employees appears to 
provide a more definitive assessment of when the October bank statement was mailed, and when 
it would have arrived at Brown's home, than does the variety of mailing dates indicated on the 
envelopes of the other bank statements. 
In any event, even if the bank statement envelopes themselves were withheld by the 
police and were not, presumably, discoverable by trial counsel either prior to or during trial, as 
Petitioner herself explains, the import of the envelopes is to show that Brown "would not have 
received his statement before November 6th." Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction 
Relief at 25. Petitioner knew about this information prior to trial. Moreover, even if Petitioner 
did not have this information, through the exercise of reasonable diligence trial counsel could 
have discovered the actual date on which the October statement was mailed by asking for this 
information from the bank. See State's Reply Mem. at 10. 
For the foregoing reasons, information provided by the bank statement envelopes does 
not constitute newly discovered evidence. • 
g) Ponce Documents Related to Time of Death 
Petitioner asserts that two newly discovered police documents corroborate that the time 
of death could not have been during the morning hours of November 6th. The prosecutor argued 
at trial that Brown was murdered around 7:00 a.m. on November 6th, which was the only time 
during which Petitioner did not have an alibi. According to Petitioner newly discovered police 
documents show that the medical examiner "twice explained to police that the time of death was 
approximately 36 to 48 hours before the autopsy-between noon and midnight on Saturday, 
November 6[th]." Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 24. 
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However, trial counsel indicated in his deposition that he was aware that testimony 
concerning time of death was a very important issue in the case. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 
29. Furthermore, Petitioner herself states that in his trial testimony the medical examiner 
"maintained his position that the medical evidence supported a time of death thirty-six hours 
prior to the autopsy." Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 24. Thus, the 
facts set forth in the police reports in relation to time of death were already known to Petitioner 
and her counsel at the time of trial and, therefore, this information does not qualify as newly 
discovered evidence. Finally, because the definition of "newly discovered evidence" requires 
that "the material evidence [cannot be] merely cumulative of evidence that was already known," 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(ii), even if the information from the police documents was 
not known and could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, it is 
still merely cumulative of evidence that was already known to trial counsel. Therefore, this 
information is not newly discovered evidence as defined by the PCRA and cannot serve as a 
basis for relief under Claim 2. 
h) Police Documents Concerning to Access to Brown's Home 
Petitioner explains that the State's theory at trial was that Brown's home was secure, with 
no signs of forced entry, and, therefore, the person who committed the murder must have entered 
with a key. Since Petitioner had a key to Brown's house, the implication was that she was the 
person who committed the murder. According to Petitioner, newly discovered documents show 
that Brown's grandson Todd had broken into his grandfather's house on more than one occasion 
and, moreover, that Brown's son Michael reported that his father never locked his front door. 
Thus, Petitioner argues, contrary to the State's theory it is likely that entry into Brown's home 
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was forced. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 26-27; Pet'r Mem. in 
Opp. at 36-37. 
However, as Petitioner herself points out, photographic evidence available at the time of 
trial "show[s] that [Brown's] home was in disrepair, that the glass in his front storm door was 
smashed, that the front door had a broken lock, and that the back door was jimmied shut with a 
knife and in even worse repair than the front door." Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-
Conviction Relief at 27. In addition, one of the law enforcement officers testified at trial that 
officers in the home who were investigating the murder opened one of the windows. Finally, 
trial counsel has indicated that he recalls seeing photographs of Brown's house, viewing the front 
and back doors, and considering the possibility of force entry. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 13, 
29-30. 
There is little question that the security of Brown's home, or the lack thereof, was known 
to trial counsel prior to or at the time of trial and, therefore, is not newly discovered evidence. 
Moreover, it is undisputed that trial counsel knew who Michael was, see Dep. of Shannon 
Demler at 53, and that, although counsel "did not recall information that Todd Brown had broken 
into the house, he did recall that Todd was considered a possible suspect." State's Mem. in 
Supp. at 13. Both Michael and Todd were interviewed by the defense team. See Dep. of 
Shannon Demler at 83-84. However, it is unclear whether trial counsel's knowledge of Michael 
and that Todd was considered a suspect in the case is sufficient to also conclude that, through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence, counsel could have discovered that Todd had broken into his 
grandfather's home on multiple occasions and that Michael had information that his father never 
locked his front door. Because this information was discovered during or after July 2008, see 
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Decl. of Jensie Anderson at 2, and Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief was filed on 
March 4, 2009, it has been timely raised in support of Claim 2. Nevertheless, because the 
security of Brown's home was a fact known to trial counsel at the time of trial, the information 
concerning Todd and from Michael cannot constitute newly discovered evidence because, at 
best, it is merely cumulative of evidence that was already known by trial counsel. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(e)(ii). This information is not, therefore, newly discovered evidence 
and cannot serve as a basis for relief under Claim 2. 
]} Police Investigation 
Petitioner argues that newly discovered evidence from internal police notes demonstrates 
that the police mishandled the crime scene by failing to preserve critical financial information or 
collect hair, fibers, blood, or other evidence left at the murder scene that had exculpatory value. 
In addition, she also asserts that law enforcement failed to investigate other possible suspects or 
secure Brown's house. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 12, 31-36; 
Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 37-39. However, the internal police notes are relevant to the scope and 
adequacy of the police investigation which could have been discovered by trial counsel through 
the exercise of reasonable diligence. Indeed, trial counsel has averred that the prosecution had 
an open-file policy which permitted counsel to examine the evidence in the State's possession. 
In addition, how law enforcement investigated Brown's murder was known by trial counsel prior 
to or at the time of trial. Law enforcement officers testified at the preliminary4 hearing and at trial 
Problems related to the police investigation form the basis of issues raised in Claim 2 and Claim 3 of 
Petitioner's post-conviction petition. However, the bulk of the discussion in her supporting memorandum occurs 
under Claim 3, which is her due process claim, rather than under Claim 2, which seeks relief based upon newly 
discovered evidence. In light of Petitioner's assertion that "all of [her] PCRA claims are based upon newly 
discovered evidence," Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 31, the Court assumes that the problems she raises concerning the 
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concerning the scope of their investigation. Through the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
including nothing more than simply asking questions of law enforcement, trial counsel could 
have discovered what evidence was collected and preserved, what evidence was not collected 
and preserved, when Brown's house was released to family members, who had been identified as 
a suspect, which suspects had been investigated, and so forth. Therefore, information concerning 
the police investigation from internal police notes are not based upon newly discovered evidence. 
j) Police Documents Showing that Petitioner Told Police She Borrowed 
$3,000 from Brown 
According to Petitioner, the prosecution's case against her relied, in part, upon the claim 
that she had stolen Brown's October bank statement after his death in an effort to cover up the 
fact that she had forged several of Brown's checks in the amount of $3,000. Petitioner argues 
that, contrary to the State's claim, "newly discovered notes from a police interview demonstrate 
that [she] voluntarily admitted to police that she owed [Brown] $3,000 at the time of his death." 
Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 25. However, despite this argument. 
Petitioner also acknowledges that "[d]uring an interview on December 12, 1993, [she] . . . 
voluntarily told police that she owed [Brown] $3,000." kL at 17. Clearly, the information in the 
police documents cannot constitute newly discovered evidence because the fact that Petitioner 
told tne police that she borrowed money from the victim is a fact that was known to Petitioner. 
2. Summary 
In light of the foregoing considerations, none of the evidence that Petitioner has alleged is 
newly discovered is, in fact, newly discovered evidence. With limited exceptions, all of the 
information was either known or could have been discovered by Petitioner or her trial counsel at 
police investigation under both Claim 2 and Claim 3 are, basically, the same. Therefore, the Court has opted to 
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the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence. Because it is not disputed that the 
decision on Petitioner's direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court was entered on October 24, 
1997 and that the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme 
Court was January 22, 1998, all of this information should have been raised in a petition filed on 
or before January 22, 1999. Since Petitioner's post-conviction petition was not filed until March 
4, 2009, Claim 2 is untimely to the extent it relies upon information that was known or could 
have been discovered at trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
As for information from Geary concerning the link between Sheen and a blue and white 
Ford Bronco, and information about Todd and from Michael in relation to the lack of security of 
Brown's home, the Court has determined that this evidence (1) was not known and could not 
have been discovered at the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and (2) 
was discovered by Petitioner's post-conviction counsel sometime during or after July 2009. It 
follows, therefore, that the Geary affidavit and the information concerning Todd and Michael 
was timely presented in Petitioner's current petition. Nevertheless, none of this evidence can 
serve as a basis for relief under Claim 2 because it is all merely cumulative of evidence that was 
already known and, therefore, cannot constitute newly discovered evidence as defined by the 
PCRA. 
Based upon the foregoing assessment, all of the evidence presented by Petitioner in 
support of Claim 2 was either known or could have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence or is evidence that is merely cumulative of evidence already known at trial. 
None of the evidence, therefore, constitutes newly discovered evidence chat can support relief 
under Claim 2. Therefore, summary judgment is warranted on Claim 2. 
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C. Claim 3: Petitioner's Right to Due Process Was Violated by an Inadequate Police 
Investigation and a Rush to Judgment about the Real Perpetrator 
Petitioner asserts in Claim 3 that newly discovered evidence from internal police notes 
demonstrates that the police mishandled the crime scene by failing to preserve critical financial 
information or collect hair, fibers, blood, or other evidence left at the murder scene that had 
exculpatory value. In addition, she also asserts that law enforcement failed to investigate other 
possible suspects or secure Brown's house. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction 
Relief at 12, 31-36; Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 37-39. These failures, Petitioner argues, violated her 
right to due process. 
However, trial counsel has indicated that the prosecution had an open-file policy, see 
Dep. of Shannon Demler at 12, which, with the exercise of reasonable diligence, would have 
permitted counsel to examine the evidence in the State's possession and determine the scope of 
the police investigation. Indeed, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, including nothing 
more than simply asking questions of law enforcement, trial counsel could have discovered what 
evidence was collected and preserved, what evidence was not collected and preserved, when 
Brown's house was released to family members, who had been identified as a suspect, which 
suspects had been investigated, and so forth. Thus, none of the evidence on which Claim 3 is 
based constitutes newly discovered evidence. Claim 3 should have been raised no later than 
January 22, 1999. Since it was not raised until March 4, 2009, Claim 3 is untimely and, 
therefore, summary judgment is warranted. 
D. Claim 4: Petitioner's Right to Due Process Was Violated when Police and 
Prosecutors Withheld Exculpatory Evidence and when the Prosecutor Presented 
Evidence He Knew Could Be Contradicted 
Petitioner asserts in Claim 4 that her right to due process was violated when prosecutors 
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withheld exculpatory evidence and presented evidence at trial that they knew could be 
contradicted. According to Petitioner, during the post-conviction investigation she was finally 
granted access to police files which included the following exculpatory evidence that was 
probably never disclosed to trial counsel: 
Police reports regarding at least three different witnesses who heard shots during 
the weekend of Lael Brown's death and during a time when Debra Brown had an 
alibi; witness reports of a blue and white Bronco vehicle seen at Lael Brown's 
home at the time of his death and apparently never fully investigated by police; 
information about Bobbie Sheen and his connection to the murder; Sylvan 
Bassett's attempts to report his suspicions to Clara Brown and to police; police 
reports showing that Debra Brown admitted borrowing $3,000 from Lael; and 
bank statements6 showing that Lael Brown had not yet received his October 
statement as was alleged at trial. 
Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 38. 
First, w ith respect to the claim that previously undisclosed police files contained evidence 
that Basset attempted :o report his suspicions concerning Sheen to Brown's wife, this evidence 
was not, In fact, contained in any police files, but was raised by Bassett in his affidavit signed on 
March 5. 2009. Indeed, according 10 Petitioner, "[njeither the State nor Petitioner can point to 
any place in the case documents that mentions Sylvan Bassett's name." Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 9. 
Second, as explained in the sections above, the remainder of the evidence referred to that was 
allegedly contained in the police files is evidence that was either known or could have been 
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence, and, therefore, is not newly discovered 
evidence. Under the PCRA, this claim should have been raised no later than January 22, J 999. 
Since it was not raised until March 4, 2009, Claim 4 is untimely and, therefore, summary 
Presumably, Petitioner is referring to the bank statement envelopes from months other than October, and 
not the bank statements themseives. See Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 18 ("Petitioner and her counsel did not know when 
the October bank statement was mailed until they discovered the bank statement envelopes in the police file on July 
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judgment is warranted. 
E. Claim 5: Petitioner's Trial and Appellate Counsel Were Ineffective in Violation of 
Both the Utah and United States Constitutions 
Petitioner asserts in Claim 5 that both her trial counsel and appellate counsel7 provided 
ineffective representation. In order to avoid summary judgment on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel, Petitioner must demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact with respect to each prong of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984): (1) that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and (2) that the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. IcL at 686. See also Bundy v. Delano, 763 P.2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988) (to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, "a defendant must show, 
first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, 
that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant."); State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 
1985) (to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must prove "(1) that his counsel 
rendered a "deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the 
trial would probably have been different but for counsel's error."). However, as the Supreme 
Court noted in Strickland, "counsel is strongly presumed io have rendered adequate assistance" 
and there is also a strong presumption that the outcome of the particular proceeding is reliable. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 696. 
Under the first prong of the test, an attorney's performance is deficient if he has "made 
14,I!0G8.W). 
In Petitionei's case, her trial and appellate counsel were the same. However, while she refers to the 
deficient performance of her attorneys as trial counsel, she nowhere sets forth the deficient performance of her 
attorneys as appellate counsel. 
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errors so serious that [he] was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a] defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment." Id at 687. The seriousness of any errors is judged by whether counsel's 
representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. IcL at 688. In this context, 
the "reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the 
defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on 
informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the 
defendant." Id. at 691. In challenging counsel's effectiveness, a petitioner "must identify the 
acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable 
professional judgment. The Court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, 
the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance." Id. at 690. In making this determination, fairness requires "that every effort be 
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the 
time." Id. at 689. Moreover, the assessment of counsel's performance cannot be based upon 
"what is prudent or appropriate, but only [upon] what is constitutionally compelled." United 
States v.Cronic, 466 US 648, 665 n.38 (1984). 
With respect to the second prong of the test, even if a finding is made that an attorney's 
representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms, a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must fail if rhe errors committed by counsel had no effect on the outcome 
cf the criminal proceeding. Id. at 691. A petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
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I 
the outcome. Id at 694. 
Petitioner raises two theories of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, she argues that 
trial counsel were deficient in failing to present exculpatory evidence that was available to them 
at the time of trial. Alternatively, she argues that if the Court finds that trial counsel could have, 
with reasonable diligence, discovered the exculpatory evidence she sets forth in her 
memorandum in support of her post-conviction petition, then her counsel were deficient in 
failing to do so. See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. of Pet. for Post-Conviction Relief at 40. She further 
argues that had trial counsel not performed deficiently in failing to present a wealth of 
exculpatory evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of her trial would have 
been different, namely, that she would not have been convicted. See id. at 41. As the State aptly 
points out, however, any exculpatory evidence not presented by trial counsel because it was not 
known and could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence cannot 
be the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Clearly, not presenting evidence that 
was neither known nor could not have been discovered does not constitute deficient 
performance. See State's Mem. in Supp. at 25; State's Reply Mem. at 11. Therefore, summary 
judgment is warranted with respect to Claim 5 insofar as it is based upon newly discovered 
evidence. 
The State also argues that "[i]f the evidence was available to counsel at the time of trial 
or could have been discovered by him, then the evidence does not qualify as newly discovered 
evidence and [Claim 5] is untimely." State's Reply Mem. at 11. As noted previously, any claim 
This showing is greater than simply demonstrating 'Hhat the errors had some conceivable effect on the 
outcome of the proceeding," but less than demonstrating "that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not 
altered the outcome in the case." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984). 
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based upon newly discovered evidence should have been raised by Petitioner within one year 
from the date her cause of action accrued, which was January 22, 1998. It follows, therefore, 
that her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon trial counsel's failure to present 
exculpatory evidence that was already known, or that is based upon the failure of trial counsel to 
discover exculpatory evidence that could have been discovered through the exercise of 
reasonable diligence, should have been raised no later than January 22, 1999. Because Claim 5 
was not raised until March 4, 2009, it is untimely and, therefore, summary judgment is 
warranted. 
F. Alternative Requests for Relief 
Petitioner states in her opposition memorandum that all of her claims are based upon 
newly discovered evidence, see Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 31, and argues that none of the claims are 
time-barred under the statute of limitations. She further argues, however, that even if the Court 
concludes that her post-conviction claims are time-barred, the Court should either (1) set aside 
the default in order to avoid an obvious injustice or (2) find that the PCRA's one-year statute of 
limitations is unconstitutional because it does not include an interests of justice exception. 
1. uObvious Injustice" Argument 
In support of her request to have the Court set aside her default based upon an obvious 
injustice. Petitioner relies on federal caselaw mat addresses exceptions to procedurally defaulted 
claims in federal court. See id at 45-46 (citing Schlup v Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)). As the 
S'ate argues, however, ;;hese exceptions are relevant only to procedurally defaulted claims raised 
in federal court and do not apply to claims raiseo under Utah's PCRA. Therefore, they cannot 
independently justify granting Petitioner's request. 
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In addition, Petitioner also relies on the case of Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, 128 P.3d 
1123, which allowed a Brady claim to proceed many years after trial when previously 
undisclosed material evidence was discovered.9 In Tillman, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
even if it were to conclude that the petitioner could have raised his Brady claim in one of his 
previous petitions for post-conviction relief, this failure should be excused because the "Brady 
claim was overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the post-conviction process." 
Id. at 1j25. The Supreme Court further stated that it has consistently recognized exceptions to 
procedural defaults "in 'unusual circumstances' where 'good cause' excuses a petitioner's failure 
to raise the claim earlier," kL at H20 (quoting Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1037 (Utah 1989)), 
and in those rare cases "where 'an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a 
constitutional night has occurred' that would make it 'unconscionable' not to reexamine ihe 
issue. Id at1j2i (quoting Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1035). 
Notwithstanding the language from Tillman and Hurst, this Court has a 'fduty . . . to 
implement the law as it reads," Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, 935 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah 1997), 
and it cannot ignore the 2009 amendments to Rule 65C that removed the former "good cause" 
language and added other language expressly espousing the PCRA as the law governing "the 
manner and extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and 
sentence after the convection and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65C(a). When these changes are considered in combination with statutory amendments made 
in 2008 that now make the PCRA "the sole remedy" for any person seeking to collaterally 
Importantly, the Tillman case does not address exceptions to the PCRA's statute of limitations, but cnly 
ugood cause" exceptions to procedural defaults, specifically where a claim could have been raised in a prior post-
conviction petition, but was lot. 
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challenge a conviction or sentence, it is the Court's considered view that the overall intent of 
these rule and statutory alterations was to restrict any exceptions to procedural or statute of 
limitations defaults to those found in the PCRA. This view is bolstered by the advisory 
committee note to rule 65C which states that the "2009 amendments embrace Utah's Post-
Conviction Remedies Act as the law governing post-conviction relief." Utah R. Civil P. 65C, 
advisory committee note.10 
In addition, both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have 
commented that the "sole remedy" language "in Section 78B-9-102 appears to have extinguished 
our common law writ authority for future cases." Peterson v. Kennard 2008 UT 90, [^16 n.8, 
201 P.3d 956. See also Kissell v. State, 2010 UT App 123 n.3 (unpublished) (referring to the 
"sole remedy" language, the Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he 2008 amendment . . . of the 
PCRA appears to have extinguished our authority to apply the unusual circumstances 
exception."). In light of these recent rule and statutory changes, the Court cannot grant 
Petitioner's request and excuse her failure to timely raise her post-conviction claims.11 
2. Constitutional Argument 
Petitioner also argues that her failure to timely raise her claims should be excused 
because an interest of justice exception to the PCRA's statute of limitations is a constitutional 
Although advisory committee notes are not authoritative, they still "merit great weight in any 
interpretation of [the] rule[]." Burns v. Bovden, 2006 UT 14, f 18 n.6, 133 P.3d 370. The Utah Supreme Court has 
"primary constitutional authority to adopt these rules." Id. Because adoption of the rules do not require legislative 
approval, "the advisory committee note[] [is] a . . . reliable indicator of [the Utah Supreme Court's] intent in 
adopting the rules." Id, 
Any remedy in terms of excusing the failure to timely raise a post-conviction claim can only come from 
the Utah Supreme Court. See Gardner v. State, 2010 UT 46, Tf93, 234 P.3d 1115 (agreeing with the State's position 
"that this court [meaning the Supreme Court] retains constitutional authority, even when a petition is procedurally 
barred, to determine whether denying relief would result in an egregious injustice." (emphasis added)). 
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requirement and the Utah Legislature's removal of this exception in 2008 rendered the 
limitations period unconstitutional. In support, Petitioner cites to the case of Julian v. State, 966 
P.2d 249 (Utah 1998), where the Utah Supreme Court stated that because a "proper consideration 
of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always be in the interests of 
justice[,] . . . [i]t necessarily follows that no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied 
to bar a habeas petition." Id. at 254 (emphasis in original). Since the PCRA's statute of 
limitations no longer includes an interest of justice exception, Petitioner argues that it "is plainly 
unconstitutional and cannot be applied to bar [her] claims." Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at 50. 
In considering whether a particular legislative enactment is constitutional, the Court must 
ctbegin[] with the premise that 'statutes are presumed to be constitutional.'" Salt Lake City v. 
Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1349 
(Utah 1990)). See also State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^42, 99 P.3d 820 ('"[Legislative enactments 
are presumed to be constitutional'") (quoting Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 
816, 819 (Utah 1991)); Preece v. Rampton, 492 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Utah 1972 ("[A]n enactment of 
the legislature is presumed to be constitutional and it should not be stricken down unless it is 
clearly and unequivocally in conflict with a constitutional provision."); Avis v. Board of Review, 
837 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("State legislatures possess the discretion to enact 
statutes of limitations, and these statutes are presumptively constitutional."). The Utah Supreme 
Court has expiessly held that "only when statutes manifestly infringe upon some constitutional 
provision [can they] be declared void . . . [and] [ejvery reasonable presumption must be indulged 
in and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of constitutionality." In re Estate of Baer, 562 
P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1977). Moreover, "those who challenge a statute or ordinance as 
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unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality." Greenwood, 817 P.2d 
at 819. See also Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343, 347 (Utah 1991) ('The burden is on 
the [challenger] to affirmatively demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the statute."). 
Generally, a "statute of limitations precludes suit a statutorily specified number of years 
after a cause of action accrues." Velarde v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 
125 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "Statutes of limitations care designed to promote justice by 
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 
evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.'" Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981) (quoting Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway 
Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944)). "To be constitutional, a statute of 
limitations must allow a reasonable time for the filing of an action after a cause of action arises.'" 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985). The United States Supreme 
Court has opined that "[w]hat shall be considered a reasonable time must be settled by the 
judgment of the legislature, and the courts will not inquire into the wisdom of establishing the 
period of legal bar, unless the time allowed is manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes 
a denial of justice." Wilson v. Isemingen 185 U S. 55, 63 (1902). See also Avis, 837 P.2d at 
587 ("State legislatures possess the discretion to enact statutes of limitations."). 
As Petitioner points out, the Utah Supreme Court stated in Julian that because the 
''proper consideration of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always be in 
the interests of justice[,] . . . [i]t necessarily follows that no statute of limitations may be 
constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition." Julian, 966 P.2d at 254 (emphasis in original). 
The conclusion Petitioner draws from this language, and which she asserts is binding on the 
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Court, is that any statute of limitations under the PCRA is unconstitutional if it excludes an 
interests of justice exception. While the logical inference Petitioner draws from the Supreme 
Court's language may be correct, whether it constitutes an authoritative pronouncement is less 
clear. As the State points out, and as the Utah Court of Appeals has recognized, see Swart v. 
State, 1999 UT App 96, T[3, 976 P.2d 100, the Supreme Court's language in Julian is dicta12 and 
was not an essential part of the Supreme Court's holding in the case because the petitioner was 
not challenging the constitutionality of the PCRA's statute of limitations. Normally, comments 
that "are dicta[] . . . are not binding authority."13 State v. Worthen, 2008 UT App 23, f 17, 177 
P.3d 664. See also Black's Law Dictionary 1100 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "dictum" as a 
statement in an opinion that is "unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not 
precedential."). 
The fact that the Supreme Court's language in Julian is dicta, rather than binding 
authority, is significant in the Court's view, because, as noted above, the Supreme Court has 
itself more recently determined, based upon its rule-making authority, see Bums v. Boyden, 
2006 UT 14,1J18 n.6? 133 P.3d 370 (Utah Supreme Court has "primary constitutional authority to 
adopt these rules."), that the judiciary will exercise its constitutional powers over post-conviction 
cases within the parameters of the PCRA. Rule 65C expressly states that the PCRA "sets forth 
The language from Julian that "no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a habeas 
petition'' was also quoted in Frausto v. State. 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998). However, xhe lead opinion did not garner a 
majority. Two justices concurred only in the result, namely, that "courts must always consider the * interests of 
justice' exception in [the PCRA] when a petitioner raises meritorious claims." Id. at 851 Judge Bench from ihe 
Court of Appeals, who was sitting in for Justice Stewart, also only concurred in the result, but specifically indicated 
that he "disagreefd] with the main opinion's holding that la petitioner's failure to comply with a statute of 
limitations may never be a proper ground upon which to dismiss a habeas corpus petition.'" Id. at 852 (Bench, J., 
concurring). 
Dicta may, of course, be considered persuasive. 
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the manner and extent to which a person may challenge the legality of a criminal conviction and 
sentence after the conviction and sentence have been affirmed in a direct appeal." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65C(a). This change to rule 65C was adopted by the Supreme Court with the knowledge that 
the Legislature in 2008 had removed the interests of justice exception to the PCRA's statute of 
limitations. Clearly, the logical inference drawn by Petitioner from the Supreme Court's dicta 
that no statute of limitations can be constitutional if it lacks an interest of justice exception is 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's recent adoption of a rule that embraces the PCRA, which 
does not include an interests of justice exception, as the law governing petitions for post-
conviction relief. Petitioner has not adequately explained why the Supreme Court's more recent 
actions are not a repudiation of the dicta in Julian. Thus, Petitioner has not earned her burden of 
demonstrating that the Legislature's removal of the interests of justice exception renders the 
PCRA's statute of limitations provision unconstitutional. 
In addition, Petitioner has not otherwise shown that the PCRA's one-year statute of 
limitations, with its accompanying tolling provisions,14 is so inflexible, see Currier v. Holden, 
862 P.2d 1357, 1371 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (striking 90-day limitations period because of 
inflexibility), or "is manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes a denial of justice," 
Wilson. 185 U.S. 55 at 63, and, therefore, unconstitutional. Section 78B-9-107(2)(d) specifically 
allowed Petitioner to raise claims based upon evidentiary facts that were previously unknown to 
her and which could not have been known to her through the exercise of reasonable diligence. 
Again, in the Court's considered view, requiring Petitioner to raise her claims within one year 
14 
The limitations period is tolled when (1) "the petitioner was prevented from filing a petition due to state 
action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity," Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-107(3); and (2) "during the pendency of the outcome of a petition asserting: (a) exoneration through DNA 
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from the date she learned of the evidentiary facts in support of her claims is a "reasonable time 
for the filing of an action after a cause of action arises"15 Berry, 717 P.2d at 672, and does not 
render the statute of limitations "inflexible." Rather, it merely requires Petitioner to be diligent 
in pursuing her claims for relief. Additionally, the equitable tolling provisions, which replaced 
the interest of justice exception, further mitigate against any alleged inflexibility by tolling the 
limitations period "due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to 
physical or mental incapacity." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107(3). Petitioner has simply not 
provided the Court with a cogent argument showing that the PCRA's statute of limitations is 
impermissibly inflexible or that insufficient time was allowed for her to adequately raise her 
post-conviction claims. She has not, therefore, carried her burden of demonstrating that the 
PCRA's statute of limitations provision is unconstitutional. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court cannot grant Petitioner's request to excuse her 
failure to timely file her post-conviction claims based upon her argument that the PCRA's statute 
of limitations is unconstitutional. 
V. Conclusion 
Petitioner raises five separate claims for relief in her post-conviction petition, all of which 
she alleges are supported by newly discovered evidence. The State argues that none of the 
evidence is newly discovered and, therefore, Petitioner's claims are all time-barred. With respect 
testing . . . or (b) factual innocence." Utah Code Ann. § 78b-9-107(4). 
Although clearly not dispositive, it is at least noteworthy that the one-year statute of limitations 
applicable to federal wrts of habeas corpus has not been found to constitute a suspension of the writ. See Hill v. 
Dailey, 557 F.3d 437, 438 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Like every other court of appeals to address the issue, this court has held 
that [the] . . . one-year statute of limitations does not improperly suspend the writ of habeas corpus."); Wyzykowski 
v. Dept. of Corrections, 226 F.3d 1213, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Every court which has addressed the issue-i.e., 
whether, as a general matter, [the one-year statute of limitations] constitutes an unconstitutional suspension of the 
writ-has concluded that it does not."). 
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to Claim 1, which alleges that newly discovered evidence establishes that Petitioner is innocent 
under the Utah Determination of Factual Innocence statute, summary judgment is warranted 
because the PCRA expressly states that the "court may not grant relief from a conviction based 
on a claim that the petitioner is innocent of the crime for which convicted." Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-9-104(3). 
With respect to Claim 2, which alleges that newly discovered evidence demonstrates that 
no reasonable trier of fact could have found Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, none of 
the alleged new-found information set forth in Petitioner's post-conviction petition constitutes 
newly discovered evidence. First, most of the information was known or could have been 
discovered at the time of trial through the exercise of reasonable diligence. To the extent Claim 
2 relies upon this evidence, it should have been raised no later than January 22, 1999. Since it 
was not raised until March 4, 2010, Claim 2 is untimely. Second, the remainder of the 
information is evidence that is merely cumulative of evidence that was known at trial. This 
information also does not constitute newly discovered evidence as defined by the PCRA and, 
therefore, cannot serve as a basis for relief under Claim 2. For these reasons, summary judgment 
is warranted on Claim 2. 
In terms of Claim 3, which alleges that Petitioner's right to due process was violated by 
an inadequate police investigation and a rush to judgment that Petitioner was the real perpetrator, 
and Claim 4, whicl? alleges that Petitioner's right to due process was violated when police and 
prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence, none of the evidence on which these two claims rely 
constitutes newly discovered evidence. Thus, these claims should have been raised no later than 
January 22, 1999. Since they were not raised until March 4, 2010, Claims 3 and 4 are untimely 
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and, therefore, summary judgment is warranted. 
As for Claim 5, which alleges that Petitioner's trial and appellate counsel were ineffective 
in violation of both the Utah and United States constitutions, to the extent Claim 5 relies upon 
newly discovered evidence, summary judgment is warranted because the failure to present 
exculpatory evidence that was not known and could not have been discovered through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence cannot constitute deficient performance, On the other hand, to 
the extent Claim 5 relies upon evidence that is not newly discovered, summary judgment is also 
warranted because the failure to present exculpatory evidence that was known or that could have 
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been raised no later 
than January 22, 1999. 
Finally, the Court cannot excuse Petitioner's failure to timely raise her claims. No 
provision in the PCRA or rule 65C permits the Court to excuse her default. Moreover, the Court 
finds that Petitioner has not carried her burden of demonstrating that the PCRA's statute of 
limitations is unconstitutional because it lacks an interest of justice exception. 
Order 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief is GRANTED. This Memorandum Decision and Order constitute the 
final order of the Court. No further order is necessary to effectuate the Court' sjles 
DATED this <^J day of December, 2C(R). 
Michael D. DiReda 
Second District Judge 
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